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This chapter provides an overview of local government auditing in Brazil. The mandate of regional Courts of Accounts, which are public audit organisations, includes overseeing states and municipalities’ legal compliance and public policy performance, while the federal Supreme Audit Institution scrutinises fiscal transfers from the central to local governments. Each of the 32 regional Courts of Accounts is autonomous. However, all follow the Napoleonic audit model and are internally organised in three main functions: auditing (comprising investigation, fair hearing and adversarial phase, and accusation), prosecuting (comprising legal compliance analysis), and judgmental. Despite the comprehensive legal mandate and recent digitalisation efforts, Courts still focus on compliance audit. Due to their autonomy, the Courts lack central coordination, standardised audit techniques, and uniform procedural rules. Moreover, the Courts’ lack of independence and transparency may impair their capacity to promote democratic accountability.

This article analysed how data collection systems (DCS) developed by governmental audit organizations (Court of Accounts) affect budgetary planning within local governments.

Eighteen semi-structured interviews complemented by six time-lagged interviews via WhatsApp were carried out with the actors involved in the preparation and auditing of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) in Brazilian local governments. Documents such as the structured layouts of Courts' DCS and the publicised MTEF prepared by local governments were also analysed.

The findings indicate that Courts' DCS structured layouts reduce local governments' budgetary planning autonomy in elaborating their MTEF. It happens as the Courts' main driver is to make MTEF information auditable and not to improve the usefulness of information by governments. As a result, the planning choices of the local governments end up limited, not by the general legislation but by the rules established by the computerized systems of the Courts.

The paper's originality relies on demonstrating that the digitalisation of audit processes ultimately affects local governments' practices through structured layouts for the data collection on MTEF information - that impose rigidity on the budget planning process of local governments. The authors highlight the role of public sector auditing organisations as potential catalysts of reforms; however, this should be considered cautiously since the drivers and motivations of the organisation that sponsors public financial management reforms matter for overall reform effectiveness.

The Court of Auditors – Tribunal de Cuentas – is the Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) of Spain which, together with the Regional Audit Institutions (RAIs) of the Autonomous Communities – Órganos de Control Externo – carry out the institutional external audits in Spain. At internal level, the Intervención General de la Administración del Estado (IGAE) and the internal comptroller bodies of the Autonomous Communities and the Local Entities, carry out the internal audit on the three levels of the Spanish public sector, contracting in some cases private audit firms. So, the structure of the public audit in Spain is fragmented. With respect to the scope, although in theory the three types of audit are carried out on the public entities in Spain (legality compliance audits, accounting and finance audits and performance audits), in practice the last one is not enough implemented. There are room for improvements. Public audits in Spain include more and more actions for electronic administration environments.

On the one hand, the auditing of the public hospitals regarding their financial information is carried out by the State Audit Court which is the Supreme Auditing Institution in our country, on the other hand it is carried out by the auditors of the Ministry of Health. While the audits made by the Ministry of Health are generally about compatibility and medical controls, the financial information of the hospitals needs to be made by the external independent auditors and their impact on the general budget needs to be determined.

In this study, the subject matter of financial auditing has been elaborated on within the specificity of the public health sector and evaluated as to whether the conducted auditing is effective in determining the mistakes in the financial information of the organizations. For the purpose of conducting the evaluation, the six-year auditing reports between the years of 2012 and 2017 of the Supreme Auditing Institution (State Audit Court) conducting the financial auditing of the public health sector regarding the Public Hospitals Administration of Turkey (Türkiye Kamu Hastaneleri Kurumu). The auditing reports are addressed within the framework of the types and numbers of findings determined by the State Audit Court, the responses that the Public Hospitals Administration of Turkey has given against those findings and the opinion of auditing. In the consequence of the conducted evaluation, it was concluded that the Court of Accounts was effective in determining the mistakes in the financial reports and increasing the correctness and reliability of the financial information of the Administration.

This study of the impact of Belgian Court of Audit on Federal Administration for the 2005 to 2010 period aims to highlight the auditors’ influence on the management of governmental organizations through the performance audits they have been conducting since 1998. A set of ten variables allows us to measure the three types of uses of performance auditors’ work by auditees: instrumental, conceptual and strategic use.

A survey was sent out to a total of 148 respondents identified by the authorities of the targeted organizations; 47 usable questionnaires were completed (32 per cent response rate).

The Court of Audit’s impact on the audited entities did not provoke radical changes in the auditees’ organizational life, but the intervention of the auditors was nevertheless noticeable. The nature of the impact was rather conceptual than strategic or instrumental. And the negative consequences on auditees anticipated in the literature were not observed.

Given the five-year period covered by the study which was made in 2014 (four years after 2010), it had to deal with the mortality of respondents and the loss of organizational memory.

The study gives more accurate insights about the influence that Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) actually exert on audited Administrations through their performance audits.

Because SAIs have been mandated to evaluate the government’s economy, efficiency and effectiveness for almost 40 years in the Western democracies, it is mandatory that their actual ability to influence Administrations be documented more abundantly and independently by academic researchers.

In the Netherlands, the majority of financial and compliance audits of local government are conducted by private audit firms, while courts of audit are in charge of conducting performance audits. External auditors are appointed by the municipal council based on a tendering procedure, creating a dual system of responsibilities between the council and the Board of Mayor and Aldermen. The recent trend that several large audit firms have withdrawn from the municipal audit market and the strong need for public sector expertise because of the complexity and uniqueness of local government call for rethinking current auditing practices in this sector.

The Portuguese local government is subject to several controls that have evolved substantially throughout the last decades. This chapter offers a summary of the current state of these controls, particularly focussing on municipalities. The political parties of the opposition who sit in the Executive Board monitor all decisions. The Assembly exerts supervision and political control. The central government supervises legal and financial activities through a finance inspection body. The Court of Audit has a technical and jurisdictional control. Finally, the external auditor gives an opinion on the true and fair view of the municipality’s accounts, comprising both budgetary and financial statements. Because public financial management still mainly focusses on the (inputs-based) budget, conformity auditing takes precedence over other types of control.

Provides a response to a 1994 article in a Berlin daily newspaper reprimanding the German Federal Court of Audit (FCA) for allegedly exceeding its powers, since it is not a policy‐making body. Sets out to explain how the FCA, in spite of its obligations to exercise self‐restraint in matters of policy, may influence policy decisions. Cites the FCA′s reports on the Eurofighter 2000 and on the new Parliament building in Bonn as examples. Describes the FCA′s role in relation to Parliament and Government and explains its involvement in budget negotiations. Provides specific examples of matters in which the FCA has had an advisory role.

This paper aims to review the auditing procedures and structure in an emerging economy's public sector by explaining the recent changes and developments in the auditing process, its structure and the responsibilities of its underlying actors.

This paper traces the development of Iran's public sector financial monitoring by examining the country's legal and governmental documents as well as the auditing standards and procedures.

The Supreme Audit Court of Iran (SACI) is the main actor in public auditing and uses various tools and involves several organizations to cover diverse scopes of public auditing; this paper also discusses the structure and the financial (in)dependence of the SACI.

This is the first piece of work that explains the public auditing procedures and structure in Iran's public sector by focusing on recent changes and developments in its objectives and scopes.