Constitutionalism, Federalism, and Limited Government: Hayekian Arguments in Political Scientists’ Perspective

Abstract

The notion of constitutionalism and federalism as principal devices for limiting the power of government is central to F. A. Hayek’s political philosophy. A number of political scientists have recently criticized Hayek’s (as well as J. M. Buchanan’s and B. R. Weingast’s) reasoning on this subject for its presumed “neoliberal bias.” This paper reviews this critique and takes it as a challenge to clarify certain ambiguities in Hayek’s – and, more generally, in liberal – accounts of constitutionalism and federalism.

Citation

Vanberg, V.J. (2016), "Constitutionalism, Federalism, and Limited Government: Hayekian Arguments in Political Scientists’ Perspective", Revisiting Hayek’s Political Economy (Advances in Austrian Economics, Vol. 21), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 123-143. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1529-213420160000021004