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The concept of light-handed regulation, including light-handed approaches to the regulation of airport services, is discussed. The rationale for the economic regulation of airport services and the traditional approaches used for economic regulation of airport charges are summarized. The evolution of international practice of light-handed regulation is outlined, including the experience with minimal regulation across monopoly industries in New Zealand and the acceptance of “negotiated settlements” in utility industries in North America. General reasons for moving to light-handed regulation of airports include the disadvantages of the price cap approach in practice and the benefits of facilitating greater negotiation between airports and users. Comparisons are made between alternative approaches to light-handed regulation of airport services, including price and quality of service monitoring, information disclosure regulation and negotiate-arbitrate regulation, approaches that have been applied to airport services in Australia and New Zealand. The role and nature of the incentives under each approach are discussed. The chapter concludes that whether light-handed regulation provides a suitable alternative approach to direct regulation depends on the market circumstances and the design characteristics of the light-handed approach.

The purpose of this paper is to expose the necessity of introducing some degree of flexibility in the definition of wholesale access price of FTTx, in the EU competition regulatory framework, and incorporating new regulatory actions to boost investment substitutability to ensure that NRAs accomplish dynamic and/or static efficiency targets.

Given the European historical context, the current preponderance of cable and the strong heterogeneity in NGA networks rollout across Europe, a policy-oriented analysis defines a set of recommendations useful for member states whose NGA networks market is in a more advanced state of development.

Flexibility is necessary in jurisdictions holding a highly competitive NGA wholesale market at the three previously described levels to avoid that strong dynamic efficiency is passed-through into excessive retail prices which may decrease static efficiency in greater proportion, thereby generating a deadweight loss.

The novel measures pointed out are part of the on-going debate concerning the revision of the European regulatory framework for NGA networks.

This paper aims to study the competition problems and market failures in the Canary Islands and propose an alternative management model for the telecommunication transmission network. This model is based on a wholesale-only open-access transmission network, available to all the retail service providers of this region, and managed by a unique entity subject to regulation with cost-based prices. The proposal hopefully will help to debate about the implementation of certain regulatory models in the network industries, concerning telecommunication submarine cables connecting archipelagos.

An empirical approach has been used, based on the observation and analysis of the regulatory policies applied to the wholesale transmission networks in the Canary Islands, Azores and Madeira archipelagos.

Results show a persistent margin squeeze situation on the retail broadband market in the Canary Islands, due to the pricing strategy on the Spanish mainland-Canaries wholesale market, which is, in turn, delaying the entry of alternatives and the level of development and efficiency of competition. The risk of duopoly collusion is also present on this wholesale market. Additionally, public aids will be needed to replace the systems connecting with the non-capital islands and to provide redundancy to El Hierro. The alternative proposal might help preventing the above. Eventually, several insights are considered for further investigation.

Little attention has been paid to this topic in the literature, regarding the analysis of regulatory policies applied over fiber optic submarine cable infrastructures in fragmented territories like archipelagos. Consequently, an empirical analysis has been accomplished to emphasize this research work, based on the regulatory policies adopted.

A typology of interventionism can categorize regulations, taxes, and subsidies both theoretically and as they sequentially unfold in practice. This typology is inspired by, but broader than, the Mises interventionist thesis, which, similar to Madison's lament, recognizes the propensity of intervention to expand from its own shortcomings in the elusive quest to achieve economic rationality (Lavoie, 1982, p. 180; Ikeda, 1997, pp. 41–46; Bradley, 2006).

There are only a limited number of empirical analyses on the impacts of MTRs. According to the data from 2006-2011 by the European Regulators Group (ERG), many countries have continuously reduced their MTRs. This paper therefore aims to enrich the empirical analysis of the impacts of MTRs according to EC policy on retail prices.

This paper applies the one-step generalised method of moments (GMM) approach to dynamic panel data.

The results support the hypothesis that lower MTRs will reduce consumer retail prices, which is consistent with the EC framework. It is therefore recommended that regulators in the calling party network pays (CPNP) regime reduce MTRs to at least the same level as the operators' cost to raise overall social welfare, especially consumer welfare. However, the approach by each country can differ depending on its situation.

This study supports the idea that it is appropriate for the EC to regulate MTRs by reducing the rates to at least the same level as the efficient operators' cost, and other regulators with a calling party network pays regime from other regions could also follow this strategy.

The twin objectives of power sector reforms in India – improving efficiency and attracting private investment – are far from being achieved. It is commonly acknowledged that competition in the sector can help achieve the objectives of the reforms, but although the Electricity Act of 2003 promised to usher in competition, even after seven years of its enactment there is very little competition in generation and absolutely no competition in retail supply. This paper seeks to find a road map for the introduction of competition in the power sector in India by discussing and drawing upon the US model of deregulating generation and retail supply whilst simultaneously keeping transmission and distribution under regulation.

The study is a historical analysis of deregulation in the US power sector and its relevance for India by drawing upon both primary and secondary resources.

The introduction of competition in the USA has brought substantial gains for the consumer and India can follow this model by mandating all distribution utilities to procure their future requirement of power through open competitive bidding. For retail competition, the system of provider of last resort (POLR) with POLR price being fixed with reference to market price can be the way forward.

This paper offers some practical and implementable suggestions for introducing competition in the power sector in India.

Unbundling has been the widely adopted regulatory solution to introducing competition in the local loop. But what is the aim of unbundling? Is it an end in itself, or a means to an end? Experience from around the world suggests there is as yet no clear cut evidence one way or the other that unbundling encourages facilities competition, or that it encourages investment in broadband networks in particular. This article considers the case for unbundling the local loop in Hong Kong and examines the experience in countries such as the EU, the UK, USA, Canada, South Korea and Japan.

Re‐estimates the famous study by Stigler and Friedland (1962) that examines the impact of regulation on the price of electricity. Employs time‐series data in the analysis, in light of recent extensions of the Stigler‐Peltzman theory of regulation. By modelling regulatory behaviour as an endogenous variable in a simultaneous system the model suggests that regulatory agencies are more likely to respond to the concerns of the firms that are being regulated. The regulatory authorities use their political power to regulate when the price of electricity (and hence, producer profits) falls over time.

Incentive regulation has become an important regulatory tool in the telecommunications industry in the USA. The issue explored here is whether incentive regulation has resulted in an increase in productive efficiency. After providing an overview of the nature of incentive regulation, a methodology for measuring technical efficiency and its change is introduced. This is a multiple‐output/multiple‐input distance function approach to measuring technical efficiency. The results of implementing this approach for 19 local exchange carriers for the 1988‐1999 period indicate that, in the production of local service, intrastate toll/access service, and interstate access to local loops, there was no change in technical efficiency between the 1988‐1990 and the 1991‐1999 periods, something that incentive regulation was specifically designed to promote.