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While there have been extensive empirical investigations of pay-performance sensitivity, the perspective of performance-pay has received less attention to date. While executive compensation is sensitive to firm performance, firm performance is also likely to be affected by executive compensation. Adopting multiple theoretical perspectives, the purpose of this paper is to examine whether executive compensation has a greater influence on firm performance or whether the latter has a greater influence on compensation.

Using data from a five-year period (2010-2014) for Financial Times and Stock Exchange 350 companies, the authors employ a set of simultaneous equation modelling to jointly investigate, after accounting for endogeneity problem, the mutual association of executive compensation and firm performance by employing four control variables (board size, non-executive directors, leverage and boardroom ownership).

The authors find strong evidence for the greater influence of executive compensation on firm performance than the pay-performance framework. This finding supports the tournament theory compared with the agency perspective.

Inevitably, there are limitations in a wide-ranging study of this nature that could be addressed in future research. As any empirical study utilising company data, there may be concerns to the effect of survivorship bias and the manner in which companies have reorganised, if there is any, themselves during the period under examination. There are also issues as to missing data, some measures relating to both executive compensation and corporate governance are not provided by the BoardEx database.

The study results provide evidence that using the tournament perspective by remuneration committees as a guide for determining executive compensation helps in achieving better performance. This helps in developing appropriate mechanisms for setting executive remuneration.

This paper combines an empirical investigation of the frameworks of pay-performance and performance-pay and develops a system of six simultaneous equations to examine the associations between executive compensation and firm performance.

This paper aims to develop an ideal technique for the preparation of print circuit boards (PCBs) with ladder conductive lines on practical industrial process lines.

First, the raw materials of ladder copper-clad laminates were prepared by plating double-sided copper-clad laminates with vertical plating line. Second, etching compensation experiments were designed and conducted to set up the relationships between etching compensation and width of conductive lines on ladder line print circuit boards (LLPCBs). Third, to evaluate the process technique for the preparation of LLPCBs through etching compensation, verification experiments were designed and conducted on a practical industrial process line, and the quality of lines on LLPCBs was observed and evaluated.

Under the judgment of the quality of conductive lines on LLPCBs as well as the feasibility with a practical industrial process line, the process technique for the preparation of LLPCBs with etching compensation is a simple and reliable method which has the potential to be applied in the industry.

It is the first successful report of a new method that produces LLPCBs with etching compensation and has the potential to be applied in the industry.

We survey the literature on the Risk Augmented Mincer equation that seeks to estimate the compensation for uncertainty in the future wage to be earned after completing an education. There is wide empirical support for the predicted positive effect of wage variance and the negative effect of wage skew. We discuss robustness of the findings across specifications, potential bias from unobserved heterogeneity and selectivity and consider the core issue of students' information on benefits from education.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and firm performance proxied by efficiency estimated from data envelopment analysis (DEA) of the US property‐liability (P&L) insurance industry.

This study was conducted in two stages. First the authors applied DEA model to calculate efficiency scores. In the second stage, a translog model was used to correlate the level and structure of CEO compensation and the efficiency for the sample P&L insurers over the period of 2000‐2006.

Firm efficiency is positively and significantly associated with total CEO compensation. While revenue efficiency is associated with CEO cash compensation, cost efficiency is associated with incentive compensation.

These findings suggest that while CEO compensation is tied to both revenue and cost efficiency, revenue efficiency is more important in determining cash compensation, and cost efficiency is more prevalent in influencing incentive compensation.

This is the first paper to use efficiency scores as proxies for firm performance to explore the relation between CEO compensation and firm performance in the P&L insurance industry. Due to the nature of insurance business, using efficiency as a performance measurement is more appropriate than accounting and financial ratios since it enables us to net out the effects of differences in exogenous firm‐specific conditions that are beyond management's control.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether or not the chief executive officers’ (CEO) compensation is affected by the compensation of the outside directors sitting on their board, who are also CEOs of other firms.

The authors collect CEOs’ and CEO-directors’ compensation data from Execucomp. The authors then match the CEO-directors’ compensation with appointing firms’ CEO compensation and financial statements, from Execucomp and Compustat, respectively. The sample contains 7,561 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2010, with 1,213 distinct S&P 1500 firms and 1,563 distinct CEO-directors. The authors use ordinary least squared method with firm and year fixed effect in most of the analysis.

