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This paper aims to clarify the effects of introducing depositor preference on resolution costs, probability of default and bank funding costs, allowing for the possibility of collateralized funding.

The importance of conflict among creditors in generating bankruptcy costs is documented. A model of such a conflict is provided, which is then used in analyzing the effects of depositor preference and other forms of asset encumbrance. The model takes into account the reactions of providers of secured and unsecured financing.

Depositor preference and collateralization of borrowing may reduce the cost of settling the conflicts among creditors that arises in case of resolution or bankruptcy. This net benefit, which may be capitalized into the value of the bank rather than affect creditors’ expected returns, should result in lower overall funding costs and thus a lower probability of distress despite increasing encumbrance of the bank’s balance sheet. The benefit is maximized when resolution is initiated early enough for preferred depositors to remain fully protected.

The interaction of asset encumbrance with liquidity risk is not addressed directly.

The issues addressed on the paper are currently the subject of debate by regulators and market participants. There are direct implications for prudential regulation and bank resolution policies.

The theory of conflict resolution is applied to bankruptcy and bank resolution, generating rigorous analysis of an important practical issue.

This paper presents issues arising from the enactment of legislation that changes the priority ordering of claims by uninsured depositors and the FDIC in the resolution of costly failed insured banks and thrifts. Under the legislation, uninsured domestic depositors and the FDIC receive preference in the payment of their claims in the resolutions of failed insured institutions over both foreign depositors and general creditors. As a result of the legislation, one can expect changes in the behavior of nonpreferred claimants.

The Isle of Man, a British Isles offshore jurisdiction located in the middle of the Irish Sea, has experienced three separate bank collapses during a relatively brief 26 year period. These collapses have affected in excess of 20,000 depositors and inflicted significant damage on investor confidence in the Isle of Man as an offshore finance centre. The purpose of this paper is to trace the evolution of deposit protection during this time frame, teasing out the delicate balance required in small offshore jurisdictions between rigorous standards of investor protection on the one hand and the vital importance of remaining competitive with rival offshore finance centres on the other. It critically evaluates the recently enacted Isle of Man deposit compensation scheme (DCS) by reference to this organising principle.

The paper outlines the nature of the Manx jurisdiction and its offshore development. Focussing on the period 1982‐2010, it discusses the three separate bank collapses and insular regulatory and legislative responses. The focal point of the paper is a critical evaluation of the new Isle of Man DCS including comparisons where appropriate with deposit protection schemes in the Channel Islands offshore jurisdictions of Jersey and Guernsey and discussion of the extent to which the new Isle of Man DCS complies with specific features of recently formulated international best practice standards.

The paper reports that insular regulatory and government responses to bank collapses have tended to be distinctly short‐term and reactive. Despite being the first small offshore jurisdiction in the world to embrace the principle of deposit protection in 1991, there has been a conspicuous failure in the Isle of Man to develop related financial safety net policies, and the overriding motive for the introduction and indeed continuation of deposit protection has been to repair enduring reputational damage inflicted on its offshore finance centre by successive bank failures. The new Isle of Man DCS conforms to this model, reflecting insular anxieties regarding risks of lost banking business to rival offshore jurisdictions as opposed to rigorous standards of investor protection.

Analysis contained in this paper sheds light on the problem of effective deposit protection in small offshore jurisdictions, including tensions in policy terms between principled investor protection and finance centre reputational and competitiveness concerns. It also highlights, more broadly, the endemic problem of delivering optimum investor protection at (small) jurisdictional level in the context of international banking groups operating on a multi‐jurisdictional basis and deploying entrenched business models which operationalise offshore banking arms as essentially vehicles for the onward transmission of liquid funds to treasury functions located in parent groups' home jurisdictions.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the full potential of an effective deposit insurance system. The current financial crisis in Europe has arguably casted fresh doubt on the role and need for deposit insurance. In this regard, the deposit insurance system’s rationale is a key starting issue in order to fully understand its design and role within a financial safety net system.

Using the UK regulatory regime as the main reference point, the deposit insurance system’s objectives are divided into two broad categories: depositor protection and financial stability.

It is argued that a deposit insurance system could only be effective if designed to perform key regulatory objectives. Otherwise, authorities will keep resorting to other rescue measures, as this system will never be well equipped to respond to a bank failure.

Notwithstanding recent regulatory reforms, there is still a lack of clear objectives and, thus, a clear profile for the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, as the UK deposit compensation scheme. In light of systemic risk and increased demands on prudential banking regulation, the UK deposit insurance system should be reformed to perform significant regulatory objectives.

The further reform of the UK deposit insurance will enhance depositor protection and financial stability, especially amid the euro-crisis.

An effective reform of deposit insurance requires a clear role-setting for deposit insurance. To this end, this paper offers a comprehensive analysis of all regulatory objectives that the post-crisis UK deposit insurance system should serve.

This paper presents an integrated regulatory model to protect depositors in the event of a retail financial institution run or failure. In Australia, many of the factors included in this model are either not in existence, or if in existence have not been fully implemented. A review of regulatory arrangements for retail financial institutions in Australia is warranted in the light of these deficiencies.

This study aims to assess the effectiveness of the banking market discipline in relation to the development of Financial Technology (FinTech) startups.

Using panel data collected from 144 banks in Indonesia from 2004 to 2018, this study’s regression models were estimated using fixed effects with robust standard errors.

