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This study aims to examine whether compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in mitigating the CEO horizon problem.

The author uses a sample of 7,280 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2011.

In this study, the author finds evidence of opportunistic research and development (R&D) reduction and accruals management in firms with retiring CEOs and compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors. Moreover, it is found that R&D reduction and income-increasing accruals are less discouraged when determining the compensation for retiring CEOs by compensation committees that are dominated by co-opted directors. The results suggest that compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in adjusting CEO compensation to mitigate the CEO horizon problem.

The study reveals that co-opted directors are weak monitors. Moreover, the study adds empirical evidence to the debate of organizations’ CEO horizon problem. Finally, the study adds to the literature on corporate governance, revealing that compensation committees play an important role in mitigating an organization’s CEO horizon problem by adjusting CEO compensation.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of managerial decision horizon (MDH) on real estate investment trust (REIT) behavior and performance.

In this study, the authors expand the number of proxies and measure managerial horizon by CEO age, CEO tenure, cash compensation relative to total compensation, and the amount of vested equity-based compensation to total compensation. To avoid potential measurement error, the authors compute the average ranking score of the four individual measures to determine the overall MDH of a CEO. Cross-sectional time series regressions are then performed on the effects of CEO MDH on REIT policies and performance. The authors also examine if the effect of myopic MDH can be mitigated by good corporate governance. For robustness purpose, the authors also compare the effects of age-related MDH and compensation-related MDH.

The results show that REITs managed by CEOs with short MDHs have lower levels of asset growth and a lower standard deviation of return on assets. These REITs also have lower debt levels, lower dividend payouts, and hold more cash. The results suggest that short-horizon CEOs have incentives to lower investment risk, default risk, and liquidity risk at the firm level in order to protect personal benefits. CEOs with a short horizon also have a negative impact on REIT performance. The results also show that CEO compensation-related horizon problems are mitigated by corporate governance, but CEO age-related horizon problems are significant and persistent. The results suggest that age-related behavioral biases of the CEO are important determinants of corporate decisions.

The results of this study suggest that the managerial behavioral biases should be considered in understanding firm behavior.

This is the first study that examines the effects of MDH on REIT behavior and performance. The unique regulatory environment of REITs makes them less susceptible to agency problems of free cash flow and thus provides a clearer picture of the effect of MDH. Prior studies focus on the effect of managerial horizon on firm investment activity, this study expands the scope to examine the effects on investment and financial policies. In addition, this study adds to the literature by showing that the effect of age-related horizon problems may not be mitigated by good corporate governance.

We study the events that motivate CEOs to underinvest in R&D long-term projects (CEO myopia). Based on the existing literature in earnings management and agency theory, myopia is likely to become more problematic under five circumstances: when the CEO nears retirement (the CEO horizon problem), R&D projects have very long time horizons (the project horizon problem), the firm’s financial health is deteriorating (the cover-up problem), ownership structure is heavily weighted toward insider owners (minority owner oppression problem), and when the threat of hostile takeover increases (the entrenchment problem). We setup a dynamic simulation model in which rational CEOs maximize the total value of their bonus compensation over their tenure. Our findings related to the five circumstances are consistent with the extant literature. However, we found an unexpected stable, nonlinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship between CEO tenure and R&D investment. We discuss the theoretical implications of our model and offer suggestions for future research.

The present study examines the effect of the chief executive officer (CEO) career horizon (CH) problem on earnings quality (ERN) for selected family-controlled firms known to have a unique operational goal.

The generalised method of moment linear regression model was used on a sample of family-controlled firms in Malaysia from 2005 to 2016.

The study found a negative relationship between CH and ERN, measured by earnings persistence and earnings predictability. However, in the earnings predictability model, the reverse was found to be the case after interacting CH with CEO family affiliation, CEO experience and CEO equity. However, the use of a reputable auditor could not mitigate the CH problem. Also, the study obtained a closely related result in the earnings persistence model. The result aligns with the socio-emotional wealth (SEW) theory, which states that the goals of family-controlled firms go beyond financial objectives to include other non-financial objectives, and hence, their commitment to perpetuating their dynasty encourages them to preserve the quality of their earnings.

