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Build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts are widely used in the construction and operation of charging piles for new energy vehicles worldwide and stipulate that governments grant charging pile operators franchises for a certain period of time to invest in the construction and operation of the charging piles. The charging piles are then transferred to governments when the concession expires. To encourage charging pile operators to build and operate charging piles, governments usually provide two kinds of subsidies, namely construction and operating subsidies.

The authors establish a typical game model to study the optimal BOT contract between a government and a charging pile operator and their preferences for the two kinds of subsidies.

First, the authors show that there are substitution and complementarity effects between the concession period and the subsidy level. Second, the operator prefers the construction subsidy (operating subsidy) when the additional operating cost is low (high). The government prefers the operating subsidy (construction subsidy) when consumer sensitivity to the number of charging piles is low (high) and the concession period is short or long (moderate). Finally, the adjusted joint subsidy can not only improve social welfare but also that the charging pile operator can obtain the same profit as under the operating subsidy at a lower subsidy amount.

This work develops the first analytical model to study two subsidies in the construction and operation of charging piles and investigate the optimal BOT contract and subsidy preferences. The insights are compelling not only for the charging pile operator but also for policymakers in practice from a circular economy perspective.

The net-present-value (NPV) method is well-known for its drawbacks. To overcome some of these NPV weaknesses this paper aims to provide a methodology to determine an optimal concession period that treats risk and time separately. The purpose of this paper is to apply the notion of risk-adjusted decoupled net present value (risk-adjusted DNPV) to determine a conception period taken into consideration synthetic insurance premiums as compensation for risks.

This paper conducts theoretical and empirical analysis and provides an integrated model for deriving concession periods of any PPP projects. The model is able to capture several contractual issues such risks costing and other contractual scenarios. Methodologically, the paper addressees both the issues of risk-based cost–benefit analysis and cash flow analysis bearing an emphasis of risk-adjusted DNPV to compute an optimum concession period.

The results show that using DNPV will produce a shorter concession period comparatively to NPV. The consequence of this is that the public sector will gain financially from an earlier transfer of the concession.

This paper contributes to the PPP literature by combing DNPV and risk to determine the PPP concession period for the mutual benefits both the private and public sectors. The decoupling of risk from traditional NPV computation will allow for risk pricing and tradability through insurance and allocation.

The attempt to decouple time and risk in the computation of NPV is the added value to the body of knowledge.

Targeting public–private partnership (PPP) projects, the purpose of this paper is to help decision makers fairly allocate financial risk between governments and private investors through a properly designed length of concession period.

On the one hand, the length of the concession period should be long enough to help private investors to achieve their expected profits. On the other hand, the length of a concession period cannot be decided without agreeing on an upper limit, since an overlong concession period takes too much time for governments to recover their investment and leads to an overly lucrative condition for private investors. Following this logic, the concession period decision range is decided, which defines the lower and upper limits for the length of the concession period. The net present values (NPVs) for governments and private investors are estimated via Monte Carlo simulation to better reflect the uncertainties. To further decide on the optimal length of the concession period, the principle of fair risk allocation between governments and private investors is adopted. The concession period, as an important project parameter, should help to minimize the financial risk gap between governments and private investors.

The developed concession period determination process is validated using a numerical example of a PPP transportation project. The analysis outcomes show that the proposed methodology is capable of determining the length of the concession period so as to control private investors’ profit within a reasonable range while achieving a fair allocation of financial risk between governments and private investors. The outcomes also indicate that, before determining the optimal length for the concession period, governments may need to make a choice between better financial risk allocation or stringent profit control for private investors.

The determination process developed here may be inapplicable to social infrastructure PPPs where the income stream is less predictable. In addition, the data analysis targets a highway project with a capital subsidy provided by the government. To strengthen the effectiveness of the proposed determination process, further research should apply the model to PPPs with other kinds of government support.

The concession period for a PPP project is an important parameter and it is a common practice for governments to predetermine the length of the concession period before inviting tenders. The existing models for determining the concession period focus too much on the simulation of NPVs for project parties and neglect the importance of risk allocation in signing and maintaining a long-term contract. There is also a lack of research to evaluate the influence of governments’ preferences on the length of the concession period. To overcome the limitations of the existing models and enrich the methodology for concession period determination, this paper contributes to the body of knowledge by developing a concession period determination process which can help governments to make better decisions. The financial risk is expected to be more evenly shared between governments and private investors with the concession period derived from the proposed process. This determination process is also capable of evaluating the influence of governments’ preferences on the length of the concession period.