This study finds that FinTech startups disturb bank deposits. Meanwhile, market discipline exists in Indonesian banks, as indicated by depositors’ behavior with higher credit and liquidity risks. However, market discipline does not exist for bank insolvency risk, which is indicated by a significant and positive relationship with the dependent variable. Therefore, the higher the number of FinTech startups, the more effective the market discipline. Empirical findings also revealed that the joint impact between FinTech startups and bank risk is also important in explaining the difference in the effectiveness of banking market discipline.

This study has policy implications for banks in mitigating risk associated with market discipline and instability of financial intermediation.

This study offers a significant contribution to the empirical literature because it specifically explores the effectiveness of the banking market discipline by focusing on the joint impact of FinTech startups and bank risk on deposits. Furthermore, this study contributes to providing empirical evidence that links between FinTech startups and bank risk affect depositor behavior at government-owned, private, large and small, as well as nonmobile and mobile adoption banks.

The purpose of this study is to show the presence of market discipline and provide an explanation for bank risk nondisclosure behavior, specifically market risk (MR), credit risk (CR), operational risk (OR) and counterparty credit risk (CCR). The response of market discipline when banks comply with Basel III capital and liquidity restrictions is also investigated in this study.

The study used the Lasso regression method to give accurate results with the lowest error when using small observational data with a large number of features.

First, theoretically, the study points to the presence of market discipline and its sensitivity to the risks disclosed by the bank, especially when applying capital regulations under Basel III. In addition, the study also shows differences between the developed and emerging countries in the sensitivity of market discipline to factors when considering banking regulations. Finally, an interesting result that the study shows is that the higher the index of economic freedom, the weaker the market discipline is, especially for emerging countries.

The study’s findings have several important implications: (1) help regulators devise policies to manage banks' risk and meet liquidity and capital requirements according to the Basel III framework. The effectiveness of market discipline is reduced, and banking regulators need to compensate by strengthening their supervisory functions. (2) Showed the reasons why banks ignore the disclosure of bank risks according to the provisions of the third pillar of the Basel III framework. Because when following the Basel III framework, depositors demand higher interest rates or increase market discipline towards riskier banks.

This study is the first attempt to assess market discipline under the new capital and liquidity regulations using the Lasso regression model as suggested by Tibshirani (1996, 2011), Hastie et al. (2009, 2015). This is also the first study to look at the impact of four different forms of risk on market discipline (as required by the Basel regulatory framework to improve disclosure).

Using bank-level data on MENA countries during 2000-2016, this study aims to examine the role and relevance of macroprudential policies in affecting depositor discipline.

The author uses the dynamic panel data methodology as compared to alternate techniques, owing to the ability of this technique to effectively address the endogeneity problem of some of the independent variables.

The findings suggest that market discipline for MENA banks occurs primarily through deposit rates. During the crisis, depositors typically focus on a catch-all measure of bank performance. Second, macroprudential policies play a role in influencing market discipline. Third, the behavior of depositors in exercising market discipline is more pronounced in countries with high Islamic banking share and works mainly through the price channel.

To the best of author’s knowledge, this is one of the early studies for MENA countries to examine this issue in a systematic manner. By focusing on an extended sample of MENA country banks covering an extensive period that subsumes the global financial crisis, author’s analysis is able to shed light on the relevance of macroprudential policies in affecting depositor discipline.

Recent calls by prominent Islamic scholars to shift the focus of Islamic finance away from bond‐like sukuk have been met with great unease by bankers in the industry. Islamic Financial Institutions, which hold the majority of all sukuk issued, face deposit side constraints on the types of returns they distribute, due to a need to match returns to market‐based deposit interest rates. Hence, it is in their interest to hold assets that provide stable benchmark‐based returns. The purpose of this paper is to provide an outline of an incentive‐based regulatory mechanism to encourage Islamic banks to reconcile their intended normative structure (profit and loss sharing) with the operational and pragmatic realities within which Islamic banks exist.

The paper traces the regulatory infrastructure and in particular Islamic Financial Services Board regulations on Capital Adequacy for Islamic Banks and provides recommendations for technical improvements to particular aspects of the regulations.

The paper provides practical regulatory recommendations on the capital adequacy regime implemented by central banks that could potentially align more effectively with the intended form of Islamic bank's operational structure, either as an investment bank or as a commercial bank.

By aligning the activities of Islamic banks with their intended operational structure through the implementation of a system of regulatory incentives as recommended in this paper, may help in quelling the increasing tide of criticisms of the current Islamic banking model which has deviated from its intended form. More importantly, if such regulation is implemented, it could also lead to enhanced systemic stability, since Islamic banks will be more resistant to economic shocks that affect the system.

While there are studies that research the effect of the capital adequacy ratio, none really provide practically implementable recommendations that align the Islamic bank business model with its intended objectives.

The purpose of this study is to explain rationale for regulatory change in Australia and New Zealand after the global financial crisis.

Outline regulatory changes and relate to crisis experience and regulatory shortcomings exposed.

Regulatory change was driven primarily by need, as capital importing nations, to comply with emerging global standards, and the different approaches in both nations are also related to domestic political considerations.

The process of regulatory change in response to the crisis is ongoing.

A number of areas for further improvement in financial regulation are identified.

Costs of poor regulation and financial crises are identified.

A comparison of regulatory approaches in two countries dominated by the same four large banks helps understand the challenges of cross-border financial regulation cooperation.