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Designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) are important actors both in the formal and informal sectors owing to the nature of services they offer. The DNFBPs are key players in financial and economic development and thus are highly vulnerable to money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) risks. Globally, and indeed, within the West African region, typologies studies have indicated several instances of misuse of DNFBPs for the laundering of proceeds of crime and to a lesser extent, TF. Factors that make DNFBPs vulnerable to ML and TF in the region, include limited understanding of ML/TF risk and anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) obligations, and poor implementation of AML/CFT measures by the sector. As reporting institutions, DNFBPs are required to implement appropriate measures to mitigate the ML/TF risk facing them. Mutual evaluation reports (MERs) of countries in the region noted weak implementation of AML/CFT measures by DNFBPs compares to financial institutions. These coupled with the general poor monitoring and supervision of DNFBPs for compliance, make them a weak link in member states’ AML/CFT regime. This study examined how Economic Community of West African States member states can plug the loopholes in the DNFBPs to strengthen their AML/CFT regime and thus improve their performance during mutual evaluation. This study reviewed data from the publications of Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and other credible sources.

This study is more of desk-review based on secondary data, including information obtained from GIABA, and FATF publications, and websites as well as information obtained from reliable sources on the internet. The authors reviewed the MERs of GIABA member states that have been assessed under the second round, especially that of Ghana, Senegal, Cape Verde, Mali and Burkina Faso, with particular focus on sections of the reports relating to preventive measures and supervision. In general, this paper adopts a policy approach with a view to explaining the importance and benefits of implementing AML/CFT preventive measures by reporting entities, especially the DNFBPs.

This study found that there is a general lack of information on the exact size of DNFBPs across member states, the risk of ML/TF associated with DNFBPs is generally identified as high across member states (albeit at different levels), the extent and level of monitoring/supervision of DNFBPs for AML/CFT compliance trails what is obtainable in financial institutions; the institutional and operational frameworks for regulating, supervising and monitoring DNFBPs are either weak or poorly defined in many member states; and the focus of AML/CFT technical assistance has been more on financial institutions than DNFBPs. Although the number of MERs reviewed for this work may be few, the findings and conclusions in the concluded MERs reflect regional peculiarities, including high informality of the economies, preponderance use of cash in transactions, diversity of DNFBPs and the general weak application of AML/CFT preventive measures by these entities, and the weak AML/CFT supervision or monitoring of DNFBPs which cut across all GIABA member states. Although efforts to address the weaknesses in the DNFBPs, including training and supervision, have commenced, in most member states, these are still at rudimentary levels.

However, this study is limited by the fact that it was desk-based review without direct inputs of industry players (DNFBPs and their supervisors).

In general, this paper adopts a policy approach with a view to explaining the importance and benefits of implementing AML/CFT preventive measures by reporting entities, especially the DNFBPs. It aims to bring to the fore the weaknesses of the DNFBPs in the implementation of AML/CFT preventive measures and therefore will be useful to national authorities who are striving toward strengthening their national AML/CT regimes and to DNFBPs who wish to protect the integrity and stability of their system.

It is imperative to mention that the weak compliance by DNFBPs, and indeed other challenges inhibiting effective implementation of preventive measures, is not peculiar to West Africa. A review of MERs of 17 African countries (eight countries in the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti Money Laundering Group region, five in GIABA region and three in the Middle East and North Africa region assessed under the current round as on October 2020, show a similar pattern of weak ratings under Immediate Outcome 4.

The purpose of this paper is to highlight vulnerabilities in Australia’s anti-money laundering/counter-terrorism financing (AML/CTF) regime through Australia’s non-compliance with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations on the regulation of designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs). It is intended that through examination of the justifications for and against AML/CTF regulation of DNFBPs, the paper will provide support for the position that Australia’s AML/CTF regime should incorporate regulation of DNFBPs.

The paper presents findings from research conducted in 2015 that focused on some of the principal arguments for and against the extension of Australia’s AML/CTF regime to DNFBPs. Review and consideration of the merits of these arguments is undertaken to support the conclusion that AML/CTF regulation should be extended to DNFBPs, in line with the FATF recommendations.

The current exemption of many DNFBPs from AML/CTF regulation perpetuates vulnerabilities within Australia’s AML/CTF regime; until this is addressed, criminals will continue to exploit these vulnerabilities and the regulated AML/CTF sector will continue to shoulder an unfair burden of Australia’s AML/CTF response.

This paper provides an objective assessment of factors for and against the regulation of DNFBPs in Australia. It may be of value to government policymakers, regulators, financial institutions and DNFBPs.

This paper complements existing research on this subject and provides a specific focus on some of the main arguments for and against the extension of Australia’s AML/CTF regime to specific DNFBPs.

The purpose of this study is to assess whether level of income of a particular country affects the level of effectiveness in anti-money laundering (AML)/ countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) supervision to identify the most important recommendations in achieving high level of effectiveness and critically discuss the findings of the fourth round evaluations with the outcome of first two objectives.

