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Prior research suggests that given the legal environment in the U.S., smaller syndicates with fewer lead banks should represent “best practices” to promote efficient monitoring and ease of renegotiation. Such syndicates should be associated with lower loan spreads. Controlling for other influences on loan pricing, we conduct tests of this proposition drawing on data from DealScan, Compustat and Federal Reserve Call Reports for U.S. loans between 1988 and 1999. Consistent with our hypothesis, the number of lead lenders is shown to have a significant positive influence on loan yield spreads.

This chapter studies banks’ loan pricing behavior in mainland China during 2003–2013 by applying panel regressions to firm-level loan data and the estimated default likelihood for listed companies. The authors find that with the progress of market-oriented financial reforms, banks generally require compensation for their exposure to borrowers’ default risks. It is even more so if the borrower is a non-state-owned enterprise (non-SOE), mainly due to the pricing behavior of the Big Four banks. Bank lending rates are shown to be less sensitive to the default risks of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Our results also reveal that banks priced in firm default risks before 2008 financial crisis, but not necessarily so after the crisis. As for industries, we find that after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the real estate sector and other government-supported industries tended to enjoy better terms on loan pricing in terms of default risks. We believe the main reason is that the government stimulus policies tilted toward those industries that have played crucial roles in China’s economic growth.

The paper investigates whether stock liquidity of firms is valued by lending banks revealing that firms with higher liquidity in the capital market pay lower spreads for the loans they obtain. This relationship is causal as evidenced by using the decimalization of tick size as an exogenous shock-to-stock liquidity in a difference-in-differences setting. Reduction in financial constraint and improvement in corporate governance induced by higher stock liquidity are potential mechanisms through which liquidity impacts loan spreads. These higher liquidity firms also receive less stringent nonprice loan terms, for example, longer loan maturity and less required collateral.

This chapter examines the effect of creditors’ monitoring role on the profitability of firm acquisitions. We use the shares retained by the lead arranger of a syndicated loan as a proxy for monitoring level. We find that acquirer announcement returns are positively related to the shares retained by the lead arranger. The effect of the lead arranger’s shares on the acquirer’s return becomes pronounced in cash acquisition deals, and when there exist financial covenants. Our results suggest that lead arrangers are important not only for monitoring loans but also for successful acquisitions by borrowers. An important policy implication of the main findings of this chapter on bank monitoring is that policy makers should design financial covenants to improve the efficiency of monitoring activities by lead arranging banks in syndicated bank loan deals.

Over the last decade, foreign currency indebtedness in Hungary has become a systemic financial problem, and its crippling impact on the real economy has been aggravated by its significant constraints on economic policy. In international comparative terms, however, there are certain specific features relating to Hungary which make this issue particularly problematic, and during the financial crisis both exchange rates and interest rates were important factors in increasing the burden on individual households. We present here a case study whereby our research focuses on the causes and determining factors of the pricing of Swiss franc-denominated mortgage loans. Our empirical exercise examines four potential price shocks which might have affected the pricing decisions of credit institutions: foreign currency interest rates, the country risk premiums (measured by Credit Default Swap (CDS) spread), the deteriorating quality of the loan portfolio and the taxes levied on banks. The questions which arise concern the relationship of these costs to the changes in interest rates and the extent to which these cost shocks were passed on by banks to their clients. Empirical evidence based on Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) shows a significant long-run relationship between cost factors and CHF denominated mortgage loans interest rates — with a reasonable sign and magnitude of parameters, but also with moderate forecasting power. Finding a tractable solution to the foreign currency debt trap is only possible if a fair distribution of burdens is achieved, and this should be supported by empirical facts. At the end of the day, all three affected parties (debtors, banks, and the Hungarian State) had made their contribution, but how fair and reasonable the distribution was remains an open issue for further research.

We extend Diamond's (1989, 1991) life-cycle hypothesis to posit that, once they reach the stage of bank borrowing, firms begin with prime loans and evolve toward borrowing more cheaply at LIBOR as they grow larger, less risky and less characterized by asymmetric information. We conduct multinomial logit regressions to explain firms’ membership in one of three groups: prime only, prime and LIBOR, and LIBOR. We also examine spreads over prime and LIBOR and find that loans set up to allow borrowing at prime carry higher spreads than those allowing borrowing at LIBOR. Both sets of tests support the life-cycle hypothesis.