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Does the classical liberal emphasis on freedom of association provide an intellectual cover for bigotry? We formulate this question in economic terms using James Buchanan’s economic approach to ethics, according to which moral values can be understood as preferences about other people’s behaviors. We discuss two possible market failures associated with freedom of association: inter-group externalities and Schelling-type emergent segregation. We show that the classical liberal position about freedom of association, as elaborated in Buchanan and Tullock’s Calculus of Consent, is fully equipped to deal with the first one, but not with the second. The progressive view that some preferences are so offensive that they should be dismissed rather than engaged or negotiated with can be reframed as an attempt to solve the emergent segregation problem, but it is vulnerable to political economy problems of its own, in particular to an inherent tendency to over-expand the meaning of “bigotry.”

Discusses James Buchanan′s contribution to the important topic of cost‐containment in the area of health care. Historical and ideational in its thrust, it seeks also to make a more general contribution by showing how the methodology of public choice can be applied to a specific issue in economic and social policy. Examines the precise body of theory which Buchanan brings to bear when attempting a politico‐economic calculus of consent. Considers the causes of the rise in the cost of health and assesses Buchanan′s anxieties in respect of the burden. Discusses Buchanan′s solutions and explores alternatives to the options he endorses. Concludes that Buchanan′s answers may not appeal to all readers, but they are a fruitful area of research and speculation.

Can we model politics as exclusively based on self-interest, leaving virtue aside? How much romance is there in the study of politics? We show that James Buchanan, a founder of public choice and constitutional political economy, reintroduces a modicum of romance into politics, despite claiming that his work is the study of “politics without romance”: Buchanan’s model needs an ethical attitude to defend rules against rent-seeking.

We claim that Adam Smith, more than David Hume, should be considered one of the primary intellectual influences on Buchanan’s public choice and constitutional political economy. It is commonly believed that Hume assumes in politics every man ought to be considered a knave, making him an influence on Buchanan’s idea of politics without romance. Yet, it is Smith who, like Buchanan, describes rent-seeking and suggests that public virtues may be the remedy through which good rules maintaining liberty and prosperity can be generated and enforced. Smith, like Buchanan, rejects sole reliance on economic incentives: the study of politics needs some romance.

Nancy Maclean’s Democracy in Chains (2017) is an attempt to provide a narrative arc for the rise of free market ideas in political action during the second half of the twentieth century and into the first decades of the twenty-first century. The central character in her narrative is neither F.A. Hayek nor Milton Friedman, let alone Adam Smith or Ludwig von Mises, but James M. Buchanan, the 1986 Nobel Prize winner in economics. MacLean argues that rather than extol the virtues of the market economy as Hayek and Friedman did before him, Buchanan focused on the dysfunctions of politics. Due to a series of argumentative fallacies and failures that follow from her ideological blinders, I argue that MacLean’s attempt is a missed opportunity to seriously engage some very pressing issues in public choice and political economy and understand how James Buchanan attempted to resolve them in a democratic manner. As such, Democracy in Chains is not only a mischaracterization of Buchanan and his project but also a poignant lesson to us all about how ideological blinders can subvert even the sincerest effort to unearth truth in the social sciences and the humanities.

A review of Nancy MacLean’s Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of the Radical Right’s Stealth Plan for America focuses on the implications of her historiographic method in reading Jim Buchanan’s work and the resulting failure to take seriously the underlying framework of constitutional political economy that informed both Jim Buchanan’s and Frank H. Knight’s work. MacLean’s historiography is that of social movement history, which sublimates the interests and motivations of the individual to that of the movement. The real scholar disappears into simply an agent of the movement’s master plan. Because MacLean is suspicious of the movement she believes Buchanan to be part of, his work is interpreted solely in light of what she assumes to be the master plan. In particular, she ignores Buchanan’s habit of returning to key themes in order to develop new modes of analysis. MacLean focuses solely on his public choice work, ignoring the latter developments of constitutional economics and even moral order.

Two issues in MacLean’s account are the focus on the review. The first is simply a research mistake that she drew unwarranted conclusions from regarding Buchanan’s connection to the “massive resistance” movement against desegregation of Virginia public schools. The second issue reveals MacLean’s unwillingness to consider the changes in Buchanan’s scholarship over his career. Taken together, the issues indicate that she refused to read Buchanan on his own terms in order to understand the progress of his work, even if she disagreed with him at the end.

The notion of constitutionalism and federalism as principal devices for limiting the power of government is central to F. A. Hayek’s political philosophy. A number of political scientists have recently criticized Hayek’s (as well as J. M. Buchanan’s and B. R. Weingast’s) reasoning on this subject for its presumed “neoliberal bias.” This paper reviews this critique and takes it as a challenge to clarify certain ambiguities in Hayek’s – and, more generally, in liberal – accounts of constitutionalism and federalism.

The purpose of this article is to assess the extent to which Hong Kong’s laws deter its companies from engaging in corruption and bribery abroad.

A mix of economics, public administration, management and legal analysis was used to assess weaknesses in Hong Kong’s laws governing the prohibition of bribe payments abroad.

Hong Kong does not explicitly criminalise corporate bribery abroad. Companies – as legal persons – can not be found guilty of corruption. It is argued that Hong Kong’s Legislative Council should amend various laws to modernise Hong Kong’s approach to tackling corruption committed by its companies abroad. The various approaches lawmakers can take towards assigning responsibility for corruption to companies are presented. The approaches that prosecutors at the Department of Justice can take to adopt prosecutorial methods like those used in other upper-income jurisdictions and the ways that Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) can assist in this work are also described.

This research has practical findings for Hong Kong’s policymakers, law firms and companies which operate in Hong Kong. For policymakers, we describe legal changes Hong Kong’s legislators will likely make in the years ahead and the preferred ways of engaging in such change. For law firms, we describe the legal changes coming to Hong Kong which legal advisors will need to advise their clients on. For companies, we describe changes that companies operating in Hong Kong will likely need to comply with in the future.

This paper shows that when Hong Kong adopts best practice in the field of corporate criminalisation, Hong Kong’s role in “exporting” corruption will likely fall.

This article describes a set of legal changes which will change the way Hong Kong treats corruption. The literature tends to glamorise Hong Kong’s anti-corruption work. It is shown that its law falls far behind other jurisdictions, as well as how “treating companies like people” in the case of Hong Kong will likely change the way Hong Kong’s prosecutors think about crime and criminal perpetrators.