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1 – 10 of over 2000Yves Bozec, Richard Bozec and Mohamed Dia
The objective of this study is to investigate further the interplay between corporate governance and firm performance with special focus on a situation expected to bring larger…
Abstract
Purpose
The objective of this study is to investigate further the interplay between corporate governance and firm performance with special focus on a situation expected to bring larger agency costs to the firm, that is, when voting rights of the dominant shareholder exceed his/her cash flow rights.
Design/methodology/approach
The research is conducted in Canada over a four‐year period from 2002 to 2005 and uses a balanced sample of 130 firms or 520 firm‐year observations. Corporate governance is measured based on the ROB corporate governance index published by The Globe and Mail.
Findings
The results clearly show a positive and significant relationship between the ROB governance scores and Tobin's Q, when there is a separation between voting and cash flow rights. In the absence of any excess voting rights, no significant relation is found between governance and performance.
Practical implications
The findings suggest that regulators need to exercise caution before deciding whether or not to recommend or impose corporate governance rules for all firms, since the benefits of these rules may vary among the firms.
Originality/value
The study contributes to explaining mixed international evidence on the governance‐performance relationship, while directing attention to the moderating effect of the deviation from the one share‐one vote principle. To the best of the authors' knowledge, no other study using corporate governance indices has taken into account the impact of excess voting rights despite the widespread use of that practice outside the USA.
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The aim of this paper is to revisit the board independence–audit fees (BI–AF) relationship while taking into account the ownership structure of the firm. Two effects are unfolding…
Abstract
Purpose
The aim of this paper is to revisit the board independence–audit fees (BI–AF) relationship while taking into account the ownership structure of the firm. Two effects are unfolding along the ownership concentration spectrum: separation of ownership and control (principal–agent problems) and separation of voting and cash flow rights (principal–principal problems).
Design/methodology/approach
The study is conducted over a seven-year period (2002-2008) using panel regressions on a sample of Canadian publicly traded companies. The authors use a moderated regression analysis incorporating two-way interactive terms (ownership × BI) and a sub-group analysis.
Findings
The results show a positive and significant relationship between BI and AF when ownership is concentrated in the hands of a dominant/controlling shareholder. The higher the gap between voting and cash flow rights of the ultimate owner, the stronger the relationship between BI and AF. Overall, evidence supports both the demand-based perspective on AF and the expropriation effect argument.
Practical implications
Results support a one-size-fits-all approach to governance despite growing concerns from academics and interest groups about the appropriateness of pursuing such strategy when ownership is concentrated in the hands of a dominant/controlling shareholder.
Originality/value
By taking the excess voting rights into account (difference between voting rights and cash-flow rights of the ultimate owner), the authors propose a refined classification of the sample firms along the ownership concentration spectrum.
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the incentives of controlling shareholders in the market for corporate control. The author investigates the takeover premiums paid by a…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the incentives of controlling shareholders in the market for corporate control. The author investigates the takeover premiums paid by a sample of European acquiring firms with voting rights structures that are highly concentrated. The results show a positive relationship between takeover premiums and the bidder’s concentration of both voting rights and excess voting rights over cash-flow rights. The author argues that with higher levels of entrenchment, takeover premiums reflect the private benefits of control which controlling shareholders in bidding firms seek to extract from a public transaction.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper uses cross-sectional regression analyses to examine the relationship between takeover premiums and the extent to which bidding firm shareholders exert control as well as the arrangement which underlie this. The sample is composed by 210 deals. The data are collected from various databases (Thomson Financial’s Mergers and Acquisition; Faccio and Lang’s (2002); Datastream/Worldscope, LexisNexis).
Findings
The premium paid in European M&A transactions is affected by the level of ownership exerted by the controlling shareholder. The results show premiums are positively and significantly associated with higher levels of voting rights, as well as, the level of separation of ownership and control when controlling shareholder ownership is low. Pyramiding structure seems to be the means of separation the most associated with takeover premiums.
Research limitations/implications
This paper can be improved by other specifications. First, it would be interesting to analyze premiums paid by firms with dispersed ownership structure and to compare these premiums with those paid by firms with controlling shareholders. Second, the author suggests to examine whether a controlling shareholder occupy the seat of a CEO or a chairman. In these cases, the author assumes that the controlling shareholder can benefit from more discretion and can extract more private benefits. Third, the author suggests extending the sample period to 2007 at least to include the sixth wave. This wave was even more significant than the high-tech wave and has not been studied much. In these cases, the author assumes that the controlling shareholder can benefit from more discretion and can extract more private benefits.
Originality/value
Previous studies show that the premium reflects the private benefits of control in privately negotiated transactions (mainly block transactions). In the present study, the author shows that the premium can also reflect private benefits in public merger transactions.
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The purpose of this paper is to add to the understanding of the monitoring role of multiple large shareholders (MLS) by examining their impact on the informativeness of firms'…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to add to the understanding of the monitoring role of multiple large shareholders (MLS) by examining their impact on the informativeness of firms' earnings.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper uses regression models that relate earnings to stock returns for a sample of 402 French publicly traded firms covered during 2003‐2007.
