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At a time when the US federal government failed to act on climate change, California's success as a subnational climate policy leader has been widely celebrated. However, California's landmark climate law drove a wedge between two segments of the state's environmental community. On one side was a coalition of “market-oriented” environmental social movement organizations (SMOs), who allied with private corporations to advance market-friendly climate policy. On the other side was a coalition of “justice-oriented” environmental SMOs, who viewed capitalist markets as the problem and sought climate policy that would mitigate the uneven distribution of environmental harms within the state. The social movement literature is not well equipped to understand this case, in which coalitional politics helped one environmental social movement succeed in its policy objectives at the expense of another. In this chapter, we draw on legislative and regulatory texts, archival material, and interviews with relevant political actors to compare the policymaking influence of each of these coalitions, and we argue that the composition of the two coalitions is the key to understanding why one was more successful than the other. At the same time, we point out the justice-oriented coalition's growing power, as market-oriented SMOs seek to preserve their legitimacy.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the continued viability of the European Union emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) as a tool for climate control in the face of continued criticisms.

This evaluative study makes use of connected existing studies and other secondary data from economics, management, politics and law.

The study found that though there were various flaws in the scheme in its initial launching phase, the insights gained are being applied in the second and subsequent phase of the EU ETS. It is also ascertained that despite initial doubts, a market for carbon finance is successfully established in the EU albeit with various limitations. The scheme is also poised to link with other regional schemes to address climate control.

Though the study relied primarily on secondary data, the findings were sufficiently triangulated with perspectives from economics, politics, management and law. The findings would also provide useful and relevant information to those engage in the theory and practice of carbon finance.

This paper updates on the legal and economic significance of the EU ETS as a market mechanism to address climate change.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overarching conceptual decision model that delineates the major issues and decisions associated with carbon regulations that will allow executives to better understand the potential regulatory schemes and implications that may be imposed in the near future.

The authors use the extant literature as the foundation to develop a conceptual model of the decisions pertaining to climate change regulation that face business executives today.

This paper suggests four major categories of issues that must be addressed in any climate change regulatory scheme. These include: “scope” – will carbon emission management systems be global or regional; “who pays” – will the consumer or will the supply chain be responsible for the cost of their emissions; “market or compliance‐based mechanisms” – will the CO₂ emissions system be market‐based or a compliance‐based regulatory system; and “criteria” – how can credence of the remedy be established – what is necessary for a business initiative to qualify for as a creditable carbon offset?

This paper offers a framework that categories the fundamental decisions that must be made in any climate change regulation. This framework may be useful in advancing research into any of the four categories of decisions and their implications on commerce and the environment. This paper is designed to be managerially useful and in that way does limit its ability to specifically advance many dimensions of research.

The paper offers executives for a simple model of the decisions that must be made to craft an effective climate change regulatory scheme. In addition, it suggests how these decisions may create exploitable economic opportunities for innovative and proactive firms.

This paper adds value to the debate by clarifying the decisions that must be addressed in any climate change regulation scheme.

In the era of climate change, industrial organizations are under increasing pressure from consumers and regulators to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of product mix as a strategy to deliver the low carbon supply chain under the cap-and-trade policy.

The authors incorporate the cap-and-trade policy into the green product mix decision models by using game-theoretic approach and compare these decisions in a decentralized model and a centralized model, respectively. The research explores potential behavioral changes under the cap-and-trade in the context of a two-echelon supply chain.

The analysis results show that the channel structure has significant impact on both economic and environmental performances. An integrated supply chain generates more profits. In contrast, a decentralized supply chain has lower carbon emissions. The cap-and-trade policy makes a different impact on the economic and environmental performances of the supply chain. Balancing the trade-offs is critical to ensure the long-term sustainability.

The research offers many interesting observations with respect to the effect of product mix strategy on operational decisions and the trade-offs between costs and carbon emissions under the cap-and-trade policy. The insights derived from the analysis not only help firms to make important operational and strategic decisions to reduce carbon emissions while maintaining their economic competitiveness, but also make meaningful contribution to governments’ policy making for carbon emissions control.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the operational decisions of a manufacturer who produces multiple products and the government's selection of cap-and-trade and carbon tax regulations.

This paper explores the production decisions of a multi-product manufacturer under cap-and-trade and carbon tax regulations in a cap-dependent carbon trading price setting and compares carbon emission, the manufacturer's profits and social welfare under the two regulations. Game theory and extreme value theory are used to analyze our models.

