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The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of controlling shareholders’ share pledging on goodwill impairment.

This study empirically investigates the effect of controlling shareholders’ share pledging on both the decision and amount of goodwill impairment for Chinese listed firms from 2007 to 2017.

This study finds that the proportion of controlling shareholders’ share pledging is negatively related to both impairment decisions and amounts; these negative relationships are intensified when firms face high stock price crash risks. In addition, the empirical results show that firms with larger share pledging are less likely to recognize goodwill impairment or are likely to record relatively smaller impairment amounts when they are followed by fewer financial analysts.

Most of the relevant literature has focused on managers’ behaviors toward goodwill impairments, while less attention has been given to goodwill impairments from the perspective of controlling shareholders. In fact, controlling shareholders may have strong incentives to protect their control rights when they exercise disproportionate control rights, especially in China. Given the high ownership concentration, prior studies may not have adequately explained the agency problem of controlling shareholders in goodwill impairment. This study uses share pledging as a case to fill this gap. Specifically, it investigates whether both goodwill impairment decisions and amounts are affected by controlling shareholders’ share pledging.

The information of pledging stocks for liquidity by controlling shareholders of publicly traded firms in Taiwan has been required to disclose since 1998. A common perception by market practitioners in Taiwan is that stock pledging by controlling shareholders is an indication of expropriation of firms. This study first examines the determinants of the tendency that controlling shareholders of firms in Taiwan pledge their stocks to financial institutions for liquidity and then evaluates how stock pledging by controlling shareholders affects their firms' accounting and financial performances. Determinants of firm attributes, market conditions, and corporate governance are identified. The tendency of stock pledging by controlling shareholders has a negative effect on accounting and financial performances. The negative effect on firm performance is reduced when the firm has a higher level of working capital. These findings indicate that stock pledging by controlling shareholders is an indication of weak corporate governance when the firm has lower liquidity. These findings may provide insights to the equity markets of the other countries in which public firms have more concentrated ownerships.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of share pledging by controlling shareholders on earnings informativeness.

Using a sample of 23,120 firm-year observations from 2003 to 2019 in China, this paper examines how share pledging by controlling shareholders affects earnings informativeness, measured by earnings persistence and earnings response coefficients.

This paper finds that share pledging by controlling shareholders makes earnings less informative. The adverse impacts are more pronounced when share pledging distorts incentives of controlling shareholders to a greater extent and when the signaling of share pledging about a firm’s weak future performance is stronger. Finally, this paper further shows that the 2018 new regulation on share pledging effectively alleviates the negative impacts of share pledging on earnings informativeness.

First, this paper adds to the growing literature on the economic consequence of share pledging by documenting the adverse impacts of share pledging on earnings informativeness. The literature on the economic consequence of share pledging is often mixed, which justifies further research on the impacts of share pledging on earnings informativeness. Second, this paper documents a new signaling channel through which share pledging affects earnings informativeness. Third, the finding of this paper on the 2018 new regulation on share pledging may be interesting to research agencies, such as the Chartered Financial analyst institute and Institutional Shareholder Services institute that recommend tightening regulations on share pledging.

The authors analyze the effects of controlling shareholders' stock pledging on firms' strategic change behavior, and investigate how the balance of power between shareholders and analyst coverage moderates those effects.

Employing fixed effects models, the authors test hypotheses based on Chinese listed company data from 2011 to 2017.

Controlling shareholders' stock pledges has a negative effect on strategic change. As the balance of power among shareholders and/or analyst coverage increases, it mitigates the effect of controlling shareholder stock pledges on strategic change. In particular, the balance of power between shareholders and analyst coverage weakened the relationship between controlling shareholder stock pledges and strategic change. Lastly, after distinguishing family from nonfamily firms, the authors discovered that these findings only held for family firms.

This study makes important contributions to strategic change, stock pledge and family firm literature, and also provides guidance on firms' strategic change practices.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between accounting conservatism and pledging of shares by controlling shareholders of a firm to obtain a loan. The pledging of shares by the controlling shareholders of a firm results in alterations to the payoff and risk structure for these shareholders. Since accounting numbers have valuation implications, pledging of shares by a controlling shareholder has an impact on accounting policy choices made by the firm. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of controlling shareholder share pledging to obtain a loan on a specific accounting policy choice, namely, conservatism.

The paper uses a large data set from India comprising 14,786 firm years consisting of 1,570 firms belonging to 58 industries for a period of 11 years (2009–2019). The authors use ordinary least square regression with robust standard errors. The authors conduct robustness checks and the results are consistent across alternative statistical methodologies and alternative measures of the primary dependent and independent variables.