Findings
The paper shows that earnings informativeness is significantly positively related to the owner's ultimate cash flow rights. Consistent with the alignment effect, stock ownership aligns management and shareholders interests which reduces managers' incentives to manipulate accounting information. It also finds that earnings informativeness is significantly negatively related to the excess control of the ultimate controlling shareholder. This result supports the entrenchment effect and suggests that controlling shareholders have greater incentives to obscure accounting figures when expropriation is likely. Finally, control contestability of the largest controlling shareholder mitigates information asymmetry problems thereby enhancing earnings informativeness.
Research limitations/implications
The findings stress the importance of MLS in enhancing internal monitoring and mitigating agency costs. Because France is characterized by a weak legal system, highly concentrated ownership structures and excess control, the results provide valuable insights to mitigate extreme agency problems.
Originality/value
The paper adds to the literature on corporate governance and the quality of accounting information by investigating strategic interactions between various blockholders and their impact on earnings informativeness. The study complements prior studies on the monitoring role of MLS by demonstrating that both their presence and control size translate into significantly greater earnings informativeness.
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Kuntara Pukthuanthong, Thomas J. Walker, Dolruedee Nuttanontra Thiengtham and Heng Du
– The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and how family ownership enhances or damages firm value.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and how family ownership enhances or damages firm value.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper studies a sample of Canadian companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) between 1999 and 2007 and apply multivariate regression with firm value as a dependent variable. The paper measures firm value as Tobin ' s Q and ROA based either on net income or EBITDA. The independent variables include family firm dummy and ownership percentage.
Findings
It is found that control-enhancing mechanisms which are often employed by family companies add value to companies. Furthermore, it is found that agency conflicts between ownership and management are less costly than those between majority and minority shareholders, suggesting that family ownership helps resolve the agency conflicts between ownership and management and in turn enhances firm value. Finally, it is found that family companies with founders as CEOs outperform those with descendants as CEOs.
Research limitations/implications
The paper studies Canadian family firms; as such, the sample size is not relatively large. Nonetheless, the results should be generalized as Canada is one of the largest markets in the world and have high integration with the rest of the world.
Practical implications
The results suggest investors should invest in family ownership firms.
Originality/value
The paper shows whether firm ownership increases firm value and the determinant of family firm value.
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David Jackson, Shantanu Dutta and Miwako Nitani
The purpose of this paper is to empirically study the relationship between informed trading and overall corporate governance mechanisms.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to empirically study the relationship between informed trading and overall corporate governance mechanisms.
Design/methodology/approach
A broad range of governance characteristics are used to measure the governance structure of firms in the Toronto Stock Exchange. The risk of informed trading is estimated using a PIN measure that avoids biases induced by trade classification errors. Our proxies for informed trading are regressed on measures of corporate governance.
Findings
Our most important result is that the observed trade‐off between CEO compensation and informed trading holds only for large firms. There is no correlation between CEO cash compensation and the risk of informed trading in small and medium sized firms. We find evidence that cross‐sectional differences in the risk of informed trading are explained by a firm's governance structure.
Research limitations/implications
Research finding a trade‐off between CEO compensation and informed trading merits closer examination.
Practical implications
Limitations on insider trading, and more broadly on informed trading, may involve different costs and benefits for large firms than for medium and small firms.
Originality/value
This paper expands the set of governance characteristics shown to interact with informed trading activity. The Toronto market is well suited to focusing on relations between informed trading and firm‐level governance characteristics.
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The objective of the study is to analyze corporate governance practices of Canadian companies in the post‐Enron period. The attempt is to investigate whether the convergence…
Abstract
Purpose
The objective of the study is to analyze corporate governance practices of Canadian companies in the post‐Enron period. The attempt is to investigate whether the convergence phenomenon evidenced in prior studies is limited to the minimum mandatory requirements imposed by regulators or reflects a real behavioral transformation.
Design/methodology/approach
Changing governance structure might be slow except in times of financial crisis, increased public scrutiny and reforms. These conditions are met in the post‐Enron period (2002 to 2005) where major reforms have been launched including the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) in the USA and Bill 198 in Canada. The authors expect changes in corporate governance to be more important during this period, therefore, enhancing the robustness and reliability of their results. They measure corporate governance on a global scale, relying on the ROB index published by the Globe and Mail. The index distinguishes between four blocks of corporate governance, namely, board composition, compensation, shareholder rights, and disclosure.
Findings
The present results show signs of convergence. However, Canadian companies improved their corporate governance practices in the post‐Enron period mainly in areas mandated by regulation. This includes provisions related to the composition, attributes and working of the board of directors and board committees. No significant improvement is found in non‐regulated governance best practices.
Research limitations/implications
Overall, the findings suggest a lack of real behavioral change in corporate leaders. Instead, convergence in corporate governance appears to be the result of a box‐checking exercise.
Practical implications
If corporate governance is about ethical conduct and stems from the culture and mindset of management, these results show that corporate governance cannot be regulated by legislation alone.