This paper explores the impact of both government subsidies and decision makers' loss-averse behavior on the determination of transportation build-operate-transfer (BOT) concession periods based on cumulative prospect theory (CPT). The prospect value of a transportation project under traffic risk can be formulated according to the value function for gains and losses and the decision weight for gains and losses. As an extra income for investors, government subsidy is designed for highly risky aspects of BOT transportation projects: uncertain initial traffic volumes and fluctuating growth rates.

A decision-making model determining the concession period of a transportation BOT project is proposed by using the Monte-Carlo simulation method based on CPT, and the effects of risky behaviors of private investors on concession period decision making are analyzed. A subsidy method related to the internal rate-of-return (IRR) corresponding to a specific initial traffic volume and growth rate is proposed. The case of an actual BOT highway project is examined to illustrate how the method proposed can be used to determine the concession period of a transportation BOT project considering decision makers' loss-averse behavior and government subsidy. Contingency analysis is discussed to cope with possible misestimating of key factors such as initial traffic volume and cost coefficients. Sensitivity analysis is employed to investigate the impact of CPT parameters on the concession period decisions. An actual BOT case which failed to attract private capital is introduced to show the practical application. The results are then interpreted to conclude this paper.

Based on comparisons drawn between a concession period decision-making model considering the psychological behaviors of decision makers and a model not considering them, the authors conclude that the concession period based on CPT is distinctly different from that of the loss-neutral model. The concession period based on CPT is longer than the loss-neutral concession period. That is, loss-averse private investors tend to ask for long concession periods to make up for losses they will face in the future. Government subsidies serve as extra income for investors, allowing appointed profits to be secured sooner. For the benefit side of contingency variables, the normal state of initial traffic volume, average annual traffic growth rate and bias degree and the government subsidy need to be paid close attention during the project life span. For the cost side of contingency variables, the annual operating cost variable has a significant impact on the length of predicted concession period, while the large-scale cost variable has minor impact.

With an actual BOT highway project, the determination of transportation BOT concession periods based on the psychological behaviors of decision makers is analyzed in this paper. As the psychological behaviors of decision makers heavily impact the decision-making process, the authors analyze their impacts on concession period decision making. Government subsidy is specifically designed for various states of initial traffic volume and fluctuating growth rates to cope with corresponding high risks and mitigate private investors' loss-averse behaviors. Contingency analysis and sensitivity analysis are discussed as the estimated values of parameters may not be authentic in actual situations.

The purpose of this paper is to develop compensation mechanisms against risks factors that impact private party’s costs in concession-based projects as a basis for minimizing failure rate of concession contracts.

The study extended earlier work on the factors that impact private party’s costs in concession-based projects by developing compensation mechanisms against the risks factors. It commenced with semi-structured face-to-face interviews which were launched with different stakeholders organizations that had been involved in PPP contracts in the Southwestern Nigeria. Responses from the interview were analyzed using interpretative phenomenal analysis via ATLAS.ti6/7. The mechanisms identified from literature review were assessed through structured questionnaire which were administered on professionals selected from governmental-based organizations (ministries, agencies, corporations/parastatals, etc.), private developers/concessionaires, law firms, banks among others, using the respondent-driven sampling technique. The robustness of the quantitative data was achieved by including the initial respondents to the interview in the questionnaire survey. The quantitative data were analyzed using percentile for better understanding of the flexibility between “most” and “more” preferred mechanisms. The criterion for the selection of appropriate mechanism(s) for the factors was based on minimum average of 20.0 percent (the ratio of maximum percentage (100 percent) of the respondents to total number of variables) suggesting the five identified mechanisms. The results in both cases of qualitative and quantitative assessments were compared. Based on the convergences of the findings, preferred compensation mechanisms were developed against concession contract risk factors.

Options of mechanisms were developed against specific investment risks that are consequent to the defaults of the public party in PPP contracts. The findings indicate that the mechanisms in extant literature with respect to administration of traditional models are relevant for PPPs. The study, however, identified new concepts, including “compensative” “zero compensation,” “equitable sharing” and “adjustment of concession period,” which are suitable in specific cases of PPP contracts.

