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The European Union’s (EU’s) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has gained increasing attention as the EU faces new threats and challenges from its surroundings. As part of its CSDP, the EU currently runs six military operations and 11 civilian missions. This paper aims to analyze the EU’s social media use of four CSDP missions and operations running in two regions: in the Mediterranean and in the Western Balkans.

The paper has a mixed-methods research design. A computer-assisted content analysis was conducted to extract data on the Twitter communication of the chosen missions, followed by a quantitative analysis on which elements of the EU’s strategic communication can be identified. The timeframe for investigation was set up between 1 January 2019 and 31 August 2020.

Patterns of communication cannot be recognized either based on regional or on the civilian-military division. The strong connectivity with the accounts of other European actors and/or institutions is striking. This study finds that the concept of local ownership can be observed only at European level, local populations of the host countries are usually not targeted. Even though several elements of the EU’s strategic communication are recurrent on the missions’ official Twitter account, Twitter communication seems to be an intra-European communication tool.

The research revealed the main features of the Twitter communication of four CSDP missions. Due to the software-assisted methodology, measuring influence score was made possible, a feature that was still missing from academic literature regarding this specific area, the EU’s CSDP.

The European Union (EU) and Russia are considered to be trapped into security concerns in a form of spillover, in a zero sum perspective, considering each step of the other as directed against another. Such an approach seems to prevail, after attempts of engagements for decades after the Cold War. Rather history prevailed in informing perceptions and currently driving the behaviors toward each other, in other words in othering each other.

Discourse analysis

The move in Eastern Europe of both parties is perceived with suspicion from both sides, materialized through their policies, culminated in clash of interests and crash of policies between both parts, manifested by Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2014 and recently in 2022 in one side, and the EU response through massive, unprecedented sanctions against Russia. This has created a context that fosters not just keeping a status quo of clash and struggle for influence between them in the region, but also nourishes further securitization of their respective policies toward the Eastern Europe and beyond. In 2014 and more recently in 2022 Russian aggression in Ukraine, the EU and Russia appear to have the same image to each other as they had during the Cold War, or even beyond. Having this in mind, this paper will address those developments, with particular focus on attempts to avoid them, the failure to do so and how they are impacting the EU, Russia and global politics in a form of emerging new world (dis)order.

This paper is an original paper having a critical approach toward the current conflicts going on in Eastern Europe.

International crises are events that develop suddenly in different areas around the world. These crises have different effects on countries. The European Union (EU), a supranational organization, was established in 1951 with the Paris Agreement and remains a gradually evolving structure to this day. In this process, the EU has a growing structure with both enlargement and deepening movements. As it advances its deepening, it also completes its institutional development within its own structure. In the almost 71 years of its existence, the EU has also been confronted with various global crises, which it has survived during this long period. These crises can sometimes be in security, sometimes in the area of economics, and sometimes in the form of a global epidemic such as the recent COVID-19 pandemic.

The COVID-19 pandemic was first identified in China in December 2019 and quickly spread around the world. This pandemic, which is transmitted through human contact and respiration, quickly spread around the world and became a deadly virus. This situation caused panic in the world and forced countries to take various measures and methods to protect themselves from epidemics. Countries that made a serious test were faced with a deadly epidemic after a long time. At this point, the attitude of the EU, which has 27 member countries, is the main subject of this study. The study mainly aims to present the attitude of the EU toward different types of crises by briefly mentioning the global crises that the EU faced. Then, the strategies created by the EU, which faced a global epidemic for the first time, are examined.