Originality/value
This study goes beyond the minimum mandatory requirements and looks into compliance of non‐regulated provisions as well. Examining the evolution of corporate governance practices on these two fronts helps to further investigate the extent and nature of convergence.
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Vas Taras, Esra Memili, Zhonghui Wang and Henrik Harms
This study aims to investigate the effects of family involvement in corporations on firm performance. It remains unclear whether family-owned companies, or companies with other…
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to investigate the effects of family involvement in corporations on firm performance. It remains unclear whether family-owned companies, or companies with other forms of family involvement in the corporate governance, perform better than firms with no family involvement. Furthermore, the study focuses on family involvement in publicly traded firms, which are different from private family firms. Hence, knowledge about family firms will be enriched through a closer look at the publicly traded family firms and shed further light onto the heterogeneity among family firms.
Design/methodology/approach
The present study uses a meta-analysis of the extant research on family involvement and publicly traded family firm performance. The authors synthesize past research, identify and reconcile mixed findings and expand the understanding of the phenomenon.
Findings
Involvement of the founding family members in firm governance tends to improve firm performance, albeit the effect is rather weak. However, the effect varies greatly depending on the type of family involvement and the measure of performance. The authors also identify regional differences, as well as variations by the firm size and study design. Furthermore, under-researched areas are identified for future research.
Practical implications
The results of the study would be useful in guiding organizational design and investment decisions.
Originality/value
By using the meta-analytic approach, the present study provides a comprehensive review of the empirical evidence available on the issue so far. Most importantly, the authors were able to conduct a series of tests to assess the moderating effects of a number of factors that could not be evaluated in any individual study in the meta-analytic database.
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Wuchun Chi, Huichi Huang and Hong Xie
This paper aims to investigate whether there is heterogeneity in the relationship between the bank loan interest rate and its determinants using the quantile regression method and…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to investigate whether there is heterogeneity in the relationship between the bank loan interest rate and its determinants using the quantile regression method and to reconcile some conflicting findings in prior literature.
Design/methodology/approach
First, the effects of 18 determinants were examined on the bank loan interest rate using the ordinary least squares method (OLS). Second, it was investigated whether the relationship between the loan rate and its determinants is heterogeneous across quantiles of loan rates using the quantile regression method.
Findings
Considerable heterogeneity was found in the relationship between the loan rate and its determinants. Specifically, a determinant that is beneficial for the bank loan rate, on average, as revealed by the OLS method may become unimportant or even detrimental for firms located at extremely high or low loan rate quantiles. By revealing extreme heterogeneity in the relationship between the loan rate and some of its determinants, the authors potentially explain two conflicting findings in prior literature.
Originality/value
The conventional OLS method masks the heterogeneity in the relationship between the bank loan interest rate and its determinants. Quantile regression can be used to supplement the OLS estimates to gain a more detailed and complete picture of the relationship between the dependent variable and explanatory variables.
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Md Jahidur Rahman, Hongtao Zhu and Md Moazzem Hossain
From an agency perspective, the authors investigate whether family ownership and control configurations are systematically associated with a firm's choice of auditor and audit…
Abstract
Purpose
From an agency perspective, the authors investigate whether family ownership and control configurations are systematically associated with a firm's choice of auditor and audit fees. Agency theory is an economic theory that purposes the existence of a contract between two parties, principals and agents. Auditor choice and audit fees by family firms provide interesting insights given the unique nature of the agency problems faced by such firms.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors employ Big-4 auditors (PWC, KPMG, E&Y and Deloitte) as a proxy for high quality auditor (Big N) for the auditor choice model. For the audit fee model, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of audit fees (LnAF). The authors use two measures for family firm as explanatory variables: (1) a dummy variable (FAM_Control), which equals one if the firm is classified as a family firm and (2) FAM_Ownership, which is an indicator variable with a value of one if a firm has family members who hold CEO position, occupy board seats, or hold at least 10% of the firm's equity. Data of Chinese listed firms from 2011 to 2021 are used. The authors adopt the Heckman (1979) two-stage model to mitigate the potential endogeneity issue involved in the selection of Big-N auditors.
Findings
The findings suggest that compared with non-family firms, Chinese family firms have a less tendency to employ Big-4 auditors due to less severe agency problems between owners and managers. Additionally, Chinese family firms sustain higher audit fees than non-family firms. Similar to the prior literature, however, Chinese family firms audited by Big-4 auditors incur lower audit fees than family firms audited by non-Big-4 auditors in this study. In contrast to young-family firms, old-family firms are less likely to pick top-tier auditors and sustain lower audit fees. Consistent and robust results are found from endogeneity tests and sensitivity analyses.
Originality/value
The empirical evidence provides a unique insight, for accounting practitioners, policymakers, family owners and other capital market participants concerning the diverse effects of various family ownership and control features on selecting high-quality auditors and audit fees. This study advances the understanding, showing that a lower demand for audit quality occurs in Chinese family firms as they encounter less severe Type I agency problems. However, the more severe Type II agency problems in Chinese family firms sustain higher audit fees due to higher audit risk and greater audit effort.
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