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The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how crop price insurance premium can be calculated using an option pricing model and how insurers can transfer underwriting risks in the futures market.

Based on data from spot and futures market in China, this paper develops an improved B-S model for the calculation of crop price insurance premium and tests the possibility of hedging underwriting risks by insurance firms in the futures market.

The authors find that spot price of crops in China can be estimated with agricultural commodity futures prices, and can be taken as the insured price for crop price insurance. The authors also find that improved B-S model yields better estimation of crop price insurance premium than traditional B-S model when spot price does not follow geometric Brownian motion. Finally, the authors find that hedging can be one good alternative for insurance firms to manage underwriting risks.

This paper develops an improved B-S model that is data-driven in nature. Insured price of the crop price insurance, or the exercise price used in the B-S model, is estimated from a co-integration model built on spot and futures market price series. Meanwhile, distributional patterns of spot price series, one important factor determining the applicability of B-S model, is factored into the improved B-S model so that the latter is more robust and friendly to data with varied distributions. This paper also verifies the possibility of hedging of underwriting risks by insurance firms in the futures market.

The purpose of this paper is to use simulation analysis to assess farmer choice between crop insurance and supplemental revenue options as proposed during development of the Agricultural Act of 2014.

The certainty equivalent of wealth is used to rank farm choices and assess the effects of supplemental revenue options on the crop insurance plan and coverage level chosen by the producer under a range of farm attributes. The risk-reducing effectiveness of the select programs is also examined through their impact on the farm revenue distribution. The dependence structure of yield and prices is modeled by applying copula techniques on historical data.

Farm program supplemental revenue programs generally have no effect on crop insurance choices. Crop insurance supplemental revenue programs typically reduce crop insurance coverage at high coverage levels. An individual plan of crop insurance combined with a supplemental revenue insurance plan may substitute for incumbent area crop insurance plans.

The analysis provides insights into farmers’ possible choices by focussing on alternative crops and farm attributes and extensive scenarios, using current data, crop insurance plans and programs contained in the 2014 Farm Bill and related bills. The results should be of value to policy officials and producers in regards to the design and use of risk management tools.

At the beginning of the production year producers face a complex risk management decision environment given by risks specific to their operation, multiple crop insurance contracts and hedging opportunities. The purpose of this paper is to provide a producer-level framework for risk management decision making, focusing on the interaction between crop insurance and hedging.

The authors develop a Monte Carlo simulation model that generates a producer’s net income (NI) distribution that incorporates historical producer risk, price-yield correlation via a copula, price risk, and production costs. The authors evaluate the NI distribution through a modified Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) decision framework. The authors use the modified MPT decision framework to explore tradeoffs between expected NI and farm ruin (defined as 1 or 5 percent expected shortfall) from different crop insurance contracts and pre-harvest hedging options.

Only revenue protection and the highest two levels of coverage level exist on the efficient frontier. The level of hedging on the efficient frontier ranges from 0 to 55 percent of Actual Production History. The authors find that increasing coverage level 5 percent (from 80 to 85 percent) negatively impacts the optimal hedging amount by 26 percentage points (from 35 to 9 percent).

The model provides the precise identification of financial benefits from different risk management strategies by incorporating producer-level historical yield data, using a copula to capture yield-price dependency structure and producer production cost in generating the NI distribution. This model can be applied to any producer’s characteristics and data.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the demand for crop insurance. Moreover, farmer willingness to pay (WTP) for crop insurance was derived. Factors affecting the demand were also examined in a country where crop insurance products are not currently available. Sensitivity analysis was conducted by studying the price-anchoring effect.

Data from a choice experiment (CE) were analyzed with mixed logit models and the distribution of farmer WTP for crop insurance was derived. A split sample approach with varying premium vectors was used to analyze the price-anchoring effect.

Demand was revealed for crop insurance products in Finland. The demand was higher among younger farmers and farms with more arable land. WTP for crop insurance products was very sensitive to the premium interval presented in the CE design.

The price-anchoring effect may disrupt the market development of crop insurance products, because insurance companies may take advantage of the lack of awareness among farmers of crop insurance pricing.

The insurance product expected indemnity was a more important factor than the deductible in determining farmer WTP for crop insurance. Therefore, the 30 percent deductible level set for subsidized crop insurance products is not an obstacle for the development of such products in the EU.

The study applied a well-known method (CE) to crop insurance in a country where these products are non-existent. The split sample approach was used to examine the price-anchoring effect on crop insurance.

This study seeks to evaluate the impacts of land rental arrangements on crop insurance and grain marketing decisions.

The analysis is conducted in an Illinois corn‐soybean setting in which optimal marketing and crop insurance decisions are estimated for a risk‐averse producer under typical cash rent and share rent agreements using numerical simulation methods.

Results indicate that the availability of crop insurance impacts the intensity of use of put options under both cash and share rent arrangements. Similar to previous work in this area, revenue insurance is found to cause a substitution away from marketing using put options, while yield insurance is complementary to price risk management alternatives. However, while insurance and marketing play a role under both types of land tenure arrangements, shifting from a cash rent to a share rent agreement provides a relatively greater degree of risk reduction.

The results suggest that additional research is needed to explain trends in land rental contracts. Crop insurance and other federal programs may provide incentives to switch from share leases to cash rent arrangements. Changes to the design of these programs could facilitate risk management for producers more efficiently.

The unique contribution of this study is the comparison of insurance and marketing decisions under both cash rent and share rent agreements for crop land.

