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The purpose of this paper is to investigate changes proposed in 2012 to commodity programs for the new Farm Bill. Both the Senate and House Agriculture Committee versions of the new Farm Bill eliminate current commodity programs including direct payments, create new revenue‐based commodity program options designed to cover “shallow” revenue losses, and also introduce supplemental crop insurance coverage for shallow revenue losses.

This paper documents the payment functions for the new revenue programs proposed in both the Senate and House Ag Committee Farm Bills, and also estimates expected payments for each using a model based on historical county yield data, farmer‐level risk rates from RMA, and commodity price levels from the March 2012 CBO baseline projections.

The authors find significant variation in expected per acre payment across programs, crops, and regions. In general, the Senate's bill would be expected to be preferred over the House's bill for corn and soybean producers, particularly those in the Midwest. Also, the RLC program in the House's Bill typically would be projected to pay much less than the Senate's SCO or ARC programs for most producers in the Midwest.

This study develops an extensive nationwide model of county and farm yield and price risks for the five major US crops and employs the model to evaluate expected payment rates and the distribution of payments under the House and Senate Farm Bill proposals. These analyses are important for program evaluation and should be of great interest to producers and policymakers.

The purpose of this paper is to use simulation analysis to assess farmer choice between crop insurance and supplemental revenue options as proposed during development of the Agricultural Act of 2014.

The certainty equivalent of wealth is used to rank farm choices and assess the effects of supplemental revenue options on the crop insurance plan and coverage level chosen by the producer under a range of farm attributes. The risk-reducing effectiveness of the select programs is also examined through their impact on the farm revenue distribution. The dependence structure of yield and prices is modeled by applying copula techniques on historical data.

Farm program supplemental revenue programs generally have no effect on crop insurance choices. Crop insurance supplemental revenue programs typically reduce crop insurance coverage at high coverage levels. An individual plan of crop insurance combined with a supplemental revenue insurance plan may substitute for incumbent area crop insurance plans.

The analysis provides insights into farmers’ possible choices by focussing on alternative crops and farm attributes and extensive scenarios, using current data, crop insurance plans and programs contained in the 2014 Farm Bill and related bills. The results should be of value to policy officials and producers in regards to the design and use of risk management tools.

Regional differences in crop insurance uptake have persisted over time. To partly explain this phenomenon, the purpose of this paper is to propose and evaluate a budget constraint (heuristic) effect within the standard expected utility theory (EUT) framework through simulation methods.

Within the EUT framework, a standard simulation model is used to gain insights into farm insurance decisions when a budget constraint is in effect. The budget constraint is modeled as it has been revealed through the data on farmers’ insurance expenditures. In the simulation analysis, certainty equivalent values are used to rank farm options subject to the revealed budget constraint.

A budget constraint effect within the EUT framework stands out in explaining the observed regional differences. The proposed explanation is consistent with the historical trends on the ratio of crop insurance expenditure to expected crop value, higher premium rates in regions with lower crop insurance uptake, and the limited turnout for the 2014 Farm Bill’s supplemental area-based crop insurance products. Farmers’ crop insurance choices are found to be mostly constrained-optimal.

This appears to be the first study taking the revealed preferences approach to farmers’ crop insurance choices in a simulation analysis. Some policy implications are drawn and future research avenues are suggested. The findings should be of considerable value to policymakers, academics, bankers, and producers in regard to the design and use of risk management tools.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of the 2008 Farm Bill's average crop revenue election (ACRE) program on the risk‐reducing effectiveness of crop insurance products.

Three crop/region combinations are examined, representing regions with both high and low price‐yield correlation regions. Actual production history (APH) and crop revenue coverage (CRC) insurance instruments are considered separately under the 2002 Farm Bill and under ACRE. Monte Carlo simulations, combined with the copula approach, are used to simulate net wealth distributions and to calculate the corresponding expected utilities. The outcomes are evaluated using certainty‐equivalent wealth based on different risk premium assumptions.

Crop insurance contracts appear to be more effective under the 2002 Farm Bill than under ACRE, especially for crops characterized by low yield‐price correlation. CRC insurance is found to be more effective than APH insurance for all crop/region combinations considered.

The paper only considers a static framework and farm‐level insurance contracts. Further research could investigate how ACRE affects decoupled income support, whether the results change if Supplemental Revenue Assistance is included, or how different the outcomes might be for multiple‐crop farms.

The results suggest that risk‐reducing effectiveness decreases under ACRE and that no reasonable adjustment to APH base price can make APH competitive with CRC for any crop/regions considered.

The risk‐reducing effectiveness of the 2008 Farm Bill's ACRE program is analyzed, and as a methodological contribution the copula approach is used to model the multivariate distribution of yields and prices.