The level of effectiveness was rated in terms of a four-point Likert scale given 4 for high, 3 for substantial, 2 for moderate and 1 for low level of effectiveness. The countries were ranked using a four-point Likert scale given 4 for high income, 3 for upper middle income, 2 for lower middle income and 1 for low income countries as per the categorisation of World Bank list of economies (World Bank, 2017). For the purpose of estimation, level of effectiveness was rated in terms of a four-point Likert scale given 4 for high, 3 for substantial, 2 for moderate and 1 for low level of effectiveness. The level of technical compliance was ranked using a five-point Likert scale given 5 for compliant, 4 for largely compliant, 3 for partially compliant, 2 for non-compliant and 1 for not applicable as per the ratings given in FATF 2013 methodology (FATF, 2013).

It was observed that the level of income of a particular jurisdiction has a positive relationship with the level of effectiveness in AML/CFT supervision. Statistical analysis reveal that AML/CFT framework on regulation and supervision of financial institutions (Recommendation 26) and providing guidance and feed back to reporting entities (Recommendation 34) have significant impact on effectiveness level on AML/CFT supervision over the powers of supervisors (Recommendation 27), regulation and supervision of designated non-financial business and professions (Recommendation 28) and sanctions (Recommendation 35).

The research was limited to 36 fourth round mutual evaluation reports.

This paper is an original work done by the author as a result of the experience which the author received involving as an assessor in mutual evaluations.

Kenya has made little progress in its endeavor to categorize lawyers as designated non-financial businesses and professionals (DNFBPs), despite making spirited attempts in 2007, 2018 and lately in 2019. The legal professionals are, therefore, not bound by the reporting and other stringent obligations imposed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to deter possible misuse by money launderers. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to enumerate the ongoing efforts toward designating lawyers as DNFBPs in Kenya. The paper also assesses the institutional and legislative incentives (as well as barriers) for imposing the anti-money laundering (AML) duty thereto.

The paper provides a qualitative review of Kenya’s AML legislative framework and the potential support/hindrance to imposing the AML duty on lawyers. Also, this paper provides a suggestion for possible solutions.

The legislative framework in Kenya has outlawed money-laundering, and lawyers can be compelled to disclose confidential information observed in the course of employment if it embodies crime or fraud. Thus, imposing the AML obligation on lawyers is nothing out of the ordinary, rather a mere creation for a formal disclosure mechanism. However, this paper also revealed divergent views that merit reconciliation for the seamless designation of lawyers.

To enhance the legislative framework in Kenya, the paper borrows from the FATF’s Interpretive Note to Recommendation 23 and suggests a practical solution to the apparent conflict between the legal professional privilege and the AML duty.

Money Laundering Reporting Officers (MLROs) carry out day-to-day anti-money laundering (AML) tasks while directors ultimately remain responsible for AML compliance. Therefore, directors’ expectations of what their MLROs do should ideally coincide with what their actual tasks to minimise liability risk. This paper aims to test for gaps between MLROs and their directors in terms of knowledge, expectations and performance of AML tasks. Likewise, it is researched whether MLROs and directors communicate well with regard to MLROs’ tasks.

This paper first develops a model for analysing the dyadic relationship between MLROs and their directors, based on the audit expectation-performance gap. Second, a paired electronic survey of MLROs and directors of German companies was conducted in autumn 2020, testing for participants’ knowledge, expectations and performance of possible AML tasks (n = 136 pairs).

While there is no knowledge or performance gap among MLROs and directors, expectations among them are partially unreasonable and their communication needs to be improved. Additionally, this study suggests that MLROs of German non-financial businesses are less knowledgeable, perform AML duties more poorly, and communicate less effectively with their directors.

Training of MLROs and communication with their directors need to be improved. Especially in the non-financial sector, action is urgently required.

This paper reports the results of the first paired survey of MLROs and their directors, offering unique insights into their relationship and the status of private AML efforts.

This paper aims to critically explore the factors influencing the regulation of gambling and cryptocurrencies as part of anti-money laundering (AML) initiatives in Bangladesh. As a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on money laundering, Bangladesh must adopt a risk-based approach to regulate these entities.

This study applied an exploratory design and investigated the real nature of the challenge Bangladesh facing in adopting a risk-based approach to regulate gambling and cryptocurrencies.

This study demonstrates that current regulatory responses towards gambling and cryptocurrencies in Bangladesh are largely influenced by passive wait-and-see policy instead of a proactive risk-based approach, a measure mandated by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). It demonstrates that these financial entities, which are poorly regulated because of their unclear legal status in Bangladesh and the regulator’s apparent lack of understanding of the type of threats they pose, may facilitate money laundering. Effective risk-based regulation is required to control potential risks.

This paper focuses on two specific areas –gambling and cryptocurrencies – which are linked to two specific FATF Recommendations: designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) and new technologies. Further research is required to investigate the concern from the perspective of other entities.

The results of this study will help inform policymakers about ways in which current regulatory approaches may need to be modified to better combat money laundering and financing of terrorism.

According to the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study aiming to explore challenges Bangladesh confronts in implementing a risk-based approach for DNFBPs and new technologies. Therefore, it provides important insights into the dilemma regulators facing in implementing global AML standards within their traditional legislative and regulatory framework.

