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This paper examines the formation of pension plans from a corporate finance perspective. The theoretical underpinnings for selecting a defined‐benefit or defined‐contribution plan are discussed and used to form empirically testable hypotheses. Linear probability and logit models are used to identify corporate financial characteristics that affect the likelihood of forming a defined‐benefit or defined‐contribution plan. The results strongly indicate that firms with high degrees of debt and intangible assets are least likely to form defined‐benefit plans in a post‐reversion situation, while firm size enhances the probability of forming defined‐benefit plans. The growth in private retirement plans over the past quarter century has made pension fund management a critical concern for many financial managers. The total amount of assets in private pension plans amounted to approximately $150 billion in 1970, while this figure was about $2 trillion in 1989. A corresponding trend to this growth has been an acceleration in the formation of defined‐contribution plans relative to defined‐benefit plans. In 1975 about 29 percent of all plans were defined‐contribution plans, and 71 percent were defined‐benefit plans. In contrast, defined‐contribution plans comprised 55 percent of all plans in 1988, while 45 percent were defined‐benefit plans.1 Gustman and Steinmeier (1987) suggest that the shift to defined‐contribution plans in recent years may be attributable to shifts in jobs in the economy away from the manufacturing sector and toward the service sector. Furthermore, the role of unions, firm size, and administrative costs have also been sighted as factors which partially explain the economy wide shift toward defined‐contribution plans (see Gustman and Steinmeier (1989), Clark and McDermed (1990), and Kruse (1991)). In this paper, we address the pension choice by examining the formation of individual plans from a corporate finance perspective. Specifically, we examine the pension choice issue when firms are faced with making this decision after the termination of an overfunded defined‐benefit plan. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the possible motives for selecting one plan over the other, and develops testable hypotheses. The data and methodology are discussed in section II, while section III presents the empirical results. Section IV summarizes and concludes the paper.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of employer-delayed deposits to defined contribution plans on plan participant wealth. The history of regulatory oversight on the obligations of employers to remit deposits to defined contribution plans on behalf of employees is discussed. In light of these regulations, the paper discusses and examines situations in which employers may legally delay the deposit of employee contributions to a defined contribution plan and how the existence of various calendar anomalies may impact the returns of plan participants.

Simulated equity portfolios over the period 1985-2014 are created to determine the economic significance of possible delays in plan deposits on the accumulated wealth of plan participants.

The findings suggest that in situations where employees are paid monthly at the end of the month, it is always to their benefit to have their funds deposited as soon as possible. However, for employees paid weekly at the end of the week, a slight delay (one to three days) in the deposit of funds by the employer may actually be beneficial for the employee, particularly if the employee invests heavily in small and mid-cap stocks.

This is the first paper to explicitly study the impact of an employer’s timing of deposits to a defined contribution plan on the accumulated wealth of plan participants, and is thus the primary contribution of the paper.

This paper aims to compare and contrast alternative pension plans in the market place and their status as zakatable wealth or property. These plans differ in terms of who is responsible for providing funds for pension benefit to the retirees upon retirement and who is responsible for bearing investment risk. Whether a pension plan is subject to zakat immediately or upon receipt at retirement depends on immediate accessibility to and ownership of the funds in the account. It makes no difference whether employer and/or the employee is (are) responsible for funding the plan and who bears the investment risk.

Descriptive and analytical methods were used.

There is consensus among Muslim jurists and shariah scholars that mandatory retirement plans offered as a part of compensation and benefit package for a job are subject to zakat when money is received upon retirement and non-mandatory plans offered as replacement for or supplement to employer-sponsored plans with voluntary employee participation are subject to zakat in each year of employment.

There is no prior research work in the extant literature examining zakatability of alternative retirement plans offered in the US marketplace. This paper fills this void and provides a comprehensive survey and analysis of all available retirement plans and their treatment with respect to zakat.

The purpose of this paper is to explain how the current “crisis” in the UK pension system arose. I argue that it is a result of a combination of changes in government policy and basic instabilities always inherent in the financial system. Policy changes increased the vulnerability of the pension system to those instabilities. The background to these changes and also the frame of reference in terms of which the “crisis” itself is now phrased is broadly neoliberal. Its theoretical roots are in ideas of the efficiency of free markets. Its policy roots are expressed in a series of similar neoliberal policy tendencies in other capitalist states. I further argue that neoliberal solutions to the pension crisis simply offer more of the very matters that created the problems in the first place. Moreover, the very terms of debate, based in markets, financialisation of saving and individualisation of risk, disguise a more basic debate about providing a living retirement income for all. This is a debate that New Labour is simply not prepared to constructively engage with in any concrete fashion.

The flow of cash funds from employer‐sponsored pension plans into mutual funds has been an important driving force behind the mutual fund industry's unprecedented recent growth. The increased attractiveness of mutual funds to pension investors is due to a shift from defined benefit to defined contribution plans, to changes in the tax laws, and to the growing recognition of certain types of mutual funds as suitable long‐term investment vehicles. Accompanying the tremendous growth in defined contribution plans, however, has been a shift in investment risk from employers to employees. Using the responses from a nationwide telephone survey of 2,000 mutual fund shareholders, this paper analyzes various characteristics and investment knowledge of purchasers of mutual funds through employer‐sponsored pension plans. The results show that overall, pension investors are as knowledgeable about the costs, risks, and returns associated with mutual funds as investors who purchase mutual funds through other distribution channels. However, when dividing the sample of pension‐plan investors into two subsamples consisting of those who purchase mutual funds solely through the pension channel and those also employing other distribution channels, pension‐channel‐only investors are found to be significantly less knowledgeable. These results suggest that there is much room for improvement in investor education for a large segment of pension‐channel investors.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of key issues in the governance of defined contribution pension schemes, with a focus on investment matters, and to recommend best practices.

