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Money laundering and terrorism financing use the banking sector system illegally and result in enormous losses for the state and nation. Regulatory Technology (RegTech) is an important part of effectively preventing money laundering and terrorism financing. However, the implementation of RegTech related to the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing, especially in the Indonesian banking sector, has not been widely studied and discussed. Therefore, this study aims to provide empirical testing evidence regarding the effectiveness of RegTech implementation in the Indonesian banking sector to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing.

This study uses primary data obtained through a survey distributed to 160 bankers who work in eight different banks in Indonesia with a 95% confidence level and a confidence interval of 7.75. The criteria needed to determine the sample in this study are individuals who actively work as staff whose work is directly related to banking; individuals who are actively working in banks registered with OJK; individuals who have been actively working in the banking sector in Indonesia for at least three years. The data that has been obtained were analyzed using the SmartPLS application to test the validity and reliability, descriptive statistics and structural models (inner model).

The results of this study indicate that electronic know your customer (eKYC), transaction monitoring (TM), cost and time efficiencies (CTE) influence the prevention of anti-money laundering (AML) and countering financing of terrorism (CFT) in the Indonesian banking sector. However, eKYC and CTE have little influence on AML-CFT in the Indonesian banking sector. Meanwhile, TM has a moderate influence on AML-CFT in the Indonesian banking sector. In addition, in general, most bankers agree that the bank they work for has followed the guidelines, policies and regulations that have been given.

This study uses the Indonesian banking sector as a research subject that raises the effectiveness of the implementation of the use of RegTech to prevent money laundering and terrorism financing.

The purposes of this paper are to discuss the short-term economic impact of the jurisdictions that have been identified as deficient countries in terms of the regime of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism and to identify the probable reasons for the poor results of mutual evaluation reports of the deficient countries.

This study uses a case study approach to discuss the short-term economic impact of the countries that are under the International Co-operation Review Group (ICRG) process due to poor results of mutual evaluation reports. The sample of countries for the study was selected based on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) listing as of November 30, 2019. The objectives of the study are expected to be achieved by discussing the issues of these jurisdictions based on publicly available information. However, this study will not consider the long-term economic impact on the countries due to the observed short-term nature of the ICRG process.

This analysis reveals that the ICRG process affects countries in two different perspectives. First, there are implications on the financial system of a deficient country as a result of identifying it as a high-risk country. Second, there are some other forms of economic implications due to the rigorous ICRG process. The downgrading of the sovereign rating by international and credit rating agencies is one of such implications that result in adding a risk premium to the country. This results in increased transaction costs and borrowing costs of deficient countries. Besides, it appears that the ICRG process impacts the capital and currency markets of deficient countries as a result of enhanced due diligence process on fund transfers and limitations in corresponding banking relationships. However, despite these difficulties, some countries have been identified more than once for the ICRG process. Therefore, such countries have to take measures to strengthen the anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime to avoid future listing. However, long-term sustainability of the countries that were removed from the FATF grey-listing is also questionable under the current FATF methodology of evaluating countries because of the level of effectiveness depends on the judgment of assessors on the risk and context of countries rather the technical compliance.

This study was limited to the countries that were in the grey list as of November 30, 2019. The countries exited from the list have not been considered for the study.

This paper is an original work done by the author by discussing the issues of the ICRG process in respect of deficient countries in view of strengthening the AML/CFT regimes of such countries.

To gauge the extent to which the global financial system is anti‐money laundering (AML)/countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) prepared by analysing and comparing the AML/CFT systems of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) members with countries belonging to regional AML organisations.

Mutual evaluation data of 16 FATF members and 21 non‐FATF countries is analysed and compared using Kruskal‐Wallis and paired‐t tests to determine similarities and differences across the two groups of countries.

AML/CFT systems of FATF members and non‐FATF countries are poor. The lack of compliance with global AML/CFT standards leaves so many holes in these countries' regulatory, financial, and legal systems that money laundering with or without any relationship to the financing of terrorism, would be relatively easy to achieve.

In using an analytical approach it has been necessary to put numerical values on compliance levels used by the FATF. Given that these are very broad, substituting a single value for each compliance level will provide only a crude measure of compliance for comparisons to be made. The results should therefore be used as a guide to the ranking and compliance of countries rather than some exact measurement of compliance.

There will need to be follow‐up visits to this round of mutual evaluations to evaluate country responses to their poor assessments.

Publication of mutual evaluations by the FATF and a number of regional bodies has enabled a comparison of AML/CFT systems from countries around the world. Lack of data has not enabled this to be done before.