The European Union (EU) is one of the most notable examples of economic cooperation and integration in international politics. However, it is difficult to argue that a similar stance prevails in politics and security. Although the EU made various advances and took institutional steps, particularly in the fields of defense and security during the Cold War, it acted on North Atlantic Treaty Organization's axis/with North Atlantic Treaty Organization throughout this period. During the post-Cold War period, the EU made concerted efforts to develop more independent defense and security policies. A similar determination, however, was not seen in terms of the reflections of these activities in practice. The diversity of the EU's issues, on the one hand, and the periodic divergence of interests between Atlanticist and Europeanist countries, on the other hand, posed barriers to acting on a single platform. At the same time, the United Kingdom's exit from the EU has resulted in the establishment of new defense and security balances. Nonetheless, the EU's efforts to develop an autonomous security policy persist. Among these initiatives is Permanent Structured Cooperation, which has recently been noted. Although debates on the effects of North Atlantic Treaty Organization's existence in the twenty-first century in their own context reflect a separate dimension, it does not appear plausible to foresee that the EU will have a wholly separate security perspective from North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the near future. Taking into account the relevant general framework, this study discusses the historical backdrop of the EU's security and defense strategy, new developments in the post-Cold War period, and projections for the future of transatlantic relations.

This paper reports on the impact of China's Community of Shared Destiny Policy (CCSDP) on ethnicity, and the development and trade benefits in Africa, whilst proposing suggestions for improvements.

A mixed-research (desktop-based and online survey-based) approach was employed.

Trade and foreign direct investment alone can account for 11.8% of changes in the peaceful coexistence of China and some selected African countries, and cause changes to the mutual prosperity of China and African nations, to the tune of 6.3%. Therefore, the activation of mutual prosperity among these nations is not necessarily trade and foreign direct investment. The CCSDP is effective and has increased economic development for ethnic groups (50%), although with some negative concerns.

Inadequate/small sample size for the study.

Chinese investment in Africa has had a transformative impact, driving economic growth, improving infrastructure, and fostering regional integration. The share of trade between China and Africa in the continent's overall external trade has increased dramatically. Overall, the CCSDP should be kept in place, but with some modifications to improve its effectiveness and mitigate its negative effects. Finally, as China's engagement with Africa evolves, it is vital that partnerships are founded on mutual understanding, respect, and benefit, and that policies reflect the different needs and ambitions of African communities.

Territory-wide system assessment (TSA) was launched and administered by Hong Kong (HK) Education Bureau (EDB) since 2004. Since then, parents and teachers have been questioning its need, value, uselessness, effectiveness, harm for schools, teachers and students. In 2015, the issue blew up with Kau Yan School’s principal boycotting the tests. A series of discussions in the public and media and different surveys were then carried out widely in HK. After review, EDB announced in 2017 that the revised version of TSA be extended to Primary 3 students in HK. The purpose of this paper is to propose that TSAs for Primary 3, Primary 6 and Secondary 3 need a further review to judge their need and uselessness.

This paper reviews the educational policy governing the administration of the TSA. Primary and secondary data from focus group meetings, press interviews (Bogdan and Biklen, 1982; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Ouiment et al., 2001) and public reports would be analyzed. Besides, participant observation (Nosich, 1982; Sou, 2000; Sou and Zhou, 2007) and theoretical reasoning (Nosich, 1982; Sou, 2000; Sou and Zhou, 2007) have been applied for the critical review of this controversial test. The contrast study on the conflicting views of stakeholders in the education industry would bring up some insights of this controversial educational policy in Assessment for Learning.

Conflicting and contrasting perceptions from TSA to basic competency assessment (BCA) among stakeholders of education and government include governmental stakeholder – EDB’s awareness; EDB stressed that TSA is a low-stakes assessment which does not need extra practice for students; non-governmental stakeholders including legislative councilors’ perception, school principals’ perception, teachers’ perception, parents’ perception and students’ perception. Facing the opposition and grievances of different stakeholders, EDB announced in January 2017 that the revised version of TSA: BCA, be extended to HK in May 2017. Parents and legislative councilors were angry and they ask for a review or even cancellation for Primary 3 TSA.

This original study will initiate more thorough revisions and discussions for the TSAs for Primary 3, Primary 6 and Secondary 3 in HK, as a quality educational management step. While TSA for Primary 3 has been reviewed and substantially “revised,” the community at large still asks for further revision for its needs, uselessness and harm for parents, teachers and students. Since the underlying causes of students’ suicides are not fully identified, the problem of over-drilling practices for TSAs for Primary 3, Primary 6 and Secondary 3 needs to be satisfactorily resolved. Thus, TSAs for Primary 6 and Secondary 3, like that for Primary 3, should be reviewed for probable revision.