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This study aims to examine the consequences of tax authorities’ use of concession-timing negotiation strategies on tax practitioners and their final proposed offers.

This is an experimental study conducted on tax practitioners using a design of 2 × 1, varying the tax authorities’ negotiation strategy (i.e. concession-gradual and concession-end strategies) across two levels.

The concessionary negotiation strategies adopted by tax authorities influence tax practitioners’ final proposed offers, their perceptions of fairness (i.e. distributive justice and procedural justice) and their aggressiveness of stance in tax audit negotiations.

This experimental study contributes to existing research on tax authority-tax practitioner negotiation models used during tax audits by providing the first evidence that concession timing matters. The study extends the negotiation model to include tax aggressiveness as a new variable and examines the indirect roles of fairness and offers in tax audit negotiations.

This study aims to explore the effect of negotiating audit differences on auditors’ internal control deficiency (ICD) severity assessments, an ensuing, non-negotiated judgment, in an integrated audit.

The experiment manipulates the client’s concession timing strategy as either immediate or gradual, holding the outcome constant. A total of 34 auditors (primarily managers) resolve an audit difference with the client.

The client’s concession timing strategy during the negotiation of an audit difference spills over to affect auditors’ severity assessment of a related ICD. Auditors judged the ICD severity to be higher (lower) in the immediate (gradual) condition. Client retention risk inferences mediate this effect.

The effect on auditors’ ICD severity assessments may not ultimately affect the audit report. Participants did not control their negotiation strategy, allowing the client’s negotiation strategy and the outcome to be held constant; it is possible that interactive effects between the client and auditor’s strategy might affect the study’s implications.

Features of the auditor–client negotiation process may influence auditors’ downstream, post-negotiation judgments and may therefore help to explain empirical evidence and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board inspection findings that show auditors often fail to identify an internal control material weakness after identifying a financial statement misstatement.

This paper expands current negotiation research by exploring the impact of inferences made based on counterparty concession strategy for downstream, non-negotiated judgments and current integrated audit research by identifying client retention perceptions as a driving factor of lower ICD severity assessments.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate a number of promises typically made by owners of professional sports franchises in the USA that are also typically ignored or underevaluated by public bureaus and their elected principals using the Barclays Center in Brooklyn, New York as a case study. Ex post subsidy outcomes are evaluated against ex ante subsidy promises in order to draw lessons that can inform and improve subsidy debates elsewhere.

The case study adopts a pre-post strategy drawing on data from multiple sources over a period of up to ten years in order to triangulate the narrative and build credibility. The franchise owner’s ex ante promises and financial projections were obtained from various media including newspaper, video and interviews between December 2003, when the arena was publicly announced, and September 2012, when the arena opened. Data on ex post outputs were obtained from financial documents and government records covering periods from September 2011 through June 2016.

The franchise owner is found to have exaggerated the arena’s financial condition, under-delivered on its employment promises, and exaggerated the scope and timeliness of ancillary real estate development. Only promises of event frequency and attendance levels, measures of the public’s demand for the facility, have been met during the first three years.

Because the evaluation is a case study, causal conclusions cannot be drawn and some aspects of the Barclays Center context may not be applicable in other jurisdictions or subsidy debates. In addition, the case study does not evaluate an exhaustive list of the promises franchise owners make.

Franchise owners have a financial incentive to overpromise public benefits, since subsidy levels are tied to what the public is perceived to receive in return. This case study demonstrates that the public sector should not take owners’ promises and projections of public benefits at face value. Moreover, the case study reveals that the public sector should put more effort into ensuring ex post policy and data transparency in order to facilitate benefit-cost analyses of such subsidies.

The data required to evaluate promises, other than economic development ones, made by franchise owners are not systematically collected across state and local governments in the USA, making large-n studies impossible. Case studies are underutilized approaches in this area of public affairs, and this paper illustrates their usefulness. By focusing on a single facility, an evaluation of the franchise owner’s less acknowledged and arguably more important promises about the facility and its local impact is possible.

