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Regulators can adjust penalties to compensate for incomplete monitoring of regulated parties that are subject to legal rules, but compensating penalty adjustments often are unavailable when regulated parties are subject to legal standards. Incomplete monitoring consequently invites greater noncompliance under standards than under rules. This chapter develops a model that quantifies some of the specific tradeoffs that regulators face in designing standards regimes under incomplete monitoring. The model also considers the extent to which suboptimal compliance due to incomplete monitoring is likely to result in deadweight loss in different settings.

Compliance enforcement is central in issues involving cooperation and delegation of authority. In fact, many proposed mechanisms seek to enhance adherence to the contracted agreements. Generally, monitoring and sanction arrangements constitute one of the widely applied tools to ensure compliance. Notwithstanding the prevailing mixed opinions on the usefulness of such coercive measures, in public procurement, such seemingly drastic measures are also commonly applied to enhance the purchasersʼ adherence to the established procurement frameworks. This study investigated the effectiveness of the monitoring and sanction arrangements in enhancing procurement rule compliance in the Tanzania context. Using data generated from a cross-sectional survey conducted between December 2006 and May 2007, this study established that the effectiveness of such enforcement means in the public sector is situational contingent and has to take into account other context-specific factors, which tend to influence the outcome.

This paper summarizes the requirements of rule amendments promulgated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in 2018 regarding the duties of Chief Compliance Officers (CCOs) of swap dealers, major swap participants, and futures commission merchants (collectively, Registrants) and the requirements for preparing, certifying and furnishing to the CFTC the CCO’s annual report.

This paper provides a close analysis of the CFTC’s final rule amendments that make clarifications regarding the CCO’s duties and seek to harmonize with similar rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) applicable to security-based swap dealers.It also analyzes rule amendments for the CCO’s report that provide clarifications and simplify certain requirements.In each case, it discusses comments from the public and the CFTC’s responses to those comments.

This paper finds that the rule amendments provide a number of helpful clarifications and simplify certain existing requirements for Registrants and their CCOs subject to the rules.While the rules overall achieve greater harmonization with similar rules of the SEC governing CCOs of security-based swap dealers, this paper notes that care will need to be taken by CFTC Registrants who also become registered with the SEC to be cognizant of remaining differences between the CFTC’s and SEC’s rules in order to ensure compliance with the rules of each agency.

This paper provides valuable information regarding the duties of CCOs of Registrants and CCO annual report requirements from an experienced lawyer focused on commodities, futures, derivatives, energy, corporate, and securities regulatory matters.

This paper sets out to assess the role of the chief compliance officer (“CCO”), how the CCO performs his/her duties, and how the CCO interacts with the fund's board three years after the adoption of Rule 38a‐1 under the Investment Company Act of 1940.

Reviews the CCO's responsibilities under Rule 38a‐1, discusses how the CCO role has evolved since the rule was promulgated, and focuses on key issues such as oversight versus supervision, the annual review process, risk assessement, testing methodologies, and the annual report to the fund board on the adequacy and operation of the fund's compliance program.

Properly conducted compliance requires the support of a wide range of the advisory/administrative team with the CCO playing the role of conductor of the orchestra. More and more CCOs seek to distance themselves from approving the day‐to‐day actions of other employees, so they cannot be considered to have assumed supervisory responsibility for those employees. Although a fund is required to perform an annual review of the adequacy of its compliance programs and its Primary Service Providers' compliance programs, most CCOs have found the review process is ongoing and occurs continuously throughout the year. Now that these compliance programs have been in place for two years, more CCOs are devoting time and resources to identify high‐risk areas and to implement transactional, periodic, and forensic testing programs. The CCO annual report has taken many different shapes and sizes, but generally summarizes material changes to the fund's compliance policies and procedures that have already been reported to the board.

A current, practical assessment of the CCO role by expert lawyers who advise funds on their compliance programs.

The aim of this chapter is to investigate the relationship between ethics, risks of compliance failure and strategic value of global responsibility for BRICS companies. The first part of the chapter adopts a theoretical approach: it introduces and analyzes the key role of compliance risk management for sustainable and successful development of companies. The second part of the chapter uses an empirical approach, based on the case study method. The chapter focuses on the BRICS. The chapter demonstrates that mere formal compliance with laws, recommendations, and internal codes is not sufficient for companies that want to be responsible and attract stakeholders’ consent and resources. A shared background of ethical principles is required for a proper understanding of the rules, in order to prevent the risk of compliance failure and limit the global risk exposure of a company. Due to the business perspective adopted in the research, this chapter leaves out the sociological aspects regarding how to create, spread, and strengthen the culture of compliance within a company. The chapter encourages companies to connect ethical principles and compliance with the rules. Indeed, a lack of ethics in business operations, obscured by formal compliance, often results in indirect negative impacts on stakeholder relationships, so it is only a futile attempt to act responsibly. The originality of the chapter consists in suggesting the adoption of a responsibility-oriented approach for compliance risk management.

The purpose of this paper is to describe the exposure and the responsibilities of a broker‐dealer's senior management under NASD's and the NYSE's new rules, emphasizing a regular review of supervisory and compliance systems.

