Bank monitoring and acquirer returns: Evidence from the U.S. syndicated loan market

Abstract

This chapter examines the effect of creditors’ monitoring role on the profitability of firm acquisitions. We use the shares retained by the lead arranger of a syndicated loan as a proxy for monitoring level. We find that acquirer announcement returns are positively related to the shares retained by the lead arranger. The effect of the lead arranger’s shares on the acquirer’s return becomes pronounced in cash acquisition deals, and when there exist financial covenants. Our results suggest that lead arrangers are important not only for monitoring loans but also for successful acquisitions by borrowers. An important policy implication of the main findings of this chapter on bank monitoring is that policy makers should design financial covenants to improve the efficiency of monitoring activities by lead arranging banks in syndicated bank loan deals.

Citation

Chung, H.J., Jang, E. and Park, K. (2013), "Bank monitoring and acquirer returns: Evidence from the U.S. syndicated loan market", Global Banking, Financial Markets and Crises (International Finance Review, Vol. 14), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 449-475. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-3767(2013)0000014018