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The purpose of this paper is to study the relational impact of using win-win or win-lose negotiation strategies within different types of buyer-supplier relationships.

A multi-method approach is used. Qualitative interviews with supply chain managers reveal that relationship-specific assets and cooperation are important relational factors in buyer-supplier negotiations. Framing interview insights within the social exchange theory (SET), hypotheses are tested using a scenario-based behavioral experiment.

Experimental results suggest that win-lose negotiators decrease their negotiating partner’s commitment of relationship-specific assets and levels of cooperation. In addition, the use of a win-lose negotiation strategy reduces levels of relationship-specific assets and cooperation more in highly interdependent buyer-supplier relationships than relationships that are not as close.

Buyer-supplier relationships are complex interactions. Negotiation strategy choice decisions can have long-term effects on the overall relationship. As demonstrated in this study, previous research focusing on one side “winning” a negotiation as a measure of success has oversimplified this complex phenomenon.

The use of a win-lose negotiation strategy can have a negative impact on relational outcomes like cooperation and relationship-specific assets. For companies interested in developing strong supply chain relationships, buyer and suppliers should choose their negotiation strategy carefully as the relational impact extends beyond the single negotiation encounter.

Previous research predominantly advocates for the use of a win-win negotiation strategy within interdependent relationships. This research offers evidence that the use of a win-lose strategy does have a long-term relational impact.

While industrial marketers have long bundled their products and services to sell them as packages, to what extent should negotiators also rely on packaging their offers? Clearly, negotiating at a package level can tax the cognitive capacity of the involved parties at some point. Therefore, this study aims to analyze the impact of the number and type of issues that should be negotiated simultaneously to leverage the package strategy efficiently and effectively in multi-issue buyer-seller negotiations.

The authors conducted and analyzed negotiation simulations with 676 students from 2 public universities.

The authors’ results suggest that negotiating three out of six issues simultaneously is the least efficient but most effective strategy in multi-issue buyer-seller negotiations. Moreover, they found that bundling distributive and integrative issues is more efficient and effective than only bundling distributive or integrative negotiation issues in a package offer.

Past research has examined the impact of negotiating a package as compared to each issue separately; however, little empirical attention has been directed toward understanding how to apply a package strategy in complex multi-issue negotiations.

In negotiation, pressures to reach an agreement are assumed to influence both the processes and the outcomes of the discussions. This paper metaanalytically combined different forms of time pressure to examine its effects on negotiator strategy and impasse rate. High time pressure was more likely to increase negotiator concessions and cooperation than low pressure as well as make agreements more likely. The effect on negotiator strategy, however, was stronger when the deadline was near or when negotiations were simple rather than complex. The effects were weaker when the opponent was inflexible and using a tough negotiation strategy. The effects on cooperative strategies were weaker when incentives for good performance were available than when they were not. Although time pressure in negotiation has significant effects, situational factors play a major role on its impact.

The purpose of this paper is to explore how the history of a supply chain relationship impacts expectations concerning negotiation strategy use.

Following a grounded theory approach, experienced buyers and suppliers were interviewed to enhance understanding of the complexity of supply chain negotiations.

Qualitative analysis developed a theoretical framework emphasizing the impact of relationship history on negotiation strategy expectations in long-term buyer-supplier relationships. Data supports that previous negotiation interactions build a history between the involved organizations. This relationship history creates expectations. When negotiation strategy use is consistent with expectations, the relationship history will continue to develop in the same manner as it has previously. When negotiation strategy expectations are violated, the relationship impact will differ depending on evidence of an Extrarelational Factor that leads to the strategy change.

Results of this study present a theoretical framework that future research can quantitatively test, which has the potential to open up new streams of research on relationship history and supply chain negotiations.

Results show that buyers and suppliers should consider the strategy expectations of their negotiation partner. When actions are inconsistent with expectations, the effects impact the relationship.

Negotiation research has largely focussed on negotiations as discrete events with economic outcomes. This ongoing buyer-supplier relationship research highlights the impact that previous negotiations (relationship history) have on negotiation expectations. It also explores the relational impact when those expectations are or are not met.

In an attempt to build upon existing theory, this paper aims to investigate the potentially reciprocal relationship between negotiation and strategy, and strive to contribute toward a better understanding of the ways in which organizations negotiate.

Built upon the integration of two different bodies of literature, negotiation and strategy, and on the analysis of the case of Ryanair, this paper argues for an integrated approach to negotiation and organizational capabilities.

The case study allows for a clearer understanding of how negotiation capability can play a significant role in supporting the creation and sustainment of competitive advantage, even under unfavorable industry settings.

This paper contributes to theoretical development by offering new and insightful explanations of firms’ behavior, moving beyond the classic interpretation of industry dynamics, such as bargaining power. This study has implications for both practice and research, as it offers a better and more holistic understanding of the strategy-making process and the foundations of its success.

This paper aims to investigate how and when different dimensions of trust and contracts interact to influence the development to negotiation strategies. Specifically, it explores how different dimensions of trust and contracts are combined to influence dispute negotiation strategies when cooperation parties have or do not have expectations of continuity.

This paper theoretically identified and empirically examined the interaction effect of trust and contract on dispute negotiation strategies in contractor–subcontractor relationships, by developing a conceptual framework and conducting a questionnaire survey comprising more than 300 disputes in the Chinese construction industry. Hierarchical regression analysis was mainly used to test the hypotheses.

This paper finds that contractual control may weaken the effect of goodwill trust in fostering interest-based strategies in the presence of expectations of continuity, while it may strengthen the effect in the absence of expectations of continuity. Contractual coordination negatively moderates the relationship between goodwill trust and interest-based strategies only when parties have little expectations of continuity. Moreover, contractual control enhances the effectiveness of competence trust on fostering interest-based strategies.