First, the authors find that the optimal profit of the manufacturer (the optimal cap) increases and then decreases with the cap (the unit carbon emission of product). Second, if the environmental damage coefficient is moderate, the optimal cap of unit environmental damage coefficient is independent of the product carbon emission or other related product parameters. Ultimately, cap-and-trade regulation always generates more carbon emission than carbon tax regulation. And cap-and-trade regulation (carbon tax regulation) can generate more social welfare if the environmental damage coefficient is low (high), and the social welfare under the two regulations is equal to each other, or otherwise.

This paper contributes the prior literature by considering the inverse relationship of the allocated cap and the carbon trading price and discusses the social welfare under cap-and-trade and carbon tax regulations. Some important and new results are found, which can guide the government's implementation of the two regulations.

Even during these tough economic times the current administration has proposed to revive the US “Cap and Trade” initiative and to see it through to passage. Many in the public are not aware that the idea of cap and trade is not new as similar programs have been successfully used in the US and other countries to “wind down” environmentally damaging emissions. The aim of this paper is to explain cap and trade and to project what form current proposals could take.

This paper explains cap and trade and goes on to project what form current proposals could take. It also examines the alternatives and the arguments both for and against cap and trade. Projected costs and benefits are examined, along with some examination of the actual mechanics by which the system is expected to operate.

The current US mood is that proposals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will be expensive and burdensome to businesses and consumers. In fact, this is what is preventing them from going forward. The consensus is now growing that in order to achieve the goals of cap and trade, proposals will have to be cost effective, expanded internationally, and include India, China and other emerging manufacturing economies. If this can be done, it appears that cap and trade will continue to be part of the landscape of US emission reductions, along with the use of alternative and other renewable energy resources.

The paper examines costs and benefits of cap and trade, along with some examination of the actual mechanics by which the system is expected to operate

This study aims to examine the impact of the emission allowances granted under California's cap‐and‐trade program (AB 32) – the first major program of its kind in the USA – on the balance sheets and income statements of the S&P 500. So far there has been little discussion of what a cap‐and‐trade program would mean for the US companies' financial statements.

The author states and tests an economic model of the relation between greenhouse gas emissions and financial statement variables at the individual company level and use this model to predict emission allowances and obligations for the S&P 500.

The author's analysis suggests that the average S&P 500 company's balance sheet and net income will be adversely affected under several different accounting treatments for emission allowances, with the greatest impacts in the utilities, energy, and materials sectors.

US and European regulators have yet to set a single standard for emissions accounting. Without a single standard, companies acting in their own interests may use diverse or unclear accounting treatments for similar economic benefits. This can raise the cost of capital and hurt investors.

This is the first study of which the author is aware to document how the emission allowances under the AB 32 cap‐and‐trade program will affect American companies' balance sheets.

This study develops the economic rationale for the inclusion of new environmental financial assets, tradable pollution rights, in a well‐diversified portfolio. These new assets are generated and their valuation determined in the market‐incentive environmental regulatory approach called emissions trading, especially the cap‐and‐trade variant. This approach has been gaining wide acceptance and approval. A leading example is the sulfur dioxide market where tradable allowances are assets that may be held by private investors. Transactions in this market have reached volumes indicative of a high degree of liquidity. Comparable tradable rights in other pollutants are under active development. We explain the design and workings of these markets and demonstrate empirically, on the basis of time series data, that sulfur dioxide allowances have rates of return and yield distributions that make them candidates for inclusion in asset portfolios. We conjecture that other tradable pollution rights will exhibit similar properties when sufficient data are available. Financial analysts and accountants are likely to play an increasing role in advising investors about the role of these assets in a well‐diversified portfolio.

A new financial asset (Allotment Trading Unit or ATU) that allows a firm to pollute was issued to a number of Chicago firms in 2000 as part of a cap‐and‐trade model to reduce emissions in the Chicago area. A model of this market was developed to enable us to: 1.) Estimate equilibrium tradable credit prices and quantities and calculate compliance costs for comparison with traditional environmental regulation; 2.) Estimate the consequences for prices and quantities of introducing changing emitter costs; and 3.) Estimate the impacts on prices and quantities of changing market features such as auctioning tradable credits instead of a free allocation, introducing spatial constraints, and changing the emissions cap. The model's results on the price determination of this new financial asset are of interest to accountants and financial analysts. A dated bankable ATU credit has a one‐year life expectancy, but future tradable credits can be bought or sold for use at the appropriate future date. It is an intangible asset that should be disclosed, measured and valued. The valuation to place on this asset is an important research topic in finance and accounting and various valuation approaches are discussed to handle the short‐term and long‐term price paths.