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1 – 10 of 165Recent findings show that CEOs tend to backdate their stock option grants so that a past date on which the stock price was particularly low is picked to be the grant date. Using…
Abstract
Purpose
Recent findings show that CEOs tend to backdate their stock option grants so that a past date on which the stock price was particularly low is picked to be the grant date. Using cases now settled concerning a group of firms that were caught backdating, this paper aims to examine further whether backdating firms have higher levels of operating efficiency and corporate governance, lower levels of bankruptcy risk, more ability to increase shareholder wealth, and lower levels of market price risk. This paper also compares the characteristics of backdating firms during the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and post-SOX periods.
Design/methodology/approach
This sample of backdater firms comprises those caught backdating who have settled their cases, according to data provided by Risk Metrics Group, a non-profit organization that keeps track of most securities class actions. A matched sample of 28 non-backdating, comparison-group firms was constructed to perform univariate and multivariate comparisons.
Findings
This study found that backdating firms on average have a higher price risk than non-backdating firms, and that increasing the percentage of shares owned by the major shareholders reduces the possibility of management conducting backdating activities.
Originality/value
No previous studies have used a sample of real backdating culprits. Previous studies have usually used likely backdating traits to identify a group of suspected backdaters. In contrast, the current study, by using a group of firms whose deliberate backdating behavior had led to lawsuits that have been settled in court, investigated the characteristics of known backdaters.
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Hongyan Fang and David Whidbee
– The purpose of this paper is to provide evidence in support of incentive and retention-based explanations for backdating.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to provide evidence in support of incentive and retention-based explanations for backdating.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors use matching-firm techniques and the bivariate logistic model.
Findings
Backdating firms tend to be younger and faster growing – the characteristics of firms with growing demand for skilled labor. Further, rather than experiencing poor performance, backdating firms tend to outperform matching firms in both prior- and post-backdating years.
Originality/value
The results suggest that backdating reflects a firm's demand for valuable employees rather than strictly a manifestation of agency problems, as evidenced by previous study.
The 2008-2009 subprime mortgage crisis in the USA caused bankruptcies and closures of many financial institutions. Yet many CEOs of US financial institutions were awarded huge…
Abstract
Purpose
The 2008-2009 subprime mortgage crisis in the USA caused bankruptcies and closures of many financial institutions. Yet many CEOs of US financial institutions were awarded huge bonuses and pay packages despite the economic collapse, suggesting that their incomes were not in conjunction with those of the shareholders, indicating a serious agency problem. This issue raises the question as to whether stock option backdating, another example of an agency problem, was as prevalent as slack lending policies among these financial institutions. This paper aims to compare the relative magnitude of executive option backdating in financial and nonfinancial firms.
Design/methodology/approach
Using a sample of CEO stock option grants from 1995 to 2006, obtained from ExecuComp, the authors employ an event study around the grant dates of executive options. The authors compare the abnormal price movements between financial and nonfinancial firms.
Findings
The abnormal negative stock returns were found before the award dates for both groups of firms. The after-event abnormal returns of both groups of firms, however, show different trends. For nonfinancial firms, there is an immediate turnaround of the abnormal return movement right after the grants; that is, the price increases, indicating the occurrence of significant backdating events. For financial firms, however, there is no significant price rebound after the grant date. In fact, the price continued to decline throughout the after-event period.
Research limitations/implications
The result shows that nonfinancial firms demonstrate significantly more option backdating behavior than financial firms.
Practical implications
The findings suggest that previous findings on prevalent backdating among all public listed firms are only partially correct. This paper shows that backdating behavior found in previous studies is indeed driven by nonfinancial firms. This unexpected finding contradicts the initial prediction of authors that option backdating may be more likely among financial firms.
Originality/value
Based on previous research, the authors recognize that generally the official grant dates of firms must have been set retroactively, as shown by Lie (2005). The findings, however, show that financial firms demonstrate only partial backdating behavior. This study opens a path for future research to further discover why financial firms exhibit less backdating behavior compared with nonfinancial firms, and if option backdating is not an issue for financial firms, why the share prices of these firms decline significantly prior to the grant date.
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Andrew Trumble and Sean Pinder
The purpose of this paper is to test for managerial opportunism, specifically the backdating of executive options, in Australia.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to test for managerial opportunism, specifically the backdating of executive options, in Australia.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper analyses the return behaviour associated with a sample of 161 unscheduled options granted by Australian firms. Specifically, the authors test for differences between a subsample of grants that had late‐filed notices (and hence may be subject to backdating) versus those that had notices filed on‐time.
Findings
Consistent with backdating, it is found that these abnormal post‐grant returns persist for a sub‐sample of late‐filed grants but not for a sub‐sample of grants with same‐day filing. Furthermore – the authors find even stronger results for option grants made by firms with a history of late‐filing but for which no notice was filed with the Australian Securities Exchange. This paper is the first to demonstrate these effects in a setting subject to the IFRS requirement that the fair value (rather than the intrinsic value) of executive options be expensed.
Originality/value
This paper is the first to demonstrate these effects in Australia and further in a setting subject to the IFRS requirement that the fair value (rather than the intrinsic value) of executive options be expensed.