The purpose of this study is to assess whether level of income of a particular country affects the level of effectiveness in anti-money laundering (AML)/ countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) supervision to identify the most important recommendations in achieving high level of effectiveness and critically discuss the findings of the fourth round evaluations with the outcome of first two objectives.

The level of effectiveness was rated in terms of a four-point Likert scale given 4 for high, 3 for substantial, 2 for moderate and 1 for low level of effectiveness. The countries were ranked using a four-point Likert scale given 4 for high income, 3 for upper middle income, 2 for lower middle income and 1 for low income countries as per the categorisation of World Bank list of economies (World Bank, 2017). For the purpose of estimation, level of effectiveness was rated in terms of a four-point Likert scale given 4 for high, 3 for substantial, 2 for moderate and 1 for low level of effectiveness. The level of technical compliance was ranked using a five-point Likert scale given 5 for compliant, 4 for largely compliant, 3 for partially compliant, 2 for non-compliant and 1 for not applicable as per the ratings given in FATF 2013 methodology (FATF, 2013).

It was observed that the level of income of a particular jurisdiction has a positive relationship with the level of effectiveness in AML/CFT supervision. Statistical analysis reveal that AML/CFT framework on regulation and supervision of financial institutions (Recommendation 26) and providing guidance and feed back to reporting entities (Recommendation 34) have significant impact on effectiveness level on AML/CFT supervision over the powers of supervisors (Recommendation 27), regulation and supervision of designated non-financial business and professions (Recommendation 28) and sanctions (Recommendation 35).

The research was limited to 36 fourth round mutual evaluation reports.

This paper is an original work done by the author as a result of the experience which the author received involving as an assessor in mutual evaluations.

The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of global anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standards on combating money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) efforts. This study will assess the impact of AML/CFT legal framework as well as the effective implementation of the framework on combating crimes.

The author develops an AML/CFT effectiveness index using the results of 11 immediate outcomes in mutual evaluation reports to measure the overall effectiveness of regimes in combating ML/TF. In addition to this index, the AML/CFT compliance index is used to measure the strength of the AML/CFT legal framework of countries. A model was developed and tested to measure the impact of the AML/CFT legal framework and its effective implementation on corruption, bribery, terrorism and crimes.

The results suggest that the effective implementation of the AML/CFT legal framework is important to combat ML/TF. The existence of a sound AML/CFT legal framework alone will not be sufficient to combat ML/TF. Therefore, countries are required to implement their legal framework effectively to achieve the AML/CFT goals of the country as well as the global policymaker. The empirical results show a significant relationship between the AML/CFT effectiveness index with the proxies the author used to capture corruption, bribes and crimes. Considering the wide range of implications of the crimes, which are related to ML/TF, this study suggests the global policymakers to further strengthen the monitoring mechanism of AML/CFT deficient countries to protect the global financial systems from criminals.

There is a dearth of studies on the impact of the effectiveness of the AML/CFT regime on combating ML/TF. Therefore, this study will lay the foundation for future studies on measuring the effectiveness of an AML/CFT regime. More appropriate measures will be developed in the future based on this foundation.

This paper is an original work done by the author, which discusses the impact of Financial Action Task Force standards on combating ML/TF. The AML/CFT effectiveness index is the original idea of the author, which can be used as a quantitative measure to capture the effectiveness of the AML/CFT regimes in future studies.

This paper aims to compute a measure for anti-money laundering/counter-financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) compliance and investigate its determinants.

Using the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations and assigning weights to them, the study computes a measure for AML compliance. Further, the determinants of AML compliance were investigated using ordinary least squares (OLS) data of 155 countries between 2004 and 2016.

The findings suggest that AML compliance have slightly improved over the years. Further, the OLS regression results show that technology, regulatory quality, bank concentration, trade openness and financial intelligence center significantly determined and improved AML compliance.

From the findings, it is evident that countries that wish to improve the AML compliance should focus more on technology, regulatory quality, structure of the banking sector, size of the economy and institution of financial intelligence center so as to enhance AML compliance.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this paper reveals a first AML/CFT compliance index that measures the cross-country level of AML/CFT compliance from the year 2004 to 2016. Subsequently, this paper adopted an OLS econometric model to identify the key determinants of AML/CFT compliance among member states of FATF.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the dilemma of digital banking and the financial inclusion agenda of countries with the level of strength of the anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime.

This study develops an AML/CFT compliance index using the assessment data of FATF to measure the level compliance strength of countries to measure the impact of the strength of the AML/CFT regime on the financial inclusion. Financial literacy, literacy, number of bank branches and income level of countries are used as other control variables in regression analysis, which is used to test the developed model.

