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1 – 10 of 360This paper aims to verify whether the integration of sustainability in executive compensation positively affects firms’ non-financial performance and whether corporate governance…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to verify whether the integration of sustainability in executive compensation positively affects firms’ non-financial performance and whether corporate governance characteristics enhance the relationship between sustainability compensation and firms’ non-financial performance and to expand the domain of the impact of sustainability on non-financial performance.
Design/methodology/approach
This analysis is based on a sample of companies listed on the Milan Italian Stock Exchange from the Financial Times Milan Stock Exchange Index over the 2016–2020 period. Regression analysis was used by using data retrieved from the Refinitiv Eikon database and the sample firms’ remuneration reports.
Findings
The findings of this paper show that embedding sustainability in executive compensation positively affects firms’ non-financial performance. The results of this paper also reveal that specific corporate governance features can improve the impact of sustainability on non-financial performance.
Research limitations/implications
This analysis is limited to Italian firms included in the Financial Times Milan Stock Exchange Index; however, the findings are highly significant.
Practical implications
The findings provide regulators with useful insights for considering the integration of sustainability goals into executive remuneration. Another implication is that policymakers should require – at least – listed firms to fulfil specific corporate governance structural requirements. Finally, the findings can provide investors and financial analysts with a greater awareness of the role played by executive remuneration in the long-term value-creation process.
Originality/value
This paper contributes to addressing the relationship among sustainability, remuneration and non-financial disclosure, drawing on the stakeholder–agency theoretical framework and focusing on Italian firms. This issue has received limited attention with controversial results in the literature.
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Building on the institutional theory perspective on corporate governance change and based on interviews with investor relations (IR) managers in large Japanese companies, this…
Abstract
Purpose
Building on the institutional theory perspective on corporate governance change and based on interviews with investor relations (IR) managers in large Japanese companies, this study aims to examine Japanese IR managers’ perceptions of the influence of foreign shareholders on Japan’s corporate governance reform and stakeholder-based system. The paper examines tensions, conflicts and collaborations among different stakeholders involved in corporate governance changes in Japan, especially in the areas of firm ownership, employment relations and boards of directors. The paper explains why convergence does not happen in some large Japanese companies by investigating Japanese managers’ responses to and perceptions of foreign shareholders in multiple corporate contexts.
Design/methodology/approach
The author conducted in-depth interviews with ten IR managers at large, listed Japanese companies in Kyoto and Tokyo and two managers at foreign investment banks in Tokyo, between 2018 and 2021.
Findings
This paper explores five themes that emerged from my interviews: Chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) mixed perceptions of foreign investors, the effectiveness of CEO compensation and outside directors, managers’ reluctance to accept stock price-driven business strategies, foreign investors’ engagement vs investments in index funds and gender patterns, including the effectiveness of token female outside directors. The Japanese companies the author looked at incorporated foreign shareholders as consultants and adopted a few major shareholder-based customs, such as CEOs communicating with investors, having outside directors, increasing CEO compensation and slimming down unprofitable parts of the business via restructuring and downsizing. Simultaneously, they resisted a few major shareholder-based practices. Foreign shareholders’ pressure revealed tensions and contradictions between the Japanese stakeholder system and shareholder primacy-based customs.
Originality/value
This paper is one of the few qualitative studies that explores Japanese IR managers’ responses to and perceptions of foreign shareholders in corporate governance reform, with a particular focus on ownership, employment relations and board members. This paper provides examples of tension, conflict and cooperation between Japanese managers and foreign investors, as seen through the eyes of Japanese IR managers. Examining changes in Japan’s stakeholder-based system of corporate governance reform enables us to better understand the processes by which, with vigorous pressure from government and foreign shareholders, a non-western country like Japan may adopt shareholder-based customs and how such a change may also lead to institutional changes.
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Aiza Shabbir and Shazia Kousar
This study aims to explore the moderating impact of narcissism overload on the relation between founder CEO and entrepreneurial orientation (EO) in registered private schools of…
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to explore the moderating impact of narcissism overload on the relation between founder CEO and entrepreneurial orientation (EO) in registered private schools of Pakistan.
Design/methodology/approach
Data were collected through a stratified random sampling method with the help of previously validated questionnaires. A sample of 121 replies was gathered for analysis. SPSS has been used to find the results.
Findings
Results depict that CEO narcissism moderates the relation between founder CEO and EO and does not moderate the relationship between and CEO ownership and EO.
Originality/value
Many studies focused on the founder personality characteristics (such as generalized self-efficacy or locus of control) are not directly observed, but rather inferred their effect indirectly. The study contributes to examine how the founder CEO variable interacts with CEO personality to influence EO. This study will propose a practical approach to investigate whether and how the narcissism constructs moderate the founder CEO–EO relationship. Direct association between stock ownership and EO will also be examined.