The literature is rich with examples that stress the importance of marketers having long‐term customer relationships. Yet, the reality is that while relational attachments can foster benefits, there are many occasions when marketers seek, or are forced, to disband or change the nature of customer relationships. Interestingly however, despite the obviousness of this circumstance, this remains an unexamined strategic condition. In a unique investigation, this article explores the strategic opportunities and conditions that emanate from “relational unrest” in the business‐to‐business marketplace. Consequently, this article notes how sellers can benefit from understanding how to properly manage relational unrest. To address this issue, a strategic framework is proposed, which concludes that when sellers experience relational difficulties, strategic options with positive outcomes and related managerial implications can be associated with this condition.

The present study investigated the nature of Public–Private Partnership (PPP) in various subsectors of social and commercial infrastructure in India for better understanding of significant characteristics, attributes and factors governing the public private participation. The Indicator Analysis approach has been adopted to study a total of 119 Public–Private-partnered projects involving four qualitative and three quantitative indicators to help build a detailed profile of partnered projects in various subsectors of social and commercial infrastructure in India. The subnational government has been unravelled as the dominant form of government participation across all the subsectors of the social and commercial infrastructure in India. The infrastructure projects in the subsector of tourism have registered high average cost and time overruns. Further, Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) mode has been identified as the most preferred PPP entry mode in the social and commercial infrastructure in the Indian economy. Since, the Indian economy comprises a large workforce, investment in social and commercial infrastructure projects through PPP mode can tap and harness the demographic dividend, which is critical for sustaining the growth of developing and emerging economies. The study provides a detailed account of qualitative and quantitative information about the nature of social and commercial infrastructure sector that shall facilitate successful implementation of the PPP projects in this soft infrastructure sector, which has a substantial bearing on the economic growth and human development in the Indian economy.

Being an efficient mechanism for the value of money, public–private partnership (PPP) is one of the most prominent approaches for infrastructure construction. Hence, many controversies about the performance effectiveness of these delivery systems have been debated. This research aims to develop a novel performance management perspective by revealing the causal effect of key performance indicators (KPIs) on PPP infrastructures.

The literature review was used in this study to extract the PPPs KPIs. Experts’ judgment and interviews, as well as questionnaires, were designed to obtain data. Copula Bayesian network (CBN) has been selected to achieve the research purpose. CBN is one of the most potent tools in statistics for analyzing the causal relationship of different elements and considering their quantitive impact on each other. By utilizing this technique and using Python as one of the best programming languages, this research used machine learning methods, SHAP and XGBoost, to optimize the network.

The sensitivity analysis of the KPIs verified the causation importance in PPPs performance management. This study determined the causal structure of KPIs in PPP projects, assessed each indicator’s priority to performance, and found 7 of them as a critical cluster to optimize the network. These KPIs include innovation for financing, feasibility study, macro-environment impact, appropriate financing option, risk identification, allocation, sharing, and transfer, finance infrastructure, and compliance with the legal and regulatory framework.

Identifying the most scenic indicators helps the private sector to allocate the limited resources more rationally and concentrate on the most influential parts of the project. It also provides the KPIs’ critical cluster that should be controlled and monitored closely by PPP project managers. Additionally, the public sector can evaluate the performance of the private sector more accurately. Finally, this research provides a comprehensive causal insight into the PPPs’ performance management that can be used to develop management systems in future research.

For the first time, this research proposes a model to determine the causal structure of KPIs in PPPs and indicate the importance of this insight. The developed innovative model identifies the KPIs’ behavior and takes a non-linear approach based on CBN and machine learning methods while providing valuable information for construction and performance managers to allocate resources more efficiently.

The purpose of this paper is to develop a trading and pricing method of expansion option (EO) model to solve expansion problems of build-operate-transfer (BOT) freeway project.

This paper proposes an ex ante mechanism through trading the EO to avoid the transaction costs. By editing the paths generated from binomial option pricing model, this paper establishes an American real option binomial lattice model and evaluates the value of EO. Data are collected from Liaoning province in China and the model is practiced in the context of a BOT freeway in Liaoning province.

Supported by empirical evidence, this study finds out that there exists a minimum price at which the government can sell the EO and a maximum price that the private sector is willing to pay. When the minimum price is negative, the government should transfer the EO to the private sector free of charge to avoid the transaction costs. Otherwise, the government should sell the EO at a reasonable price to protect public interests.