The results suggest that the AML/CFT compliance level of a country is a significant factor in determining the level of financial inclusion. Besides, the number of bank branches for 100,000 people, literacy and financial literacy are significant factors in financial inclusion. However, the results reveal that financial literacy is significant over literacy in determining financial inclusion. Therefore, having considered the importance of the AML/CFT regime for financial inclusion, regulators are required to strengthen the AML/CFT regime and make clarity on the AML/CFT regulations. This clarity will promote the digitalization and financial inclusion over time.

Most of the studies related to financial inclusion and AML/CFT aspects are qualitative. Therefore, this is only the start of measuring the strength of an AML/CFT regime. More appropriate measures will be developed in the future based on this foundation.

This paper is an original work done by the author, which discusses the issues of digital banking and financial inclusion agenda of countries with the compliance strength of the AML/CFT regime. The AML/CFT compliance index is the original idea of the author, which can be used as a quantitative measure to capture the strength of the AML/CFT regimes in future studies.

The purpose of this paper is to explore countering the financing of terrorism and its impact on financial institutions.

Actual examples of terrorist financing are considered, as well as the international and Canadian framework for financial institutions.

The system for countering the financing of terrorism can be improved to lower costs and risks to financial institutions and to enhance actionable intelligence. A balance must be sought between the objective, actionable intelligence and the mechanism used to advance that objective.

There is limited research on terrorism financing and little statistical data.

Some simple and modest reforms to the framework are suggested; policy makers need to consider their goals and revaluate the existing framework.

There is little writing in this area. This paper would be of interest to financial institutions, regulators, law enforcement and the intelligence community.

The purpose of the paper was to examine the challenges inherent in harnessing the UN and other AML counter‐measures, paying particular attention to the United Nations Resolutions on countering financing of terrorism and why the UN Security Resolutions have not been easy to invoke. As regards other AML counter‐measures, the paper examined the legal status of soft law instruments, articulating the possible reasons why they are easy to implement.

The paper was written by the analysis of UN and other AML counter‐measures – which were evaluated in the gaze of how they have been implemented across states. While states are under an obligation to implement UN AML counter‐measures such as international treaties and soft law instruments, private banks as non‐state actors have exploited some loopholes in the law to flaunt them. This has undermined the efficacy of global AML counter‐measures. Many banks have been fined for violating UN sanctions on countries like Iran and Sudan. These examples were utilized in appraising the current UN and other AML counter‐measures across states.

The findings of the paper were compelling in demonstrating that global anti‐money laundering laws are often emasculated by the fact that they are implemented in the realm of international law. International law manifests itself within independent member states' vested strategic self‐interests. In the event of conflicts, national self‐interests will prevail. But again, money laundering is an opportunistic crime because it generates both synergies and externalities and the response of individual states often depends on how it is affected by it. It is wrong to assume as doing things in the realm of international law is not as easy as it is presumed to be.

It would have been better to carry out interviews so as to corroborate secondary data sources used in writing this paper. But due to some constraints, this option was not possible. It would also have been better to undertake the analysis of data based on a large sample of countries rather than cherry picking. While implementing AML counter‐measures in the realm of international law is necessary to foster international co‐operation, there are still some loopholes that need to be paid more attention.

The paper was written, analysed and evaluated based on the most recent literature on implementation of UN and other AML counter‐measures across countries. It also utilized the recent cases involving violations of UN AML counter‐measures by banks on sanctioned countries such as Iran and Sudan.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how intelligent terrorist financiers avoid detection when acquiring and subsequently transferring financial assets to finance terrorism. Particular emphasis is placed on cryptocurrency.

A qualitative content analysis of 30 semi-standardised expert interviews with both criminals and prevention experts led to the identification of means for the circumvention of current combat the financing of terrorism (CFT) measures with a focus on cryptocurrency.

The findings illustrate, for the benefit of law enforcement agencies, investigators, regulating authorities and legislators, the specific low-risk methods that terrorist financiers use to generate and transfer assets. These findings help to develop more effective prevention methods.

Qualitative findings from the analysis of semi-standardised interviews are limited to the 30 interviewees’ perspectives.

Identification of gaps in existing CFT mechanisms provides compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with valuable insights into how criminals operate.

The existing literature focuses on organisations that combat terrorist financing and the improvement of CFT measures. This article outlines how terrorist financiers avoid detection. Both preventative and criminal perspectives are considered.