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We develop and estimate an empirical collective model with endogenous marriage formation, participation, and family labor supply. Intra-household transfers arise endogenously as the transfers that clear the marriage market. The intra-household allocation can be recovered from observations on marriage decisions. Introducing the marriage market in the collective model allows us to independently estimate transfers from labor supplies and from marriage decisions. We estimate a semiparametric version of our model using 1980, 1990, and 2000 US Census data. Estimates of the model using marriage data are much more consistent with the theoretical predictions than estimates derived from labor supply.

The literature on household behavior contains hardly any empirical research on the within-household distributional effects of tax-benefit policies. We simulate this effect in the framework of a collective model of labor supply when shifting from a joint to an individual taxation system in France. We show that the net-of-tax relative earning potential of the wife is a significant determinant of intrahousehold negotiation but with very low elasticity. Consequently, the labor supply responses to the reform are essentially driven by the traditional substitution and income effects as in a unitary model. For some households only, the reform alters the intrahousehold distribution in a way that tends to change normative conclusions. A sensitivity analysis shows that the distributional effects captured by the collective model would be significant only for reforms both radical and of extended scope.

The authors aim to demonstrate the impact of allowing for unequal intra-household distribution of resources on income poverty and income inequality.

The paper applies a collective consumption model to study the intra-household distribution of resources in Visegrád countries (V4). It utilises subjective financial satisfaction as a proxy for indirect utility from individual consumption to estimate the indifference scales within couples instead of the traditional equivalence scale. The European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 2013 and 2018 data are applied.

This study’s results indicate substantial economies of scale from living in a couple that are generally higher than implied by the commonly applied equivalence scale. The sharing rule estimates suggest that at the mean of distribution factors, women receive a consumption share between 0.4 and 0.6; however, some of the results are close to an equal sharing of 0.5. The female consumption share rises with her contribution to household income. Regarding income poverty and inequality, the authors show that both these measures might be underestimated in the traditional approach to equal sharing of resources.

The authors add to the empirics by estimating indifference scales for Czechia (CZ), Hungary (HU), Poland (PL) and Slovakia (SK), countries that have not been involved in previous research.

Many aspects of well-being depend critically on individual-level expenditure and consumption. The Millennium Development Goals include the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women, which partly have to do with women’s access to resources within households. Many important questions in labour, public and development economics also hinge on the intra-household distribution of resources. This paper aims to estimate the resource shares within a household in the rural and urban sectors of West Bengal through a collective household model, where each household member has a specific utility function. The sharing rule parameters, that determine the apportionment of resources between members within a household, are estimated in an intra-household collective framework. The analysis is based on a system of log-quadratic Engel curves estimated using the 68th round (2011–2012) household-level consumption expenditure data of the Indian National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) for rural and urban sectors separately for the state of West Bengal.

The sharing rule parameters (that determine the apportionment of resources between members) within a household are estimated in an intra-household collective framework as suggested by Dunbar et al. (2013). The analysis is based on a Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) estimated using the 68th round (2011–2012) household-level consumption expenditure data of the Indian NSSO.

In this paper, the authors estimate the sharing rule of total household expenditure between couples in a household in the state of West Bengal. They use a modified version of the QUAIDS and the 68th round (2011–2012) household-level consumer expenditure data provided by the NSSO. From the exercise, it emerges that on an average, the resource shares between husband and wife in a household is about 66:34% in the rural sector and about 60:40% in the urban sector. Based on a classification of households by the distribution of resource shares, where higher resource share for the husband is classified as “Husband dominated” and the reverse as “Wife dominated”, the percentage of “Husband dominated” households is much more in both sectors. This unequal distribution of resources may have far-reaching consequences on allocation of expenditure on the children of the household. The authors leave this exercise as a future project.