This paper provides insights for practitioners to wisely use different governance mechanisms to manage negotiation strategies and generate desired outcomes of dispute resolution.

This paper provides a nuanced understanding of how the two types of governance mechanisms interact, by considering trust and contract as multi-dimensional constructs. It explicit the boundary conditions of both the substitute and complementary relationship between them.

The purpose of this paper is propose a strategic framework for understanding interpartner negotiation dynamics in alliances.

The authors define interpartner negotiations as a process of reconciling and integrating the interests of the partners in an alliance, and consider four types of interpartner negotiation strategies – problem solving, contending, yielding, and compromising – and then discuss the dynamics of these negotiation strategies in the formation, operation, and outcome stages of alliance development.

The framework makes clear that the four types of interpartner negotiation strategies identified in the article need to be appreciated as having differential impact at each stage of alliance development.

As interpartner negotiations occur at all stages of alliance evolution, future research may seek to empirically assess the impact of different interpartner negotiation strategies.

The paper discusses how alliance managers can deploy effective interpartner negotiation strategies for achieving alliance objectives at each of the three developmental stages.

The article responds to the need of managers with alliance responsibilities for a framework to help identify and exploit the most effective ways to conduct interpartner negotiations in alliances for productive interactions at different alliance development stages.

This paper seeks to fill the literature gap that lacks of exploring negotiation strategy with competing partners under asymmetric production-cost information. The purpose of this paper is to examine firms’ optimal contract negotiation strategies in buyer–supplier–supplier triads where there are concurrent negotiations between the retailer and two competing manufacturers.

The authors consider a two-echelon supply chain, in which the retailer has the option of segmented or unified negotiation policy, whereas the two competing manufacturers can withhold or share production cost information in the negotiation. Based on game theory, the authors derive the manufacturers’ optimal wholesale prices and the retailer’s optimal retail prices with eight possible scenarios. Optimal strategic choices and operational decisions are then explored through the comparative analysis of equilibriums of eight possible scenarios.

The authors find that the retailer will adopt different negotiation strategies depending on manufacturers’ decisions on sharing or withholding their production-cost information. When both manufacturers share their production-cost information, the retailer will adopt a unified negotiation policy. The high-efficiency manufacturer should adopt the same information-sharing strategy as the low-efficiency manufacturer in order to gain more profit.

The modelling helps to bring further clarity in supply chain contract negotiation by offering a conceptual framework to enhance our understanding of the effects of information-sharing strategy and negotiation policy in the negotiation process form the perspectives of all engaging parties. Managerial insights derived from the research will enable retailers and manufacturers to make informed and better strategic and operational decisions to improve market competitiveness.

In response to the somewhat paradoxical combination of increasing diversity in the global workforce and the resurgence of nationalism in an era of global mobility, the purpose of this paper is to uncover how employees on international assignments respond to exposure to new cultures. Specifically, the paper aims to explicate the underlying psychological mechanisms linking expatriates’ monocultural, multicultural, global and cosmopolitan identity negotiation strategies with their responses toward the host culture by drawing upon exclusionary and integrative reactions theory in cross-cultural psychology.

This conceptual paper draws on the perspective of exclusionary vs integrative reactions toward foreign cultures – a perspective rooted in cross-cultural psychology research – to categorize expatriates’ responses toward the host culture. More specifically, the study elaborates how two primary activators of expatriates’ responses toward the host culture – the salience of home-culture identity and a cultural learning mindset – explain the relationship between cultural identity negotiation strategies and expatriates’ exclusionary and integrative responses, providing specific propositions on how each type of cultural identity negotiation strategy is expected to be associated with expatriates’ exclusionary and integrative responses toward the host culture.

The present study proposes that expatriates’ adoption of a monocultural identity negotiation strategy is positively associated with exclusionary responses toward the host culture and it is negatively associated with integrative responses toward the host culture; expatriates’ adoption of a multicultural identity negotiation strategy is positively associated with both exclusionary responses and integrative responses toward the host culture; expatriates’ adoption of a global identity negotiation strategy is negatively associated with exclusionary responses toward the host culture; and expatriates’ adoption of a cosmopolitan identity negotiation strategy is negatively associated with exclusionary responses, and positively associated with integrative responses toward the host culture. The following metaphors for these different types of cultural identity negotiation strategies are introduced: “ostrich” (monocultural strategy), “frog” (multicultural strategy), “bird” (global strategy) and “lizard” (cosmopolitan strategy).

The proposed dynamic framework of cultural identity negotiation strategies illustrates the sophisticated nature of expatriates’ responses to new cultures. This paper also emphasizes that cross-cultural training tempering expatriates’ exclusionary reactions and encouraging integrative reactions is crucial for more effective expatriation in a multicultural work environment.

This study aims to examine how negotiators’ goal orientations may affect their negotiation strategy and consequently the negotiation outcomes.

Using cross-sectional data collected from a Fortune 500 Global firm based in France, this study empirically examines how goal orientations of negotiators may affect their value creation (win-win) and value-claiming (win-lose) negotiation behavior reflecting their desired outcome in a given sales negotiation. In so doing, this study proposes a conceptual model and tests a number of hypotheses using partial least squares structural equation modeling.

This study shows that learning and performance goal orientations (PGO) are indeed related with two commonly used negotiation strategies: win-win (integrative) and win-lose strategies (distributive) strategies, respectively. The results indicate that while the learning orientation has a positive relationship with a win-win strategy and a negative relationship with a win-lose negotiation strategy, just the opposite is true with the PGO, which is positively related to win-lose strategy and negatively related to win-win strategy.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this research represents one of the first attempts to connect goal orientations with negotiations strategies to achieve desired negotiation outcome using data from salespeople with negotiation experience.