The primary results show that pledging of shares by the controlling shareholders results in higher conditional conservatism and lower unconditional conservatism. Further analysis reveals that the relationship is stronger when the controlling shareholder holds a majority ownership in the firm. Additionally, the results show that for business group affiliated firms, which are unique to developing countries, both the conditional and the unconditional conservatism are incrementally lower when the controlling shareholder pledges the shares. For family firms with a family member as CEO, the conditional conservatism is incrementally higher and the unconditional conservatism is incrementally lower. Finally, the authors show that the results hold when the pledge intensity variable is measured with a one-year lag and finally, the authors show that conditional conservatism is incrementally higher in the year of the increase in the pledge and the year after, but there is no such incremental impact on unconditional conservatism.

The research is limited to the listed firms in India. Since majority of the listed firms are controlled by families and the family firms around the world are heterogeneous the findings of the research may not be applicable to other countries.

The study has implications for policy-making and monitoring of the pledging by the controlling shareholders. It also helps the investors in making investment decisions with respect to family firms in India.

The study is unique as it focuses on the relationship between pledging of shares by the controlling shareholders and its impact on accounting conservatism. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first research integrating these two aspects.

This paper investigates whether the audit fees of Chinese listed firms are associated with the share pledging practice of the firm’s controlling shareholders.

This study uses the audit pricing model to estimate the association between the share pledging of listed firms and audit fees. Cross-sectional analysis is conducted on a large sample of Chinese listed firms during the period 2004 to 2019. The authors further test the moderating effects of listing on the Main Board, state ownership and abnormal audit report lag on the association between share pledging and audit fees. The results remain robust to various endogeneity tests including two-stage least squares instrumental variable analysis, entropy balancing analysis and difference-in-difference analysis.

The study finds that audit fees are positively associated with the proportion of shares pledged by the listed firm’s controlling shareholder in China. The results also provide new evidence that the positive association between audit fees and the share pledging of controlling shareholders could be mitigated if the firm is listed on the Main Board and/or it is a state-owned enterprise. In contrast, pledged firms with abnormal audit report lag are found to have higher audit fees than their pledged counterparts without the excessively long audit delay.

Findings of this study have important practical implications to those charged with governance, as boards need to comprehensively understand the adverse consequences of share pledging when pursuing it as the firm’s major source of financing. The study also has policy implications for stock market regulators such as the China Securities Regulatory Commission in China. Regulators could consider developing a threshold-based share pledging disclosure and pledge ratio requirements based on factors such as a firm’s listing status and ownership structure.

This study provides new evidence on the audit-related consequences of share pledging in a significant capital market. Findings of this study also enrich the existing audit literature by introducing the share pledging activities of controlling shareholders into the audit pricing decision-making model.

Share pledge is a popular way to raise funds in China, but it aggravates information asymmetry. As an indispensable information intermediary in the financial market, media coverage affects asset price and pricing efficiency and impacts information asymmetry. This study aims to explore the governance role of media coverage as an information intermediary in the share pledge context in China.

Moderating effect and mediating effect analyses are the primary methods used to test the governance role of media coverage. The ordinary least squares model was used to test the relationship between share pledge and market performance and then proved the moderating effect of media coverage toward the corporate market value of pledge firms. Accounting earnings value relevance models were explored to test the path of media coverage on firm market value by mediating effect analysis. At last, subgroup tests were used to verify the heterogeneity of the moderating effect of media coverage.

In the context of share pledge in China, the higher the share pledge ratio, the higher is the market value of listed firms, which verifies the motivation of controlling shareholders to avoid the transfer of control right and the motivation to tunneling. Media coverage has a significant negative moderating effect on the relationship between share pledge rate and corporate value and has a significant impact on the accounting earnings value relevance of share pledge firms. From the perspective of long-term earnings, media coverage reduces the market performance of share pledge firms by reducing the value correlation of accounting earnings information. From the short-term price point of view, media coverage reduces the market performance of share pledge firms by improving the value correlation of accounting earnings information. Furthermore, media coverage has a more significant moderating effect in state-owned share pledge firms and low information transparency and low information disclosure quality firms.

This paper does not distinguish the mode difference of spreading news and the impact of non-pledge media coverage. Also, this paper does not consider factors other than accounting information value relevance when exploring how media coverage affects the corporate market value. Share pledge firms should use media for publicity and play a role in media governance and should actively improve their information disclosure quality, strengthen communication with investors and reduce information asymmetry fundamentally.