The purpose of this conference paper is to provide a contextual and better understanding of the nexus between corruption and money laundering, in order to enhance the role of anti‐money laundering (AML) in combating corruption.

This paper analyses the key elements of the linkage between AML and anti‐corruption, and provides Australia and China as examples, demonstrating the potential importance of using AML to combat corruption.

It is found that apart from the main financial sectors, designated non‐financial sectors and high‐risk customers involved businesses are also vulnerable for money laundering, such as non‐financial designated business and professions, and politically exposed persons. In the meantime, these factors are regarded as the key points to combat corruption.

This paper highlights the corruption risks hidden in designated non‐financial business and professionals, and the risks of laundering the proceeds of corruption by politically exposed persons and financially exposed persons (FEPs).

Anti-money laundering (AML) obligations follow a risk-based approach, making their extent subject to the degree of AML risk. Money Laundering Reporting Officers (MLROs) must constantly assess risks, for example, by conducting annual risk assessments of the company. The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether MLROs’ risk assessments are biased in form of a better-than-average (BTA) effect, meaning whether they favourably assess their own company’s risk compared to that of the average competitor. Additionally, MLROs’ general risk assessment capabilities are researched.

A survey of MLROs of German companies was conducted (n = 228). It tests for a BTA effect in participants’ risk assessments of their own company as well as for errors in risk assessments of other industries.

MLROs’ risk assessments are biased by a BTA effect across all industries. They view their own company’s risk to be below that of the average competitor. Additionally, MLROs are not able to correctly assess industries’ AML risks compared to the national risk assessment. Risks were especially underestimated for high-risk industries. Biases were partially found to be higher among MLROs from the non-financial sector.

Risk-based AML measures are likely to be at least partially ineffective, calling the risk-based approach into question. Regular trainings of MLROs need to include awareness for biases in risk assessments. A more stringent and effective supervision, especially in the non-financial sector, is called for.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this paper is the first to show that a BTA effect exists among MLROs.

This paper aims to examine the money laundering vulnerability of private legal practitioners in Tanzania, the involvement of these practitioners in money laundering activities and their role in preventing, detecting and thwarting money laundering and its predicate crimes.

The paper applies the “black-letter” law research approach to describe, examine and analyze the anti-money laundering law in Tanzania. It also uses the “law-in-context” research approach to interrogate the anti-money laundering law and to provide an understanding of factors impacting on the efficacy and readiness of private legal practitioners in Tanzania to tackle money laundering. The review of literature and analysis of statutory instruments and case law, reports of the anti-money laundering authorities and agencies and media reports-generated data are used in this paper. This information was complemented by data from interviews of purposively selected private legal practitioners.

Private legal practitioners in Tanzania are vulnerable to money laundering. There is an emerging evidence that indicates the involvement of some private legal practitioners in the commission of money laundering and/or its predicate crimes. The law designates the legal practitioners as reporting persons and imposes on the obligation to fight against money laundering. Law-related factors and practical challenges undermine the capacity of the legal practitioners to curb money laundering. Additionally, certain hostile perceptions contribute to the legal practitioners’ unwillingness, indifference or opposition against the fight against money laundering.

The paper underscores the need for Tanzania to reform its policy and legal frameworks to create enabling environment for anti-money laundering gatekeepers, including private legal practitioners to partake efficiently in the fight against money laundering. It also underlines the importance of incorporating the principles that govern the private legal practise to enable the practitioners to partake effectively in tackling money laundering.

This paper generates useful information to private legal practitioners, policy makers and academicians on issues relating to money laundering and its control in Tanzania and presents recommendations on possible policy and legal reforms that can be adopted and applied to augment the role of the legal practitioners in Tanzania to combat money laundering.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the inclusion of lawyers in Kenya’s anti-money laundering regime and the role they can play towards assisting in detection and gate-keeping of potential money laundering activities. Kenya is a transit point for trade-based money laundering. Accordingly, it is vulnerable to money laundering that can be facilitated by legal professionals, through their misuse by criminals. These professionals can be both enablers and perpetrators.

The study is secondary in nature. It is based on reviewing relevant literature and analysing the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act and the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Regulations. The legislation and the rules form the core of Kenya’s anti-money laundering regime.

The omission of legal professionals from Kenya’s anti-money laundering regime constitutes a big gap under its preventative mechanisms. Further, it makes them attractive to criminals because they are under no legal obligation to report potential money laundering activities. Ultimately, the inclusion of lawyers as DNFBPs is necessary. This would seal the extant regulatory gap and ensure enhanced awareness amongst the legal professionals of the money laundering risks that they face.

Given Kenya’s money laundering susceptibility, it is necessary and prudent to critically consider the inclusion of legal professionals in its anti-money laundering mechanisms. The paper seeks to make a practical and scholarly contribution in considering the issue and possibly trigger further discussions, as well as the necessary legislative and policy changes. This would positively enhance the success of Kenya’s anti-money laundering regime in detecting money laundering activities.