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Pino G. Audia and Fiona Kun Yao
We study the spatial diffusion of stock backdating, an instance of corporate misconduct about which public information was virtually absent until 2005. Contrary to the findings of…
Abstract
We study the spatial diffusion of stock backdating, an instance of corporate misconduct about which public information was virtually absent until 2005. Contrary to the findings of Bizjack, Lemmon, and Whitby (2009), our results reveal that this “invisible” practice did not diffuse through board interlocks. Rather, stock backdating spread through geographic proximity: firms were more likely to backdate stock options to the extent that other firms located geographically close to them had done so. Lending support to the importance of localized interactions among members of the local business elite, the effect of geographical proximity was conditional on high levels of local board interlocks. Our findings regarding the differential impact of geographic proximity and board interlocks on the diffusion of this invisible practice are analogous to the diffusion pattern of controversial practices proposed by Davis and Greve (1997).
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Tariq H. Ismail and Zakia Abdelmoniem
This paper aims to investigate the extent to which companies in one of the Islamic culture countries, Egypt, are complying with the Islamic implementation of the Anglo‐Saxon model…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to investigate the extent to which companies in one of the Islamic culture countries, Egypt, are complying with the Islamic implementation of the Anglo‐Saxon model of corporate governance and testing the impact, if any, of such compliance on mitigating of stock option fraud incentives.
Design/methodology/approach
A logistic regression model is used to examine the effects of board of directors, audit committee, ownership structure and other firm characteristics on the likelihood of stock option fraud. The analysis is based on the data for stock option grants obtained during the period from 2006 to 2009.
Findings
The results suggest that the rate of compliance with the Islamic implementation of the Anglo‐Saxon model of corporate governance in Egyptian public‐held companies is low. Weak corporate governance allows executives to exercise greater influence over the board of directors and audit committee decisions. Furthermore, a low level of disclosure, duality of CEO, high percentage of insiders in board of directors, auditor turnover, and management ownership are among the factors that increase the likelihood of stock option fraud in the Egyptian setting.
Research limitations/implications
The results are constrained by the proxies used to define stock option fraud. Additionally, the limited number of companies with stock option grants in Egypt might affect the results.
Originality/value
This paper provides insights into exposing stock option fraud by Egyptian public‐held companies and sheds light on the effective role of corporate governance mechanisms to mitigate this phenomenon. This would help policy setters to enhance compliance with the Anglo‐Saxon model of corporate governance and develop a comprehensive Shari'ah model of corporate governance that reduces stock option fraud.
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Nana Y. Amoah, Anthony Anderson, Isaac Bonaparte and Susan Muzorewa
This study aims to examine the use of real activities manipulation by firms implicated in the stock option backdating scandal.
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to examine the use of real activities manipulation by firms implicated in the stock option backdating scandal.
Design/methodology/approach
The real activity manipulation measures are as follows: abnormal R&D expense, abnormal SG&A expense, abnormal production cost and abnormal cash flow from operations. Using a sample of firms alleged to have backdated options during the period 1998-2006 and non-backdating one-on-one matched firms, a separate regression is run for each of the real activity manipulation measures (dependent variables) on backdating and other variables.
Findings
The authors report unusually low R&D and unusually low SG&A expenses among the backdating firms. They also find evidence of unusually high production costs among backdating firms compared to the matched firms.
Research limitations/implications
The findings imply that backdating firms are more aggressive in the use of real activities to manipulate earnings and the use of real activities appears to be opportunistic.
Originality/value
The study contributes to the literature by providing evidence of the use of real activities manipulation by firms under investigation for fraud. The authors also add to the debate on whether the use of stock options as part of compensation aligns the interest of management with the interest of shareholders.
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Corporate misconduct carries significant social and economic costs, and therefore regulators and other stakeholders seek to deter it. Despite the significant costs and deterrence…
Abstract
Corporate misconduct carries significant social and economic costs, and therefore regulators and other stakeholders seek to deter it. Despite the significant costs and deterrence efforts, corporate misconduct is widespread and our understanding of it is limited. As argued in this chapter, one key reason for this is the lack of understanding of the benefits and penalties of misconduct for the companies and individuals involved, as well as the detection of such behavior. This chapter seeks to advance our understanding of corporate misconduct and builds on the rational choice model (RCM) – where the decision to engage in misconduct hinges on a calculation of the expected costs and benefit – and links it to research in organization theory and strategy. Specifically, it sets a research agenda at the intersection of organizational and strategic perspectives, to deepen our understanding of corporate misconduct and shed light on opportunities for empirical and theoretical research which can potentially aid in developing effective deterrence strategies.
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Michael Seamer and Adrian Melia
This paper aims to investigate the incidence of remunerating Australian Securities Exchange (ASX)-listed non-executive directors (NEDs) with options and to determine whether…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to investigate the incidence of remunerating Australian Securities Exchange (ASX)-listed non-executive directors (NEDs) with options and to determine whether companies that fail to adhere to NED remuneration recommendations share a common corporate governance profile. Despite corporate regulators condemning the practice of remunerating NEDs with stock options, there is a paucity of evidence regarding its prevalence in Australia.
Design/methodology/approach
Focusing on ASX400 companies during 2008, a series of hypotheses relating NED stock option remuneration and corporate governance are tested using logistic regression.
Findings
The study shows that the prevalence and quantum of NED option payments during 2008 was considerable with 73 of the ASX400 companies, including options in NED remuneration (option payers). Comparison of the corporate governance characteristics of option payers to that of a matched control group (non-option payers) highlighted both the existence and independence of the remuneration committee as critical in ensuring NED remuneration practices comply with regulator recommendations.
Research limitations/implications
These results provide regulators and stakeholder groups with additional evidence to continue to call for corporate governance reforms to ensure that corporate remuneration practices are in the best interest of shareholders.
Originality/value
This study is the first to highlight the extent to which Australian-listed company NED remuneration practices fail to comply with regulator recommendations and adds to the limited research on remuneration committee effectiveness.
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