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The occurrence of sexual harassment in policing is a national problem. Indicative of the significance of this problem are the increasing numbers of sexual harassment complaints filed by female officers against their male counterparts. Less apparent is whether the harassing officers are disciplined for these acts. This article sheds light on the subject by providing an analysis of the disciplinary measures taken by the Florida Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission against law enforcement officers found guilty of sexual harassment. This article describes the role and responsibilities of the Commission, the regulatory body charged with disciplining law enforcement officers in Florida. The article concludes that, despite evidence of the pervasiveness of sexual harassment in Florida law enforcement agencies, the numbers of sexual harassment cases in which the Commission accepts jurisdiction are minimal and the discipline imposed is often insubstantial.

This chapter traces the evolution of political–administrative relationships in the South African public service. It traces how segregation and apartheid laid down the foundation of the country’s governmental system. The public service was effectively set up for Whites and poorly resourced self-governing territories were set up for Blacks. The National Party (NP) was in office from 1948 to 1994 and this long period in office led to the politicisation of the bureaucracy, with public servants gradually starting to adopt the government’s way of thinking instead of being impartial. In the 1980s, under President P.W. Botha, the government embarked on public sector reform, which included politicisation of the top levels of the public sector.

The role of the PSC/CoA is discussed – it had omnipotent human resources powers over the public service, particularly during the dying days of apartheid. The chapter then examines constitutional change in the 1990s, looking at both the Interim and Final Constitutions, which laid down the foundation of a democratic society. There is particular emphasis on political–administrative relationships and the declining influence of the PSC.

The purpose of this paper is to explain why Singapore has succeeded in curbing the problem of police corruption and to identify the six lessons which other Asian countries can learn from Singapore's experience.

The paper analyzes the causes of police corruption in Singapore during the British colonial period and describes the measures adopted by the People's Action Party government after assuming office in June 1959 to curb police corruption. The effectiveness of these measures is assessed by referring to Singapore's perceived extent of corruption according to three international indicators and the reported cases of police corruption from 1965 to 2011.

The Singapore Police Force has succeeded in minimizing police corruption by improving salaries and working conditions, cooperating with the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, enhancing its recruitment and selection procedures, providing training and values education for its members, and adopting administrative measures to reduce the opportunities for corruption. Other Asian countries afflicted with rampant police corruption can learn six lessons from Singapore's success.

This paper will be of interest to those policy makers, scholars, and anti-corruption practitioners, who are interested in learning how Singapore has succeeded in curbing police corruption.

The origins of the PSC in Singapore can be traced to the White Paper (Command Paper no. 197) entitled Organization of the Colonial Service issued by the British government in 1946.² Command Paper No. 197 stressed that progress toward self-government could only be achieved if the public services of the colonies were adapted to local conditions and staffed to the maximum possible extent by local people. More importantly, it recommended the establishment of PSCs in the colonies to ensure that qualified local candidates would be recruited into the public services.

The purpose of this paper is to attribute Singapore's good governance to the effective policies implemented by the People's Action Party (PAP) government and contend that it will be difficult to transfer Singapore's experience to other countries because of Singapore's unique circumstances and favourable policy context.

The paper analyses four policies initiated by the PAP government: comprehensive reform of the Singapore Civil Service; anti‐corruption measures; decentralization of the Public Service Commission; and payment of competitive salaries to attract and retain the best candidates to the government. The effectiveness of these policies is assessed by referring to Singapore's performance on eight governance indicators.

The four policies are effective, as reflected in Singapore's superior rankings and scores on eight indicators: Global Competitiveness Report's (GCR's) competence of public officials; World Bank's indicator on government effectiveness; Political Economic Risk Consultancy's (PERC's) survey on bureaucratic effectiveness; Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index; PERC's survey on corruption; World Bank's indicator on control of corruption; World Bank's ease of doing business survey; and GCR's public trust of politicians survey. However, as Singapore's good governance is the result of the PAP government's political will and its favourable policy context, it is difficult to transfer Singapore's experience elsewhere because of the limited political will and unfavourable policy contexts in many Asian countries.

This paper will be useful to those interested in learning how Singapore succeeded in promoting good governance.

Although No Secrets suggests that adult protection practices should seek to prevent abuse, it can be argued that such practice predominately focuses on pursuing effective responses to abuse that has already happened, rather than preventing the onset of abuse. This research sought to contribute to the prevention of abuse, through the identification of ‘early indicators’. Early indicators were identified, and this knowledge has been applied to equip families and practitioners to report concerns at an early stage and seek protective responses.

In the mid-1970s, China's economy had only two forms of public ownership: state ownership and collective ownership. In the agricultural sector, virtually all production was organized into collectively owned Production Brigades (villages) and People's Communes (townships or groups). In industry, SOEs accounted for 80% of total industrial output, with the remaining 20% shared by urban and rural collectives. By the late 1990s, SOEs and collectives accounted for less than 50% of GDP (International Finance Corporation, 2000; p. 18). Transformation of the ownership of production has undoubtedly been one of the key components of China's successful reform program. This has been achieved through combined efforts: privatization of agricultural production on collectively owned land; new entry of collectively owned industrial enterprises, especially township and village enterprises (TVEs), and their subsequent privatization; new entry of foreign-invested and domestic private enterprises; and ownership transformation of existing SOEs (Mako & Zhang, 2003).