Remunerating non-executive directors with stock options: who is ignoring the regulator?

Abstract

Purpose

This paper aims to investigate the incidence of remunerating Australian Securities Exchange (ASX)-listed non-executive directors (NEDs) with options and to determine whether companies that fail to adhere to NED remuneration recommendations share a common corporate governance profile. Despite corporate regulators condemning the practice of remunerating NEDs with stock options, there is a paucity of evidence regarding its prevalence in Australia.

Design/methodology/approach

Focusing on ASX400 companies during 2008, a series of hypotheses relating NED stock option remuneration and corporate governance are tested using logistic regression.

Findings

The study shows that the prevalence and quantum of NED option payments during 2008 was considerable with 73 of the ASX400 companies, including options in NED remuneration (option payers). Comparison of the corporate governance characteristics of option payers to that of a matched control group (non-option payers) highlighted both the existence and independence of the remuneration committee as critical in ensuring NED remuneration practices comply with regulator recommendations.

Research limitations/implications

These results provide regulators and stakeholder groups with additional evidence to continue to call for corporate governance reforms to ensure that corporate remuneration practices are in the best interest of shareholders.

Originality/value

This study is the first to highlight the extent to which Australian-listed company NED remuneration practices fail to comply with regulator recommendations and adds to the limited research on remuneration committee effectiveness.

Citation

Seamer, M. and Melia, A. (2015), "Remunerating non-executive directors with stock options: who is ignoring the regulator?", Accounting Research Journal, Vol. 28 No. 3, pp. 251-267. https://doi.org/10.1108/ARJ-12-2013-0092