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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which potential factors affect the use of activity-based costing (ABC) in a service context.

Design/methodology/approach – An empirical survey was conducted on a sample of 112 leading hotels enterprises in Greece.

Findings – Results show that the use of ABC is positively associated with business strategy and with chief financial officer's (CFO) educational background. In addition, ABC is negatively associated with CFO age. No association was found between the use of ABC and the quality of information technology, membership of multinational chain, and CFO tenure.

Research limitations/implications – This research was limited to the Greek hotel sector. Cross-sectional studies as the work presented here can establish associations, but not causality.

Originality/value – This paper adds to the limited body of knowledge of the design of cost systems in a service context (service cost system design). Specifically, this paper adopted a contingency approach and used empirical analysis to identify the influence of specific organizational variables and CFOs characteristics on the use of ABC in service firms. The operational homogeneity of hotels enables powerful tests of the research hypotheses.

This study examines perceptions of auditor independence (AI) and financial reporting quality (FRQ) when former auditors are hired by public companies into accounting oversight positions under differing strengths of corporate governance. Although the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) mandate of a one-year cooling-off period for the hiring of former audit engagement team members into accounting oversight positions (e.g., chief financial officer) may enhance perceptions of AI, it potentially sacrifices FRQ by restricting the hiring of candidates most familiar with a particular company's industry, risks, and controls. The results of this experiment suggest when a company (i) has strong corporate governance and (ii) hires an audit engagement team member without a one-year cooling-off period, stakeholders perceive financial statement quality to be highest as compared to all other experimental conditions. Interestingly, we also find hiring a former auditor who has not cooled-off one-year results in roughly the same perception of AI as hiring an auditor observing the one-year cooling-off requirement. Collectively, results suggest stakeholders may not perceive a benefit from the cooling-off requirement as independence is not viewed as enhanced and FRQ is viewed as diminished. Requiring disclosure of auditor alumnus hires, in lieu of a mandated cooling-off period, coupled with external measures of companies’ strength of corporate governance may be sufficient to protect AI and FRQ.

This study aims to analyze the effect of top management team (TMT) expertise on real earnings management (REM) and accrual earnings management (AEM) activities in companies in Indonesia by examining a hand-collected secondary data from non-financial publicly listed companies in Indonesia in 2016 and 2017. The expertise of TMT members is measured by possession of a master’s degree, understanding and experience of managed core functional areas, and possession of accounting certifications such as CA or CPA. The results of the study show that the expertise of the members of the TMT has no influence on the activity of AEM in companies in Indonesia. Meanwhile, understanding and experience on the managed core functional areas have a positive influence on REM activities through abnormal cash flows. Possession of accounting certification has a positive influence on REM activities in companies that are in accordance with managerial entrenchment effects, as well as a negative influence on REM activities in companies through abnormal discretionary expenses that are in line with incentive-reduction effects.

Mandatory auditor firm rotation (mandatory rotation) has been a controversial issue in the United States for many decades. Mandatory rotation has been considered at various times as a means of improving auditor independence. For example, in the United States, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has considered mandatory rotation as a solution to the independence problem (PCAOB, 2011) and the European Parliament approved legislation that will require mandatory rotation in the near future (Council of European Union, 2014). The concept of implementing a mandatory rotation policy has been encouraged by some constituents of audited financial statements and rejected by other constituents of audited financial statements. Although there are apparent pros and cons of such a policy, the developmental process of such a policy in this country has not necessarily been an open-democratic, objective process. Universal mandatory rotation may or may not be the ideal solution; however, an open-democratic, objective process is needed to facilitate the development of a solution that considers the needs of all major stakeholders of audited financial statements – not simply accounting firms and public companies, but also investors. The purpose of this paper is to critically examine key issues relating to mandatory rotation and to encourage and stimulate future research and ongoing dialogue regarding this issue, in spite of efforts by certain constituents to silence the issue. This paper provides an overview of the various reasons, including practical, theoretical, political, and self-motivated reasons, why a mandatory rotation policy has not been implemented in the United States in order to address the potential conflict of interest between the auditor and client. This paper will also discuss how some deliberations of mandatory rotation have been flawed. The paper concludes with a summary of key issues along with two approaches for regulators, policy makers, and academics to consider as ways to improve the process and address auditor independence. The authors are not advocating for any specific solution; however, we are advocating for a more objective, unified approach and for the dialogue regarding auditor rotation to continue.