This paper is an attempt to estimate the sharing rule for households using NSSO consumption expenditure data. This paper also highlights the intra household unequal resource allocation through the sharing rule. They use a modified version of the QUAIDS and the 68th round (2011–2012) household-level consumer expenditure data provided by the NSSO. From the exercise, it emerges that on an average, the resource shares between husband and wife in a household is about 66:34% in the rural sector and about 60:40% in the urban sector. Based on a classification of households by the distribution of resource shares, where higher resource share for the husband is classified as “Husband dominated” and the reverse as “Wife dominated”, the percentage of “Husband dominated” households is much more in both sectors. This unequal distribution of resources may have far-reaching consequences on allocation of expenditure on the children of the household. The authors leave this exercise as a future project.

We make use of rich microdata from the Belgian MEqIn survey, which contains detailed information on individual consumption, public consumption inside households, and time use. We explain the observed household behavior by means of a collective model that integrates marriage market restrictions on intrahousehold allocation patterns. We adopt a revealed preference approach that abstains from any functional form assumptions on individual utility functions or intrahousehold decision processes. This allows us to (set) identify the sharing rule, which governs the intrahousehold sharing of time and money, and to quantify economies of scale within households. We use these results to conduct a robust individual welfare and inequality analysis, hereby highlighting the important role of detailed consumption and time use data.

Although preference for sons has been documented among parents in developing countries, it is an open question whether and to what extent intra-household resource allocation is influenced by family sex composition. This study investigates the effects of sex composition on intra-household resource allocation based on the collective household model of Dunbar, Lewbel, and Pendakur (2013). I extend their model to estimate the influences on a household member’s resource share by observing how budget shares of a private assignable good vary not only with total expenditure and family size, but also with family sex composition. Using data from the 2005 Iranian Household Income and Expenditure Survey, I find that family composition significantly affects intra-household resource allocation in Iranian rural areas. Specifically, rural parents assign 1.6–1.9 percentage points more resources toward their sons. These resources are essentially coming at the expense of mothers. In all-boy families, mothers get 2.8–3.6 percentage points fewer resources than they do in all-girl families. These effects are more pronounced among farmer families than nonfarmer families. However, I find no significant role for gender composition in intra-household resource allocation in urban areas.

The standard approach in measuring demand responses and consumer preferences assumes particular parametric models for the consumer preferences and demand functions, and subsequently fits these models to observed data. In principle, the estimated demand models can then be used (i) to test consistency of the data with the theory of consumer behavior, (ii) to infer consumer preferences, and (iii) to predict the consumer's response to, say, new prices following a policy reform. This chapter focuses on an alternative, nonparametric approach. More specifically, we review methods that tackle the earlier issues by merely starting from a minimal set of so-called revealed preference axioms. In contrast to the standard approach, this revealed preference approach avoids the use of parametric models for preferences or demand. The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, we introduce the basic concepts of the revealed preference approach to model consumer demand. Next, we consider issues like goodness-of-fit, power, and measurement error, which are important in the context of empirical applications. Finally, we review a number of interesting extensions of the revealed preference approach, which deal with characteristics models, habit-formation, and the collective model.

Individual strategic weight plays an important role in the intra-household allocation of resources; however, empirical studies invariably find such weight difficult to define in a plausible and computable way, given the available data. This paper proposes a framework for the calculation of household members’ strategic weight that can be easily computed using a microsimulation model. The index proposed for each member as the share of resources the household would lose should he or she abandon it. The causes of strategic weight differentials are analysed in four EU countries with significantly different employment structure and tax-benefit systems (Finland, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom), using EUROMOD, an integrated EU-15 microsimulation model.

This paper uses a sample of school age children from the Nepal Demographic Health Survey (NDHS) to examine the relationship between maternal education and child schooling in Nepal. Taking advantage of the two-stage stratified sample design, we estimate a sample selection model controlling for cluster fixed effects. These results are then compared to OLS and Tobit models. Our analysis shows that being male significantly increases the likelihood of attending school and for those children attending school, it also affects the years of schooling. Parental education has a similarly positive effect on child school, but interestingly we find maternal education having a relatively greater effect on the schooling of girls. Our results also point to household wealth as having a positive effect on both the probability of schooling and the years of schooling in all our models, with the magnitude of these effects being similar for male and female children. Finally, a comparison of our results with a model ignoring cluster fixed effects produces results that are statistically different both in signs and in the levels of significance.