Search results

This study aims to explain how cryptocurrency is leveraged for illicit purposes across the global financial system. Specifically, it establishes how cryptocurrency has been changing the nature of transnational and domestic money laundering (ML). It then assesses the effectiveness of conventional anti-money laundering (AML) policy and legislation against the proliferation of crypto laundering, using Canada as a critical case study.

Data was collected from court cases and secondary sources to build cross-case trends of cryptocurrency use in ML. Illicit International Political Economy forms the theoretical foundation for this study, whose contribution is situated in the current literature on crypto-ML.

This study finds that Bitcoin is common among crypto-money launderers, though most also use some form of alt-coin, and that the use of third-party currency exchanges is a prevalent method to create illicit funds and conceal proceeds of crime. The findings validate two hypotheses that illicit use of crypto is prevalent in the first two stages of ML, and that crypto is most often used in conjunction with other fiat currencies. Although law enforcement is improving on monitoring and understanding popular cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, alt-coins pose a significant challenge for criminal intelligence. New regulations for third-party currency exchanges are having a positive impact on curtailing crypto-laundering but are shown to be insufficient per se to contain the use of crypto in criminal activity.

This study contributes to a more robust understanding of the use of virtual currency in transnational and domestic ML. It contributes to an emerging body of literature on the role of technological change in enabling the global flow of illicit funds. It also informs public policy on virtual currency in general, and on AML regulation in Canada in particular.

This paper aims to examine whether the money laundering/terrorist financing (ML/TF) model excludes important aspects of terrorist resourcing and whether the terrorist resourcing model (TRM) provides a more comprehensive framework for analysis.

Research consisted of case studies of resourcing activities of four listed terrorist organizations between 2001 and 2015: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Hamas, a grouping of Al Qaeda-inspired individuals and entities under the heading “Al Qaeda inspired” and Hezbollah.

The most prevalent resourcing actors observed were non-profit organizations/associations, and the most prevalent form of resourcing was fundraising that targeted individual cash donations of small amounts. Funds were pooled, often passed through layers of charitable organizations and transmitted through chartered banks. The TRM is indeed found to provide a more comprehensive framework for identifying sources of resourcing and points of intervention. However, it does not in itself recommend effective means of response but it has implications for counter-resourcing strategies because it identifies resourcing actors and nodes where counter-resourcing could occur.

This paper advances the state of knowledge of terrorist resourcing activities in Canada and about the value of doing so through the analytical lens of the TRM as opposed to the predominant ML/TF model.

Recruitment and retention strategy is driven by a complement of endogenous constraints and exogenous imperatives. Confronted with population aging and unprecedented and enduring fiscal austerity, staffing priorities among many armed forces of the world's advanced industrialized democracies seem to be driven increasingly by the bottom line instead of a view toward the future security environment. This study takes a demographic approach to the integration of military, political, and economic means in pursuit of states’ ultimate objectives in the international system. Similar to the youthful populations, rapid development, and urbanization that characterized the first half of the 19th century, demographic developments of the 21st century are raising the specter of systemic disorder, civil war, and political instability (Evans, 2009; Goldstone, 1993; Nichiporuk, 2000; Tam & Hoffman, 1994). Indeed, a recent intelligence forecast cautioned that “lagging economies, ethnic affiliations, intense religious convictions, and youth bulges will align to create a ‘perfect storm’ for internal conflict” in the near future (National Intelligence Council, 2004, p. 97). Factoring these developments into recruitment and retention strategy has significant implications for strategic posture.

Following recent terrorist attacks in the US and Europe, Western Muslims have been criticised for not taking a firm stand against radical Islam and extremist organisations. Drawing on insights from narrative criminology, we challenge such assertions and reveal Muslims' narrative mobilisation against violent jihadism. Based on 90 qualitative interviews with young Muslims in Norway, we show how violent extremism is rejected in a multitude of ways. This narrative resistance includes criticising extremist jihadist organisations for false interpretations of Islam and using derogatory terms to describe them. It also includes less obvious forms of narrative resistance, such as humour and attempts to silence jihadist organisations by ignoring them. While narrative criminology has effectively analysed the stories that constitute harm, less attention has been paid to narratives that counter harm. We argue that stories that counter jihadi narratives are crucial to understand the narrative struggles of Muslim communities, whose outcomes can help determine why some individuals end up becoming religious extremists – while others do not. By distinguishing between factual, emotional and humorous counternarratives and describing silence as a form of resistance, we show resistance to extremism that is often concealed from the public and the state.