The study contributes to the body of knowledge on mechanisms for improving PPP project performance. Moreover, insights were provided on mechanisms that satisfy private investor in case of specific risk factors investigated. The findings are therefore expected to guide private party in the preparation of concession contract package that minimizes investments risks and thereby attracting more private investors both from local and international environments. The findings of the study would also contribute to the body of information for documenting standard conditions of concession contract in Nigeria.

Studies on critical performance factors on PPP were extended by developing compensation mechanisms against the investment risks that impact private party’s cost.

This study aims to examine the problems of the concession system that Macao has long-term adopted to regulate its gaming industry and discuss alternatives.

Theoretical reflection was used to provide qualitatively different insights about governmental supervision of the gaming industry.

Two options for reform are proposed: (1) replace the concession system with a licensing system that does not restrict the number of concessionaires or the period of concession or (2) adopt a modified form of the concession system that changes the number of concessionaires, period of concessions and methods for selecting concessionaires.

This study’s results have implications for the Macao government and other gaming jurisdictions in Asia.

This study provides a comprehensive examination of the concession system for governmental supervision of the gaming industry.

Concession contracts provide a mechanism for transferring the traditional public sector client roles of market research, project appraisal, project financing, operation and maintenance, and revenue generation associated with power station projects to the private sector organizations, formerly only responsible for turnkey design and construction. The recent research work undertaken in the Project Management Group, UMIST, has developed and validated a mechanism for the rapid appraisal of concession contracts. A case study example is presented to illustrate the significant features of the procurement of power projects using concession contracts.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the critical decision factors of public–private partnership (PPP) concession which is complex due to a number of uncertain and random variables. To identify critical factors contributing to determination of concession period, this study reviews the published literature. It also identifies countries contributing most in PPP research. As a whole, it provides a mutually beneficial scenario by formulating a decision-making matrix.

This paper reviews the literature published during the period 2005-2015. A two-staged methodology is followed on retrieved scholarly papers: first, countries contributing to PPP are identified along with authors and affiliated institutions. Second, using frequency analysis of shortlisted critical factors, yearly appearance and stakeholders affected, a decision matrix is formulated.

The most contributing country toward PPP research is China, followed by the USA both in terms of country- and author-based contribution. In total, 63 factors are identified that affect PPP concession out of which, 8 per cent are highly critical and 21 per cent are marginally critical for decision-making.

Critical factors of PPP concession period will be identified with the help of decision-making matrix. This will help in adequate resource allocation for handling critical factors ensuring project success. Researchers may also understand the research trends in the past decade to usher ways for future improvements.

This paper reports findings of an original and innovative study, which identifies critical success factors of PPP concession period and synthesizes them into a decision-making matrix. Many of the previous studies have identified and ranked the critical factors but such a synthesis has not been reported.

This case is based on the IPO of the first Infrastructure Investment Trust (InvIT) in India that was based on a portfolio of operating toll roads. InvIT enabled the construction company, which was also the sole equity investor, to release part of its equity to future toll road investments. The case describes the structure and functioning of the InvIT. It requires participants to assess its future potential for providing long term financing to not only toll roads but also other infrastructure projects.

This paper aims to propose a management model of public assets within public-private partnerships which can be applied to properties subject to a possible requalification through the redevelopment and/or modification of the intended use.

The logic developed is described by an algorithm which borrows the mathematical tools of Operations Research to identify the solution that maximises the utility functions of the parties related to the requalification and management of a public property. The unknowns of the model are the price and concession period, while the constraints reflect the specific and reciprocal conveniences of the actors involved.

The benefits for the private investor are a reduction of the business risk, related to the lower financial outlay required by the investment, and therefore easier access to credit from banks. For the public administration, an increase in the demand of the property offered, savings in the property management costs, along with the preservation of public property. This aspect of no small importance where there is the fear of breaking up public property which local communities attach a high cultural and historic value.

This leads to a logical support to public administrations involved in the requalification of property assets.

This paper presents a strategic approach with long-term prospects, which interprets in a different way a pure concession model, which has a greater flexibility and articulation and also enriches the framework of the projects (public-private) considered necessary for the requalification of public property as well as possible urban transformation projects.