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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the incidence of employee financial participation (EFP) schemes in Europe and examine the factors that influence the likelihood of (i) a company offering EFP schemes and (ii) employees taking up EFP schemes.

Using a combination of descriptive and econometric techniques, the paper provides information on the incidence of EFP schemes in the EU and profiles a typical company and a typical employee that, respectively, offers and takes up EFP schemes. The empirical investigation is based on two models employing probabilistic techniques. Data used for this analysis include the European Company Survey (ECS) conducted in 2009 and three rounds of the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) conducted in 2000, 2005, and 2009.

Results display a significant rise in EFP in the EU-27 in the last decade. In addition, results seem to suggest that the employees’ and companies’ characteristics, as well as sector and region of operation explain some of the variation in likelihoods of companies and employees, respectively, offering and taking up EFP schemes.

Due to data limitation, our analysis lacks a dynamic assessment of the relationship between parameters. Studies that exploit longitudinal data are suggested to follow this paper.

This paper contributes to the existing empirical literature by examining jointly the determinants of financial participation from both employers’ and employees’ perspective.

This study investigates the relationship between financial participation plans, that is profit sharing, share plans and option plans, and firm financial performance using a longitudinal panel data set of non-financial listed companies for the period 1992–2009 comprising 2,216 observations. In addition, it makes a distinction between financial participation plans that are narrow based, directed to top management and executives only, and broad based, targeted to all employees. The panel data also allow us to take into account time lag effects, as profit sharing is usually said to have short-term effects while stock options and share plans are more targeted to longer term impact. Our results show that broad-based profit-sharing plans and combinations of broad-based profit sharing and share plans are positively related with many firm financial performance indicators relative to companies without these plans. However, the results consistently show negative associations between both narrow- and broad-based option plans and firm financial performance.

Taking an international comparative approach, this chapter investigates the variance in the adoption of employee share ownership and stock option arrangements across countries. In particular, we investigate the influence of multinational enterprises (MNEs), industrial relations factors, HRM strategies, and market economies on the adoption and spread of the arrangements across countries. We find that industrial relations factors do not explain the variance in adoption by companies in their respective countries. MNEs and HRM strategies are important drivers of adoption. Market economy does not moderate the influence of MNEs on adoption, suggesting that MNEs universally apply the arrangements across borders.

This chapter analyzes the determinants of adoption of sharing arrangements by companies. Using propositions from agency and strategic human resource management frameworks predicting the adoption of sharing arrangements, we test the relationships with a large international dataset. The study finds that adoption of sharing arrangements is related to human capital investments, individual incentives, involvement practices, and human resource management practices and that adoption is affected by country differences.

Using the NBER Shared Capitalism Database comprised of over 40,000 employee surveys from 14 firms, we investigate worker attitudes toward employee ownership, profit sharing, and variable pay. Specifically, our study uses detailed survey questions on preferences over profit sharing, forms of employee ownership like company stock and stock option ownership, as well as preferences over variable pay in general, to explore how preferences for these different types of output-contingent pay vary with worker risk aversion, residual control, and views of co-workers and management. Our key results show that, on average, workers want at least a part of their compensation to be performance-related, with stronger preferences for output-contingent pay schemes among workers who have lower levels of risk aversion, greater residual control over the work process, and greater trust of co-workers and management.

This chapter investigates the differences in share-plan participation among various employee groups and why these differences exist. For strategic and tactical reasons, inequality may result from an employer’s choice to distinguish among groups when allocating or offering shares. Differences among groups are also based on employee preferences. In addition, differences may be caused by social stratification, which limits access to plans for certain groups. Using these three perspectives, this study found important demographic differences in participation and received benefits. The study revealed that employers tend to focus on high-level personnel. It also found that employees may differ in how knowledgeable they are regarding share plans and how they value the usefulness of participating in share schemes.

The market for solidarity employee savings remains under most people's radar in France, but targeting a new audience of employee savers it has progressed steadily in recent years. The solidarity employee savings works on the same mechanisms of employee savings ‘classic’, while allowing employees, through a part of their investments, to help solidarity activities. Since 1 January 2010, it is mandatory that French employees be offered a solidarity savings fund in which they can invest assorted company savings plans (French acronym ‘PEE’ for plans épargne entreprise) or group retirement savings plans (French acronym ‘PERCO’ for plan épargne retraite collective). In this way, French legislators have created a wealth of around 12.3 million employees in solidarity employee savings, hence the value of understanding this emerging phenomenon and ascertaining its compatibility with employee savings.