We document three new facts about gender differences in executive compensation. First, female executives receive lower share of incentive pay in total compensation relative to males. This difference accounts for 93% of the gender gap in total pay. Second, the compensation of female executives displays lower pay-performance sensitivity. A $1 million dollar increase in firm value generates a $17,150 increase in firm-specific wealth for male executives and a $1,670 increase for females. Third, female executives are more exposed to bad firm performance and less exposed to good firm performance relative to male executives. We find no link between firm performance and the gender of top executives. We discuss evidence on differences in preferences and the cost of managerial effort by gender and examine the resulting predictions for the structure of compensation. We consider two paradigms for the pay-setting process, the efficient contracting model and the “managerial power” or skimming view. The efficient contracting model can explain the first two facts. Only the skimming view is consistent with the third fact. This suggests that the gender differentials in executive compensation may be inefficient.

This study attempts to analyze the role of governance mechanisms in municipal bankruptcy, which appears to be a neglected area of research. The analysis considers both the organizational level (micro) and the regulatory system (macro).

We use a relevant case of municipal bankruptcy in Italy to discuss the influence of governance characteristics, such as the political and management structure, interaction, and behaviors. The issues related to the accounting system and external audits are also considered. The data for this study are obtained from secondary sources such as audited budgetary reports, public documents, and reports from the Supreme Audit Institution.

The study indicates that the spoils system can favor the politicians’ exercise of power over public managers and undermine the capacity to prevent and manage financial distress. Poor accounting and weak control systems may facilitate this process. The high turnover of top management throughout a mayor’s term in office may reflect political pressure to force accounting rules and achieve flexibility to obtain the expected results or to correct poor financial performance.

To avert municipal bankruptcies, regulations should consider enforcing ex ante control by external oversight bodies, forbidding risky operations and limiting the spoils system for financial management positions and internal auditors.

Municipal defaults around the world have indicated that regulations and audits are ineffective to prevent local governments from failing. A full understanding of complex mutual interactions between the mechanisms of governance and the behaviors of politicians and managers can provide valuable insights to prevent local governments from failing.

The upper-echelons model of Hambrick and Mason ((1984). Academy of Management Review, 9, 193–206) launched a new area of research and provided the first overall theoretical framework for use in understanding how the experiences, backgrounds, and values of senior executives in organizations can influence the decisions that they make. The model is typically assumed to be what Rousseau ((1985). In: B. M. Staw, & L. L. Cumming (Eds), Research in organizational behavior (Vol. 7, pp. 1–37). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press) calls “multi-level,” as it describes how both individuals and top management teams (TMTs) make decisions in line with their preferences, biases, and values; the same model is applicable to both individuals and groups. However, the levels issues in the model have never been subjected to rigorous analysis. This chapter juxtaposes levels concepts and theories on the upper-echelons model, in an effort to highlight its strengths as well as its weaknesses. While the majority of researchers use the model to describe team-level decision making, the analysis presented here reveals that the model is inherently individual-level in focus, and several important limitations must be overcome before the model will provide a full explanation of team-level decision making.

The chapter investigates three channels through which private benefits are hypothesized to be extracted in dual class companies: excess executive compensation, excess capital expenditures and excess cash holdings.

With a propensity score matched sample of S&P 1500 dual class and single class companies with concentrated control, the chapter analyzes the relationship between the valuation discount of dual class companies and measures of excess executive compensation, excess capital expenditure and excess cash holdings.

Executives in dual class firms earn greater compensation relative to their counterparts in single class firms. This excess compensation is more pronounced when the executive is a family member. The value of dual class shares is discounted most when cash holdings and executive compensation of dual class are excessive. Excess compensation is highest for executives who are family members of dual class companies. The dual class discount is not related to excess capital expenditures.

The research shows that the discount in the value of dual class shares in relation to the value of closely controlled single class company shares is directly related to the channels through which controlling shareholder-managers can extract private benefits.