With both annual and excess compensation, the authors find strong evidence that CEO-directors’ compensation is related to the compensation of the CEO. Causally, when CEO-director overturns his/her excess compensation from negative to positive, the CEO is more likely to have similar upward change in the following year, while more interestingly, the opposite does not hold. These findings are persistent over time and remain robust to various additional tests.

Due to the data availability, this paper investigates the S&P 1500 public firms.

It is the first work that investigates the link between board members’ external compensation and the CEO’s compensation. This sheds new light on the process of the CEO’s compensation design, in regard to both the information being utilized in the design procedure and the CEO’s influence on his/her own compensation. Second, this paper adds additional evidence to the choice of peer groups in compensation construction. Third, the authors enhance the understanding of the role of CEO-directors. The authors show that CEO-directors may be the ally of CEO, and help in justifying CEO’s compensation, especially when underpaid.

To develop an image processing approach for jigsaw puzzle assembly.

First, pixels are extracted from the jigsaw puzzle blocks to calculate their rotation angles and centre coordinates. Second, a template matching method is employed to recognise each block and its orientation.

A robot‐based jigsaw puzzle system is established; and an effective image processing approach for assembly is developed.

Automatic assembly lines that assemble parts with the same shape, but random position and angle, can employ the jigsaw puzzle assembly method.

An effective image processing method for jigsaw puzzle assembly is presented in this paper. The validity of the method is proved by analysis and experiment.

The paper aims to determine whether the type selection and parameters determination of the compensation are most important for yielding the acceptable or optimized characteristics in design of hydrostatic bearings.

This paper utilizes the equations of flow equilibrium to determine the film thickness or displacement of worktable with respect to the recess pressure.

The stiffness due to compensation of constant‐flow pump increases monotonically as recess pressure increases. Also, the paper considers which is larger than that due to orifice compensation and capillary compensation at the same recess pressure ratio.

The findings show that the usage range of recess pressure and compensation parameters can be selected to correspond to the smallest gradient in variations of worktable displacement or film thickness.

This paper aims to derive firm value implications for various kinds of employee stock options (ESOs) in a framework that considers uncertainty, non‐diversification and the US statutory tax treatment.

The authors extend the analysis of ESOs from the case of perfect capital markets to two cases of imperfect capital markets using the Benninga‐Helmantel‐Sarig framework.

It is found that ESOs are inferior to cash compensation and that the degree of option inferiority depends on employee diversification. In addition, incentive stock options (ISOs) are generally inferior to non‐qualified stock options (NSOs). This relative profitability of the NSO versus ISO increases as market imperfections are added. The authors also find that in general firm hedging of ESOs is suboptimal.

The paper highlights the firm value of employee stock options.

The purpose of this paper is to solve the optimal managerial compensation problem when shareholders are either naïvely optimistic or rational.

The paper uses applied game theory to derive the optimal CEO compensation package with over optimistic shareholders.

The results suggest that boards of directors should decrease option grants to CEOs when equity is likely to be irrationally overvalued at the date when the CEO's options vest.

The implications of the model are consistent with the available empirical evidence. In addition, the model generates new testable predictions about managerial stock price manipulation, the number of options granted, and the magnitude of the options’ strike prices that have not yet been formally tested.

This is the only paper to derive closed-form solutions to optimal CEO compensation when shareholders are naïvely optimistic.

The effective and efficient motivation of the sales personnel affects the sales of a firm directly. The aim of this paper is to study the incentive effects of different compensation contracts under the framework of multi‐agent principal agent model, and it finds that the optimal contract is not the one that ties one salesperson's compensation to his own performance, but the one that ties his compensation to all the salespersons' performance. Factors that influence the incentive degree are also discussed. The purpose of this article is to design a reasonable incentive contract for salespersons where there are competitions between them.

A multi‐agent model where the efforts of one agent harm the performance of the other agent is established.

The optimal compensation of a salesperson is always composed of two parts: an incentive for an agent to improve his own performance and a disincentive for the agent to harm his colleague's performance, provided that there is a competition relationship between the two agents.

This model applies only to the rewards incentive of multi‐agents with competitive relationships.

The conclusion could be used anywhere when there are two agents with one's behavior harming the other's performance.

A multi‐agent model where the efforts of one agent harm the performance of the other agent is established to study the compensation design problems for agents.