This paper diversify the governance choices for share pledge firms and has important implications for firms, investors, information intermediaries and regulators. Media reports play an increasingly important role today, and any reports and predictions of major events may profoundly affect investors’ decisions. Although media reports can make up for the weakness of accounting information disclosure of equity pledge companies in some sense, it is still not a long-term strategy. Equity pledge companies should not only make use of media for publicity and play a role of media governance but also actively improve their information disclosure quality.

This paper focuses on share pledge firms to carry out in-depth research. Based on exploring the influence mechanism of share pledges, the authors find the importance of media governance. This paper expands the literature about the economic consequences of share pledges and provides empirical data for media governance of share pledge firms. This paper innovatively proves the governance role of media coverage from the view of accounting information value relevance. The main innovation point is the long and short-term perspective analysis of the influence of media coverage on the correlation of accounting earnings value. The heterogeneity effect analysis of media coverage also reflects the depth and strong practical guiding significance of this study.

This study aims to explore the relationship between promoter share pledging and the company’s dividend payout policy in India. Furthermore, this study also analyses the moderating impact of family involvement in business on the association between share pledging and dividend payout.

A sample of 236 companies from the S&P Bombay Stock Exchange Sensitive (BSE) 500 Index (2014–2023) has been analysed through fixed-effects panel data regression. For additional testing, robustness checks include alternative measures of dividend payout and promoter share pledging, as well as alternative methodologies such as Bayesian regression. Lastly, to address potential endogeneity, instrumental variables with a two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) methodology have been implemented.

Upholding the agency perspective, a significantly negative impact of promoter share pledging on corporate dividend payouts in India has been uncovered. Moreover, family involvement in business moderates this relationship, highlighting that the negative association between promoter share pledging and dividend payouts is more pronounced in family companies. The findings are consistent throughout the robustness testing.

The present study represents a pioneering endeavour to empirically analyse the link between promoter share pledging and dividend payouts in India. It enhances the theoretical underpinnings of the agency relationship, particularly by substantiating the existence of Type II agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. The findings of this research bear significant implications for investors, researchers and policymakers, particularly in light of the widespread prevalence of promoter-controlled entities in India.

This study aims to discuss whether a new accounting policy can help enterprises withstand operating risks and whether corporate governance can play a supervisory role. Taiwan took the lead worldwide in allowing companies to distribute cash dividends from capital reserves. Compared with traditional cash dividends distributed from retained earnings, this move was aimed at maintaining the stability of cash dividends and helping listed companies address the risks of temporary downturns. However, the distribution of cash dividends from capital reserves may violate the principle of capital maintenance and damage creditors’ equity. The authors sought to examine whether corporate governance could play a supervisory role.

The present study targeted Taiwanese listed companies and cited data from the Taiwan Economic Journal. The study period was from 2011–2019. The authors tested the hypotheses using the least square method.

The results showed that ultimate controlling shareholders of listed companies can maximize their own interests through ownership arrangements, whereas corporate governance cannot play a supervisory role nor protect creditors’ equity. The findings provide insight on whether, in the development process of corporate governance, appropriate measures are taken to protect creditors’ equity in addition to shareholders’ equity, or achieve a good coordination of interests among all stakeholders.

The ultimate controlling shareholders or directors of a listed company would seek to maximize their own interests, and transfer the operating risks to creditors through the arrangement of dividend policy, thus harming creditors’ equity. However, independent directors cannot play a supervisory role. The authors inferred that corporate governance standards previously focused on the shareholder level or alleviation of the agency problem between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders but ignored creditors’ equity.

Despite the widespread prevalence of share pledging by Indian promoters, this area remains out of the researchers’ purview. This study aims to bridge this research gap by delineating the impact of promoter share pledging on future stock price crash risk and financial performance in India.

A sample of 257 companies listed on the Standard and Poor’s Bombay Stock Exchange 500 (S&P BSE 500) Index has been analysed using panel (fixed-effects) data regression methodology over 2011–2020. Further, alternative proxies for crash risk and financial performance are adopted to ensure that the study’s initial findings are robust. Finally, the instrumental variable with the two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) method has also been employed to alleviate endogeneity concerns.

The results suggest a significantly positive relationship between promoter share pledging and future stock price crash risk in India. Conversely, this association is significantly negative for future financial performance. Moreover, the results hold, even after including alternative proxies of stock price crash risk and financial performance and addressing endogeneity concerns.

Owing to the sizeable equity shareholdings of the promoters, share pledging has remained a lucrative source of finance in India. Despite the popularity, the findings of this study question the relevance of share pledging by Indian promoters considering its impact on aggravating future stock price crash risk and deteriorating future financial performance.