The paper draws on the results of an online survey of the opinions of pensions professionals and on interviews with pensions professionals.

The paper finds that many employers and pension scheme trustees are reluctant to take an active role in pension scheme design and to provide support and guidance to members for fear of legal liability. Scope exists for regulators and legislators to create “safe harbour” provisions that will encourage employers and trustees to become more active in supporting members.

The paper makes a number of suggestions for best practice in the design and governance of defined contribution pension schemes, for example, in terms of the fund choice that should be offered.

The paper provides the first comprehensive review of investment issues for UK defined contribution pension plans.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of US firms' postretirement benefits choices.

The paper uses empirical methodology (univariate and multivariate) to test the research hypotheses.

Industry norm, average employee age, financial structure, and firm size are significant factors in the determination of the proportion of compensation that is deferred. Industry norm, financial structure, and firm size are significant factors that determine the percentage of deferred compensation that is negotiated as defined benefits. Finally, industry norm, corporate tax rates, and cash flow help explain the percentage of defined benefits that are paid in the form of retiree health benefit plans.

Data requirements might bias the sample towards larger sized firms. Data availability limits the number of observations in 2000 and 2001.

The trends in post‐retirement benefits reported in this paper are important for policy makers.

These findings have implications for the baby boomers. The trend to offer smaller proportion of compensation as deferred benefits reflects the increasing costs of deferral to the employers. This increases the employees' responsibilities to save on their own. This also would shift the retirees' dependence on the public pension system for their retirement income. The trend to favor defined‐contribution plans instead of defined‐benefit plans reflects the employers' attempts to diversify their risks of paying promised post‐retirement benefits by transferring the risk to the employee. On the other hand, the popularity of defined‐contribution pension plans also reflects the increased Government's incentives to encourage savings via 401‐k plans and employee's willingness to manage their own pension portfolios.

Most countries around the world base their old‐age pension programs largely on the pay‐as‐you‐go defined benefit (PAYGO DB) model. However, due to a number of factors including population aging, the maturing of these schemes, rapidly increasing old‐age pension costs, and the perceived need to become more competitive in international markets, many nations have become increasingly concerned about the present (or projected future) economic burden of paying for the pension benefits promised by these schemes. This concern has led policy makers to look for alternative models. One of the most innovative alternatives to emerge during the past ten years is the notional defined contribution (NDC) model. In this article we describe this model and discuss some of the implications of a shift to this model for women and low‐wage workers. We conclude that in the industrial nations women and low‐wage workers are likely to do less well with schemes based all or in part on the NDC model because such schemes are typically designed to be less redistributive (from higher to lower income groups) than the PAYGO DB schemes they will be replacing. However, in developing countries the reverse will often be true as the NDC schemes are likely to be replacing PAYGO DB schemes that tend to redistribute from low‐income groups to higher income groups. Relative to funded DC schemes a major advantage of the NDC model is that it does not subject individual pension benefits to the volatility of financial markets. This issue is relevant to workers in both developed and developing nations, but it is a particularly important consideration in developing nations.

This research designed, optimized and tested a context-specific scale to evaluate public sector employees' pension choices.

The authors developed the scale using a comprehensive process of interviews and focus groups with experts across academia and finance. The authors used the refined scale to collect data from 564 faculty members in public sector universities following a multistage systematic cluster sampling technique. The findings revealed diversity in choice across different socio-economic and demographic variables.

The results revealed that items related to the defined benefit pension system explain most of the data variance and are preferred widely. This is followed by a preference for monetizing pension benefits and a defined contribution system. These findings indicated the need for flexible pension plans.

Therefore, the progressive movement towards monetization and the shift from defined benefit to a defined contribution pension system due to economic pressures must be accurately calculated and introduced where it is suitable.

Although the theory of introducing a defined contribution pension system and monetization system is appealing, its practical implementation may not be encouraging for all employees.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the relative risks and benefits associated with defined contribution (DC) and defined benefit (DB) pension schemes. New regulatory and governance requirements and demographic changes have all significantly raised the costs and reduced the expected benefits to employers of operating DB schemes. In response, many employers have either closed down their DB schemes, closed the scheme to new members and/or to capped any further accruing of benefits for existing members. This decline in DB schemes and their replacement by less generous DC schemes, has been overwhelmingly seen by employees, the general public and Government as an unwelcome development that shifts significant pension risks from the employer onto the employee.

The paper evaluates claims that DB schemes are less risky than DC schemes and, whether their passing ought to be such a cause of concern.

The paper finds that DC schemes are not inherently riskier than DB schemes. Indeed, it is argued that the low operational, governance and regulatory costs and flexibility of DC schemes provide employers and employees with the most cost‐effective means of saving for a pension. In contrast, despite the appearance that the employer rather than the employee is the primary risk bearer in respect of DB schemes, it is shown that this is largely a fallacy. Such an arrangement merely substitutes an employer's covenant for some portion of an independent (of the employer) investment portfolio. This reliance upon an employer's promises to continue to support and fund the pension scheme imposes a raft of additional firm‐specific (i.e. non‐diversifiable) risks and regulatory and governance costs upon the members of both DB and DC schemes.

The paper provides a topical and useful review of the risks, costs and benefits of DC and DB pension schemes in the UK.