The study can be used for the government to reducing the transaction costs. By using the trading EO model, the government can sell its share of the EO to the private sector to manage its resources efficiently.

This paper builds a trading EO model to solve expansion problems instead of renegotiations. In addition to reducing the transaction costs for the whole society, trading EO can also raise the respective payoffs of both public and private sectors. An EO trading framework and algorithm is further developed. It realized an American option model, making the owner can exercise the option whenever he wants. Thus, the whole model is adapted to best fit BOT highway practice.

State leaders’ decision-making calculus is often attributed to external factors. The political arena, international community pressure and a country’s military stance all take centre stage in the analysis of national security decisions. Little weight is given to personal aspects of a leader’s psyche in explaining these decisions; this is true to the bulk of the research regarding this topic. This study theorizes and tests a positive link between Israeli leaders’ combat military experience and their propensity to enter into ‘peacemaking’ decisions namely, peace talks, cease fires and unilateral withdrawals. This research uses a new database comprising all peacemaking decision points in Israel’s history, looking at the pressure put on a leader from outside factors and his military experience to explain the decision taken. It finds a strong significant link between combat experience and the tendency to enter in a peacemaking decision with little regard to ideological affiliation, shedding a new light on Israeli politicians from both sides of the aisle.

Targeting public–private partnership (PPP) projects, the purpose of this paper is to help decision makers fairly allocate financial risk between governments and private investors through a properly designed length of concession period.

On the one hand, the length of the concession period should be long enough to help private investors to achieve their expected profits. On the other hand, the length of a concession period cannot be decided without agreeing on an upper limit, since an overlong concession period takes too much time for governments to recover their investment and leads to an overly lucrative condition for private investors. Following this logic, the concession period decision range is decided, which defines the lower and upper limits for the length of the concession period. The net present values (NPVs) for governments and private investors are estimated via Monte Carlo simulation to better reflect the uncertainties. To further decide on the optimal length of the concession period, the principle of fair risk allocation between governments and private investors is adopted. The concession period, as an important project parameter, should help to minimize the financial risk gap between governments and private investors.

The developed concession period determination process is validated using a numerical example of a PPP transportation project. The analysis outcomes show that the proposed methodology is capable of determining the length of the concession period so as to control private investors’ profit within a reasonable range while achieving a fair allocation of financial risk between governments and private investors. The outcomes also indicate that, before determining the optimal length for the concession period, governments may need to make a choice between better financial risk allocation or stringent profit control for private investors.

The determination process developed here may be inapplicable to social infrastructure PPPs where the income stream is less predictable. In addition, the data analysis targets a highway project with a capital subsidy provided by the government. To strengthen the effectiveness of the proposed determination process, further research should apply the model to PPPs with other kinds of government support.

The concession period for a PPP project is an important parameter and it is a common practice for governments to predetermine the length of the concession period before inviting tenders. The existing models for determining the concession period focus too much on the simulation of NPVs for project parties and neglect the importance of risk allocation in signing and maintaining a long-term contract. There is also a lack of research to evaluate the influence of governments’ preferences on the length of the concession period. To overcome the limitations of the existing models and enrich the methodology for concession period determination, this paper contributes to the body of knowledge by developing a concession period determination process which can help governments to make better decisions. The financial risk is expected to be more evenly shared between governments and private investors with the concession period derived from the proposed process. This determination process is also capable of evaluating the influence of governments’ preferences on the length of the concession period.

A laboratory experiment examined the effects of time pressure (high versus low) and accountability to constituents (not‐accountable‐to‐constituents versus accountable‐to‐constituents) on the competitiveness of negotiators' interaction and on the outcome (i.e., agreement or impasse) of the negotiation. Using a newly developed negotiation game with the payoff structure of a game of chicken, we predicted and found an interaction effect. Based on the pattern of results we conclude that the effect of time pressure is contingent on the accountability to constituents of the negotiator. When negotiators are negotiating only for themselves, time pressure makes the negotiators act less competitive, and a higher proportion of the negotiations will result in an agreement. In contrast, when negotiators are negotiating on behalf of their con‐stituents, time pressure will result in more competitive interaction and in a higher proportion of impasses.