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The market for solidarity employee savings remains under most people's radar in France, but targeting a new audience of employee savers it has progressed steadily in recent years. The solidarity employee savings works on the same mechanisms of employee savings ‘classic’, while allowing employees, through a part of their investments, to help solidarity activities. Since 1 January 2010, it is mandatory that French employees be offered a solidarity savings fund in which they can invest assorted company savings plans (French acronym ‘PEE’ for plans épargne entreprise) or group retirement savings plans (French acronym ‘PERCO’ for plan épargne retraite collective). In this way, French legislators have created a wealth of around 12.3 million employees in solidarity employee savings, hence the value of understanding this emerging phenomenon and ascertaining its compatibility with employee savings.

The world of ‘responsible’ ethical and social investment is more substantial than it might seem. At the end of 2007, holdings in ‘responsible’ funds amounted to 20 billion, against the 5 billion three years earlier. Although these ‘responsible’ holdings tend to be ‘best-in-class’ funds (Fig. 9.1), the significant rise in ‘sustainable funding’ in this area is clear.

Since the recent global financial crisis began in 2008–2009, there has been strong decline in financial markets and investment, huge losses and bankruptcies that have led to a major financial downturn, and a significant economic recession for most developed and emerging economies. Some economists and financial analysts now consider this crisis to be more harmful in some ways than the Great Depression of 1929. Those economists and analysts point to a number of technical issues and limitations associated with the present financial systems, monetary institution rules, accounting and rating formulas, and investment strategies and choices. To try to overcome the financial downturn and, at the same time, to protect the banking systems and financial markets and to reassure investors, central banks have attempted various solutions, governments have introduced new plans (e.g., the Paulson plan), policymakers have included these topic in their political programs, and several conferences and political summits have been organized to discuss the issues. There have been two prevailing lines of thought. According to one line of thought, the extreme risk associated with speculation in sophisticated financial products, the nature of the credit-banking economic system, the gap between real and financial economies, and the strategic errors of monetary institutions constitute the main sources of the financial crisis.¹ On the other hand, it is now argued that this trend needs to be altered. According to that view, monetary institutions, banking and trading systems, rating agencies, and asset pricing modeling need to be reassessed (Barnett, 2012).

This book is a policy proposal aimed at the democratic left. It is concerned with gradual but radical reform of the socio‐economic system. An integrated policy of industrial and economic democracy, which centres around the establishment of a new sector of employee‐controlled enterprises, is presented. The proposal would retain the mix‐ed economy, but transform it into a much better “mixture”, with increased employee‐power in all sectors. While there is much of enduring value in our liberal western way of life, gross inequalities of wealth and power persist in our society.

The bulk of research on approved profit sharing and SAYE schemes tends to focus on the effects of their presence/absence, which says little about how effectively such initiatives are implemented, particularly with regard to different categories of employee. This paper seeks to contribute towards filling that gap through comparing responses between different categories of employee, and the relative effects of differing forms of financial participation.

The paper shows that the population for the study consisted of employees in a large (153,000 employees) retail organisation in the UK. A stratified proportionate random sampling procedure was adopted to include employees at the managerial/non‐managerial levels and in shareholder/non‐shareholder groups. A total of 1,000 questionnaires were mailed to a broad spectrum of employees and a total of 430 usable returns were received. The survey results were analysed using regression analysis.

The paper found that more junior employees are less likely to choose to actively buy into profit sharing and share ownership schemes; among workers in the lower job bands, the rewards accruing from participation in such schemes are likely to be the least, yet it is there that the effects of any undermining of collective solidarities are likely to be particularly pronounced.

The paper shows, while based on the case of a single large enterprise, this case study highlights something of the contradictions and limitations of flexible reward systems.

The paper highlights the divergent effects of individualized forms of participation. On the one hand, financial participation lengthens the reward cycle; employees will be encouraged to remain with the firm, to maximise their shareholdings. On the other hand, a greater individualisation of reward systems will undermine notions of collective solidarity; workers will have different agendas according to individual choices made regarding the scale of participation in such schemes. This central contradiction will be particularly pronounced among workers in the lower job bands, where the rewards accruing from participation in such schemes is likely to be the least, yet it is there that the effects of any undermining of collective solidarities is likely to be particularly pronounced.

The purpose of this paper is to give an updated overview over the development of employee-ownership in Italy, France, Spain including Mondragon, the UK and the US with relatively many employee-owned firms. How have the barriers for employee-ownership been overcome in these countries?

The overview is based on updated descriptions of the development of employee-ownership included in this special issue. The analysis follows the structure of overcoming five barriers: the organization problem; the problem of entry and exit of employee-owners; the startup and takeover problem; the capital- and the risk problem.

Italy, France and Spain have overcome the barriers by specific legislation for worker cooperatives, this includes rules for entry and exit of employee members. Cooperative support organizations play an important role for monitoring and managing the startup problem and for access to capital. The Mondragon model includes individual ownership elements and a group structure of cooperatives. The EOT and ESOP models are well suited for employee takeovers, financing are eased by tax advantages and they are all-employee schemes. While the EOT has no individual risks, the ESOP model has the possibility for capital gains for employees but also the risk of losing these gains.

Comprehensive and updated overview of the development in employee-ownership in the five countries to identify successful formats of employee-ownership for implementation in countries with few employee-owned firms.

The sector of interdependent venture capital in France will be detailed henceforth. We will try to understand why its investments deserve to be called ‘interdependent’.

This chapter discusses how trade union structuring and organisation in the West and Asia shapes how they respond to government and employer pressures to extend working life. Class-based solidarity building in the West should lead to unions protecting employment and pension rights by mobilising members to defend the ‘right to retire’ while campaigning for protections of all older workers. Enterprise unionism in Asia, on the other hand, should mean that unions use their close relationships with government and employers to protect the job security of core employees and mobilise company-based solidarity. Drawing on the survey data, expectations and awareness of union members and non-members are compared in the United Kingdom and Hong Kong. It is shown that British union members have a greater understanding of their employment rights and retirement savings while in Hong Kong union membership correlates with better understanding of company HRM policies.

The authors herein carry out a literature review of retirement planning and highlights that proper retirement planning starts by looking at the level of income an individual is likely to continue receiving at retirement if they were to take no action, then comparing this to what they would need to lead the lifestyle they desire. The authors review the traditional economic theories that many are accustomed to when interpreting financial matters (i.e., rational behavior) and compares this to the various studies and articles found in literature. The authors then dig into retirement planning in Malta and the behavioral obstacles to proper planning and how these are tackled in different European countries.