Describes new rules, contained primarily in NASD Rules 3010, 3012, and 3013 and amendments to NYSE Rule 342, and the SROs' intentions underlying those rules; provides additional regulatory guidance on privilege issues related to CEO/CCO meetings and reports, documentation of compliance with the new rules, periodic review of office category designations, specific requirements for “offices of convenience,” and procedures to ensure up‐to‐date identification of producing managers; assesses the potential increase in exposure for CEOs, CCOs, and others under the new rules.

Both the NASD and the NYSE have made clear by their establishment of the new supervisory framework and in guidance to members that they expect increased attention to maintaining adequate compliance and supervisory systems at the highest levels of their member organizations.

Conveys an important message concerning the need for CEOs and CCOs to become increasingly involved in compliance reviews and knowledgeable about supervisory systems.

The extant literature posits several claims about the equitable resources allocation through compliance in public procurement management. Notwithstanding, there are hardly any empirical studies that explore the link between the causes and extent of compliance on one hand and value for money (VfM) on the other hand. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the efficacy of public procurement laws in ensuring VfM in a developing country context.

The study employs a qualitative case study approach involving three local government agencies in Ghana. Purposive and stratified random sampling strategies were used in selecting respondents who were interviewed through focused group discussions, semi-structured and open-ended questionnaires. The study utilizes an interpretivist/constructivist paradigm which allows for the co-creation of knowledge and subjectivity in knowledge acquisition.

The study finds that the presence of a legal and regulatory framework does not ipso facto guarantee compliance and VfM. Additionally, a possible reason why even reported cases of compliance do not translate into VfM is that evidence of compliance, especially in a developing country setting, is often a façade.

Public procurement entities in developing countries stand little chance of achieving accountability and VfM gains if they continue to rely on compliance as a micro-management tool.

The paper challenges the dominant assumptions in the public procurement management discourse by drawing attention to the quality of reported compliance and its implication for VfM.

This paper examines whether dissimilarities in societal cultures impact the path by which a key component of organizational culture—supervisory procedural justice (SPJ)—influences police officer compliance with police agency rules.

The study utilized structural equation modeling across a data set of 1,189 Croatian and Taiwan police officers to test whether a societal value (individualism/collectivism) impacts the role of three intermediary variables (trust in the public, job satisfaction and pro-organization initiative) in a procedural justice model of officer compliance with the rules.

The study found that, despite a strong statistical similarity in the individual attitudes of Croatian and Taiwan police officers, the intermediary variables in the model significantly differed between the two countries. Most notably, the role of trust in the public and pro-organization initiative supported past research suggesting that collectivist versus individualistic societal cultures lead to divergent organizational attitudes and policing outcomes.

This is the first empirical study to compare the impact of societal values on a model of SPJ on officer compliance with agency rules.

The purpose of this paper is to reach more clarity regarding the notion of compliance, in particular with regard to relation between this notion and the notion of integrity.

The paper is a conceptual investigation, following a broadly understood Wittgensteinian approach.

The main result is: there is no such thing as compliance in the full sense of that word without integrity. Compliance without integrity is a pathological case of compliance.

So far, issues of compliance and integrity have either been treated as being essentially separate or as one coming in addition to the other one. If the paper’s argument is correct, this should no longer be accepted. The whole discussion should, instead, take another route.

The purpose of this paper is to make a contribution to categorising explanations of non‐compliance of EU tendering directives and to report on a survey study to the impact of these reasons on compliance with the directives.

A literature review resulted in a conceptual model and related hypotheses, pointing at four potential reasons for (non‐)compliance: the purchaser's familiarity with the rules, the perceived inefficiency, organisational incentives to comply, and the expected resistance and readiness of suppliers to take action in case of non‐compliance. The paper uses data from a survey among 147 responding purchasing professionals of the Dutch Ministry of Defence.

The empirical findings indicate that both purchaser's familiarity with the rules and organisational incentives have a positive, statistically significant impact on compliance. Nor the alleged inefficiency of the directives, nor the expected supplier resistance seem to influence the compliance with the directives.

The study is limited in its setting: measuring perceptions of purchasing professionals within the Dutch Ministry of Defence. Future research could combine perceptual data and objective, measurable data on compliance. Future research might include other samples from other public agencies, questioning other respondents than purchasers, measuring factors from other fields and disciplines such as criminology (risk of detection and sanction risks), economy (costs and benefits), public choice theory (legitimacy), sociology (peer pressure), and social psychology (personal values).

A managerial implication of the findings of this study would be that educating and training public purchasers will be an effective tool for increasing the compliance with the directives. In addition, public agencies could try to establish incentives in order to stimulate compliance.

Although many studies have reported on the (limited) effectiveness of the EU tendering directives, little work has been undertaken on the compliance as such, while no empirical studies have been carried out to explain the (lack of) compliance with EU directives. This paper reports on a quantitative study, explaining the (non‐) compliance with the directives. The study could be of value to public policy makers, to public agencies, and to researchers in the academic world.