Revenue insurance is the most popular form of insurance available in the US federal crop insurance program. The majority of crop revenue policies are sold with a harvest price replacement feature that pays out on lost crop yields at the maximum of a realized or projected harvest price. The authors introduce a novel actuarial and statistical approach to rate revenue insurance policies with exotic price coverage: the payout depends on an order statistic or average of prices. The authors examine the price implications of different dependence models and demonstrate the feasibility of policies of this type.

Hierarchical Archimedean copulas and vine copulas are used to model dependence between prices and yields and serial dependence of prices. The authors construct several synthetic exotic price coverage insurance policies and evaluate the impact of copula models on policies covering different types of risk.

The authors’ findings show that the price of exotic price coverage policies is sensitive to the choice of dependence model. Serial dependence varies across the growing season. It is possible to accurately price exotic coverage policies and we suggest these add-ons as a possible avenue for developing private crop insurance markets.

The authors apply hierarchical Archimedean copulas and vine copulas that allow for flexibility in the modeling of multivariate dependence. Unlike previous research, which has primarily considered dependence across space, the form of exotic price coverage requires modeling serial dependence in relative prices. Results are important for this segment of the agricultural insurance market: one of the main areas that insurers can develop private products around the federal program.

Due to the low crop insurance participation by grain growers in the Pacific Northwest, the performance of insurance programs and the futures market is assessed in this area. Revenue insurance, combined with the futures and government programs, is identified as the optimal risk management portfolio. Although yield risk level, decision maker’s risk preference, and actuarial fairness of premiums can all affect farmers’ choices, the current subsidy policy is most influential. The varying subsidy levels induce farmers’ subsidy‐seeking incentive and suppress the risk‐reducing incentive. There is little diversification effect from growing two crops in the rotation instead of one.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate changes proposed in 2012 to commodity programs for the new Farm Bill. Both the Senate and House Agriculture Committee versions of the new Farm Bill eliminate current commodity programs including direct payments, create new revenue‐based commodity program options designed to cover “shallow” revenue losses, and also introduce supplemental crop insurance coverage for shallow revenue losses.

This paper documents the payment functions for the new revenue programs proposed in both the Senate and House Ag Committee Farm Bills, and also estimates expected payments for each using a model based on historical county yield data, farmer‐level risk rates from RMA, and commodity price levels from the March 2012 CBO baseline projections.

The authors find significant variation in expected per acre payment across programs, crops, and regions. In general, the Senate's bill would be expected to be preferred over the House's bill for corn and soybean producers, particularly those in the Midwest. Also, the RLC program in the House's Bill typically would be projected to pay much less than the Senate's SCO or ARC programs for most producers in the Midwest.

This study develops an extensive nationwide model of county and farm yield and price risks for the five major US crops and employs the model to evaluate expected payment rates and the distribution of payments under the House and Senate Farm Bill proposals. These analyses are important for program evaluation and should be of great interest to producers and policymakers.

The purpose of this paper is to determine which factors are most influential to farmers' crop insurance purchasing decisions in northern Illinois.

A mail survey method was used to collect information from farmers in a 42 county region of Illinois.

Of the factors analyzed, price had the most significant effect on crop insurance purchase decisions. While acres farmed had statistically significant impact on most of the crop insurance purchase decisions, different factors played a role in purchase decisions based on types of insurance and types of crops covered.

The results of this study warrant additional research relative to crop insurance purchase decisions. Analyzing the affect of varying degrees of government subsidization across crop insurance plans and coverage levels on purchase decisions is recommended. Questions regarding the relationship between crop insurance subsidization, farm program payments, and ad hoc disaster payments would be relevant in light of World Trade Organization and federal budget discussions. Also, asking participants to indicate if they have a written grain marketing plan and if that plan leverages crop insurance coverage to support forward contracting or pre‐harvest pricing would provide additional insights in determining how crop insurance purchase decisions are made. Questions regarding the claims process should be incorporated into future studies on this topic. The timeliness of claims payments, as well as the farmer's level of satisfaction with the claims adjustor and claims process may factor into the decision‐making process.

Illinois farmers and crop insurance agencies could benefit from this study. Findings could improve the crop insurance products and services available to Illinois farmers and make the federal crop insurance program more effective in enhancing farmers' ability to manage crop production risk.

This paper identified the factors that are most influential to farmers' crop insurance purchasing decisions in northern Illinois.

This paper examines the effect of overconfident yield forecasting (optimism bias) on crop insurance coverage level choices across both yield and revenue insurance.

This study simulates a representative producer’s preferred coverage level for both yield and revenue insurance under three potential models of decision-making and four potential manifestations of overconfident yield forecasting. The study then uses this framework to examine how coverage level choices change as overconfidence increases (decreases).

As overconfidence increases, producers prefer lower levels of crop insurance coverage than they would otherwise prefer, with extreme overconfidence inducing farmers to buy no insurance at all. While overconfidence affects cross-coverage demand for revenue and yield insurance similarly, this effect is more pronounced for yield insurance. Cross-coverage level demand for revenue insurance is relatively stable across changes in the correlation between prices and yields.

This research has important implications for crop insurance subsidy design and crop insurance demand modeling.

There is a growing body of literature suggesting that producers are overconfident with regard to their future yield risk and that this bias reduces their willingness to pay for risk management tools such as crop insurance. This is the first study to look at how such overconfidence affects cross-coverage level demand for crop insurance.