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Syed Tauseef Ali, Zhen Yang, Zahid Sarwar and Farman Ali
In view of organizational inertia, with the occurrence of a major event, though resource rigidity minimizes, however simultaneously, it increases process rigidity, which creates…
Abstract
Purpose
In view of organizational inertia, with the occurrence of a major event, though resource rigidity minimizes, however simultaneously, it increases process rigidity, which creates difficulties in motivating managers and dealing with the agency problem. Therefore, keeping in mind the high demand created by the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor and Naya Pakistan Housing Scheme in the cement sector of Pakistan, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of corporate governance (CG) on the cost of equity (COE) in the cement sector, to deal with the problems surging during and after the completion of these projects and highlight further opportunities for the cement sector of Pakistan.
Design/methodology/approach
CG is a qualitative concept therefore, eight proxies have been used to measure it along with the two control variables. This study uses balance panel data of six years from 2012 to 2017, collected from 18 companies of the cement sector of Pakistan. Descriptive statistics have been used to describe the data, correlation matrix to see the nature of the relationship, and Pooled OLS as the estimation technique, while to analyze the data a statistical package 13 has been used. To measure the COE, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) has been used.
Findings
Regression results suggest that block ownership, insider ownership and the board size are insignificant, while CEO tenure is negatively and significantly associated with the COE. Non-executive directors, independence and CEO duality are insignificant; however, diversity is positively and significantly associated with the COE. Moreover, the mean value of the COE is 8.22 percent for the cement sector, while the coefficient of determination of the model under study is 74 percent.
Research limitations/implications
This paper is based on the data from the cement sector of Pakistan only. Therefore, this is the reason that these results cannot be generalized on the whole economy of Pakistan.
Practical implications
This study helps in finding out the COE value specific to the cement sector, which will help this sector to evaluate the capital budgeting decision more precisely and accurately than before. Moreover, the association of diversity as positive, while independence as negative with the COE highlights a room for improvement in the implementation of CG codes by SECP. This study also helps to mitigate the impact of inertia, the after-effects of high demand, and managing the agency problem in the cement sector.
Originality/value
This is the first study using CG data collected just after the revised promulgation of CG codes in 2012, along with a wide range of eight proxies measuring CG and its impact on the COE in the cement sector.
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Luigi Nasta, Barbara Sveva Magnanelli and Mirella Ciaburri
Based on stakeholder, agency and institutional theory, this study aims to examine the role of institutional ownership in the relationship between environmental, social and…
Abstract
Purpose
Based on stakeholder, agency and institutional theory, this study aims to examine the role of institutional ownership in the relationship between environmental, social and governance practices and CEO compensation.
Design/methodology/approach
Utilizing a fixed-effect panel regression analysis, this research utilized a panel data approach, analyzing data spanning from 2014 to 2021, focusing on US companies listed on the S&P500 stock market index. The dataset encompassed 219 companies, leading to a total of 1,533 observations.
Findings
The analysis identified that environmental scores significantly impact CEO equity-linked compensation, unlike social and governance scores. Additionally, it was found that institutional ownership acts as a moderating factor in the relationship between the environmental score and CEO equity-linked compensation, as well as the association between the social score and CEO equity-linked compensation. Interestingly, the direction of these moderating effects varied between the two relationships, suggesting a nuanced role of institutional ownership.
Originality/value
This research makes a unique contribution to the field of corporate governance by exploring the relatively understudied area of institutional ownership's influence on the ESG practices–CEO compensation nexus.
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Krishna Prasad, K. Sankaran and Nandan Prabhu
The purpose of this paper is to examine the empirical relationship between gray directors (non-executive non-independent directors) and executive compensation among companies…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the empirical relationship between gray directors (non-executive non-independent directors) and executive compensation among companies listed in India’s National Stock Exchange (NSE). The paper also examines the possible interplay of relationships between controlling shareholder duality (controlling shareholder being the CEO), ownership category and executive compensation.
Design/methodology/approach
A sample of 438 firms listed in the NSE of India was studied using data spanning five financial years, 2012–2013 to 2016–2017.
Findings
Empirical evidence suggests that there is a positive association between the proportion of gray directors on the board and executive compensation. The sensitivity of executive compensation to gray directors is found to be higher among family controlled firms. This research has also found that CEOs who belong to controlling shareholder groups received higher pay than professional CEOs. The authors conjecture that these results suggest cronyism and may contribute to lower levels of corporate governance practices in the country.
Research limitations/implications
The hybrid board structure, which India has adopted with the desire to bring the best of Anglo Saxon and Japanese board philosophies, has paradoxically led to self-serving boards. Exploration of alternative thinking to bring about changes in the regulatory framework is, therefore, necessary.
Originality/value
Serious problems are identified with the philosophy behind board composition mandated by Listing Requirements for Indian firms with empirical evidence showing how the existing rules generate cronyism and unfairness to minority shareholders.
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Hsihui Chang and Helen HL Choy
This paper aims to examine the effect of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX), which was signed by President George W. Bush and came into effect on July 30, 2002, on firm productivity.
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to examine the effect of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX), which was signed by President George W. Bush and came into effect on July 30, 2002, on firm productivity.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors use the total factor productivity (TFP) as our measure of firm productivity.