This study evaluates the impacts on gross revenue distributions of the use of alternative crop insurance products across different coverage levels and across locations with differing yield risks. Results are presented in terms of net costs, values‐at‐risk, and certainty equivalent returns associated with five types of multi‐peril crop insurance across different coverage levels. Findings show that the group policies often result in average payments exceeding their premium costs. Individual revenue products reduce risk in the tails more than group policies, but result in greater reductions in mean revenues. Rankings based on certainty equivalent returns and low frequency VaRs generally favor revenue products. As expected, crop insurance is associated with greater relative risk reduction in locations with greater underlying yield variability.

Returns to a model farm are simulated to assess the impact of marketing and insurance risk management tools as measured by mean net returns and returns at 5% value‐at‐risk (VaR). Results indicate that revenue insurance strategies and strategies involving a combination of price and yield protection provide substantial downside revenue protection, while mean net returns only modestly differ from the benchmark harvest sale strategy when considering all years between 1986 and 2000.

This study seeks to evaluate the impacts of land rental arrangements on crop insurance and grain marketing decisions.

The analysis is conducted in an Illinois corn‐soybean setting in which optimal marketing and crop insurance decisions are estimated for a risk‐averse producer under typical cash rent and share rent agreements using numerical simulation methods.

Results indicate that the availability of crop insurance impacts the intensity of use of put options under both cash and share rent arrangements. Similar to previous work in this area, revenue insurance is found to cause a substitution away from marketing using put options, while yield insurance is complementary to price risk management alternatives. However, while insurance and marketing play a role under both types of land tenure arrangements, shifting from a cash rent to a share rent agreement provides a relatively greater degree of risk reduction.

The results suggest that additional research is needed to explain trends in land rental contracts. Crop insurance and other federal programs may provide incentives to switch from share leases to cash rent arrangements. Changes to the design of these programs could facilitate risk management for producers more efficiently.

The unique contribution of this study is the comparison of insurance and marketing decisions under both cash rent and share rent agreements for crop land.

This study develops a method to estimate the probability density function of the Federal Risk Management Agency’s (RMA’s) net income from reinsuring crop insurance for corn, wheat, and soybeans. When calibrated using 1997 data, results from the advocated method show that in 1997 there was a 5% probability RMA would have had to reimburse at least $1 billion to insurance companies, and the fair value of RMA’s insurance services to insurance firms in 1997 was $78.7 million.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the risk management benefits provided by the supplemental coverage option (SCO) insurance plan which was created in the 2014 Farm Bill. Specifically, the marginal expected utility benefits are compared with the potential additional subsidy cost introduced by the new program for a stylized example of a corn producer.

The paper uses a stylized simulation model examines the preferred insurance program choice for a typical Midwestern corn farmer. The expected utility of the farmer is calculated under their preferred insurance program choice both with and without the availability of the SCO program, and compared to the case where crop insurance is not available. Scenarios are examined for a range of farmer risk aversion levels, different levels of correlation between farm-level and county-level corn yields, and case with and without insurance premium subsidies.

The SCO program is found to enter into the preferred insurance program choice for risk averse farmers. As risk aversion increases, farmers are estimated to prefer higher coverage levels for individual products along with SCO coverage. While the availability of existing crop insurance programs are shown to substantially increase the expected utility of farmers, the marginal impact of adding SCO to the crop insurance program is relatively small. Furthermore, the additional expected benefits generated by SCO are shown to include both risk management and expected return components. With subsidies removed, the estimated marginal benefits provided by SCO are reduced significantly.

The findings of this paper can help inform the policy debate for future farm bills as agricultural support programs continue to evolve. The results in this paper can also be used to help explain farm-level decision making related to crop insurance program choices.

This paper contributes to the literature by documenting a new, federally supported risk management programs made available to farmers in the 2014 Farm Bill and evaluates the marginal benefits the SCO program offers US crop producers.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the sources and magnitude of variation in accrual adjusted gross farm revenue and farm revenue net of feed purchases on Michigan dairy farms representative of Upper Midwest dairy farms. The paper aims to assess whether adjusted gross revenue‐type insurance instruments meet insurability conditions when applied to dairy farms.

Accrual adjusted dairy farm revenue and revenue net of feed purchased from Michigan dairy farm panel data from 1995 through 2006 were detrended and summarized. Variance decomposition was used to identify sources of variation in adjusted gross revenue and adjusted gross revenue less feed purchases. In‐sample insurance premiums were estimated and Monte Carlo simulations were used to adjust these premiums for out‐of‐sample considerations.

Milk price variation was the largest source of variation while milk production per cow varied little. Farms with smaller herds and those with larger percentages of farm revenue from crop sales had higher relative revenue variability and would trigger a higher frequency of indemnities under a whole farm revenue insurance contract.

Because the data analyzed conclude in 2006, the volatility of the past couple of years is not reflected. Therefore, researchers are encouraged to test the proposed insurance feasibility further with more recent data.

The paper addresses considerations for the development and commercialization of a feasible dairy revenue insurance instrument.

This paper fulfils a need to understand magnitude and source of revenue variation on dairy farms and how insurance might mitigate negative consequences of this variation.