Findings
Analyzing annual firm-level data from the Compustat database for the period of 1991-2006, the authors find that firm productivity increases at a higher rate in the post-SOX period. The results indicate that, although firms incur significant costs in complying with the requirements of the SOX, they also benefit from these requirements as evidenced by the improved productivity over time post-SOX. There is also a shift in the output elasticities from capital toward labor. The SOX has a positive effect on the output elasticity of labor but a negative impact on that of capital.
Research limitations/implications
The results have the following important implications. The SOX is a value-enhancing regulation in that it not only strengthens a firm’s corporate governance but also improves its productivity. However, compliance with the SOX can impose a long-term cost on firms: the decrease in the capital investment, leading to a decline in the output elasticity of capital. If this decline in the capital investment continues, it can have an adverse effect on firm productivity in the long term.
Originality/value
This paper extends the literature along the line of the actual operational effects of the SOX regulation by examining its effect on the productivity of firms.
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In this study, we examine how ownership structure affects the use of independent directors in Vietnam – an emerging stock market.
Abstract
Purpose
In this study, we examine how ownership structure affects the use of independent directors in Vietnam – an emerging stock market.
Design/methodology/approach
We develop logit and tobit regression models to investigate the effects of ownership structure on the propensity to use independent directors and the number of independent directors on the board, respectively. Insider ownership and the use of independent directors are proposed to have a non-linear relationship.
Findings
With a sample of 1,318 observations collected from 192 listed firms over the period from 2008 to 2017, we find that insider ownership and independent director appointment have a U-shaped relationship. It is positive when insiders hold a small proportion of shares, and turns out to be negative when insiders hold a large percentage of shares. In addition, both state ownership and foreign ownership are negatively related to firm decisions of appointing independent directors.
Practical implications
Our findings imply that minority shareholders should have appropriate actions to reduce agency costs and protect their own interests. In addition, policymakers should improve the effectiveness of corporate governance legislation to increase the presence of independent directors in order to protect minority shareholders. Moreover, government agencies also need to increase the number of independent directors in state-controlled firms as a means to improve their corporate governance. Foreign investors may be a substitute for independent directors; therefore, firms without independent directors are able to improve their corporate governance by attracting foreign investors.
Originality/value
While the extant literature shows that independent directors can help firms decrease agency costs of equity in financial decisions and performance, there are relatively few studies investigating corporate decisions to use independent directors. This paper contributes to the literature of corporate governance mechanisms through independent directors in emerging markets.
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Esteban Lafuente and Miguel Á. García-Cestona
This paper investigates how past performance changes, prior CEO replacements and changes in the chairperson impact CEO turnover in public and large private businesses.
Abstract
Purpose
This paper investigates how past performance changes, prior CEO replacements and changes in the chairperson impact CEO turnover in public and large private businesses.
Design/methodology/approach
We analyze 1,679 CEO replacements documented in a sample of 1,493 Spanish public and private firms during 1998–2004 by computing dynamic binary choice models that control for endogeneity in CEO turnovers.
Findings
The results reveal that different performance horizons (short- and long-term) explain the dissimilar rate of CEO turnover between public and private firms. Private firms exercise monitoring patience and path dependency characterizes the evaluation of CEOs, while public companies' short-termism leads to higher CEO turnover rates as a reaction to poor short-term economic results, and alternative controls—ownership and changes in the chairperson—improve the monitoring of management.
Originality/value
Our results show the importance of controlling for path dependency to examine more accurately top executives' performance. The findings confirm that exposure to market controls affects the functioning of internal controls in evaluating CEOs and shows a short-term performance horizon that could be behind the recent moves of public firms going private or restraining shareholders' power.
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The purpose of this paper is to observe whether the entrenchment of managers can affect firms’ dividend disbursement decisions and investor sentiment in the Tunisia context.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to observe whether the entrenchment of managers can affect firms’ dividend disbursement decisions and investor sentiment in the Tunisia context.
Design/methodology/approach
The sample includes all non-financial listed stocks in the Tunisia stock exchange during the years 2004–2017. Moreover, the entrenchment of managers is measured by five proxy explained the managers rooting from all listed firms. The propensity to pay dividends is measured by the dividend yield.
Findings
The findings yield qualitatively consistent with the previous research. After controlling for the effect of a manager’s behavior and different entrenchment phase, the result shows that entrepreneurial the firm’s decision to pay dividends could be influenced by the managers’ entrenchment.
Research limitations/implications
The result is limited at the level of the non-financial companies listed in the BVMT, but in future studies, the investigation with other countries can be compared.
Practical implications
Moreover, investors in Tunisia show their preference for a dividend to self-control and satisfaction and increase their profit, especially in an abnormal economic situation explained by the Tunisian political crisis.
Originality/value
The originality of this paper is to investigate both the important role of the entrenchment and cycle life of the manager on the decision to distribute dividends and the investor sentiment. Moreover, the author’s problem may be a reference for future investigation talking about the managers’ psychology like opportunism.
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