Existing studies on family firms and ERN have treated family firms as homogeneous entities by comparing family and non-family firms, using the underlying theoretical justification of the agency theory. However, this study departs from the agency theory, by considering those factors (i.e. the extent of CEO alignment with family owners and the choice of auditor), using the SEW theory, which establishes the differences among family firms. This work builds on that of Chen et al., (2018) and Ali and Zhang (2015), which suggested that corporate governance can mitigate the CH problem. Therefore, the strength of a CEO's attachment to the family firm (measured by CEO equity ownership and CEO affiliation to family members in family firms) and the choice of the auditor can explain the variation in the effect of the CH problem in family firms.

In recent years, the phenomena of “accelerating” and “jumping” during the international expansion of Chinese enterprises have attracted a lot of attention from scholars. However, while a CEO’s career horizon can significantly affect his or her enterprise’s strategic decision-making, few studies have explored the role of CEO career horizon in terms of “accelerating” and “jumping” internationalization.

Based on a sample of China’s A-share listed manufacturing companies from 2008 to 2017, this study explores the impact of CEO career horizon on the internationalization pace and international rhythm of enterprises.

First, the shorter the CEO’s career horizon, the more likely the CEO can avoid risky strategic decisions, which ultimately causes a negative relationship between CEO career horizon and the internationalization pace and rhythm of the enterprise. Second, for larger and older boards of directors, there is a more negative impact of the CEO’s short-term career horizon on the internationalization pace and internationalization rhythm of the company. However, given a larger proportion of female directors and non-executive directors, the CEO’s short-term career horizon has a weaker negative impact on international pace and the rhythm of internationalization.

First, based on upper echelon theory, this study interprets the influence of CEO career horizon on the time dimension of corporate internationalization (including internationalization pace and international rhythm), deepening the theory’s explanatory power. Second, by clarifying the important predictive effect of CEO career horizon on internationalization pace and international rhythm, this research enriches extant research on both variables’ antecedents, as well as that on the influence of CEO career horizon. Finally, by introducing the regulatory role of the board’s supervisory ability, this study clarifies the boundary conditions for the influence of the CEO’s career horizon on international pace and rhythm, and it expands the literature on how CEOs and boards of directors can influence corporate strategic decisions during the internationalization process.

This study aims to examine the unique nature of family firms by investigating the moderating effect of chief executive officer (CEO) identity on CEO career horizon and the auditor’s client risk assessment. Consistent with literature on family businesses, the level of CEO attachment to socio-emotional wealth (SEW) varies among family businesses.

This study used a longitudinal sample of 2,063 non-financial family firm-year observations from 2005 to 2016 listed on the Bursa Malaysia. The study used the general method of moments (GMM), which controls for endogeneity concerns.

The results reveal that, without the moderating effect of CEO identity, the relationship between CEO career horizon and auditor’s risk assessment is positive, which suggests that the auditor’s risk perception of retiring CEOs is very high. However, the interaction of CEO identity reverses the relationship as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficient on the interacted terms. The finding suggests that the auditor’s perceived risk associated with CEO career horizon is lower in family firms with CEOs affiliated to family members or in which the CEO has an equity stake. Overall, the findings provide compelling evidence that the extent of the CEO’s attachment to the firm’s SEW affects the auditor’s client risk assessment.

The findings of the study serve as an enlightenment to policymakers such as Bursa Malaysia and Security Commission that within the family-controlled firms, differences still exist; therefore, there might be a need for future regulatory initiative to cater for the specific need of family-controlled firms.

The study contributes to prior literature by departing from the agency theory adopted in previous studies on auditor choice in family firms under the assumption that family firms are homogenous.

Drawing on upper echelons theory, the authors study how the career horizon of a CEO promotes green innovation through the incentive mechanism. Meanwhile, from the perspective of speed and amount of value realization, the authors also identify two sets of shift parameters that reduce or increase incentive gap between short-career-horizon CEOs and long-career-horizon CEOs. Specifically considering the digital trend in China and the heterogeneity of firms and industries, this study aims to examine the moderating effects of firm digitalization, industrial digital transformation, slack resources and polluting firms.

In the context of China’s transitional economy, this study uses all A-share listed companies in China from 2007 to 2021, resulting in a total of 4,286 companies with 29,310 company-year observations.

The results support the hypothesis that CEO career horizon significantly facilitates green innovation at the firm level. The positive effect is attenuated by both firm digitalization and industrial digital transformation, but is amplified by slack resources and by the polluting firms. After a series of robustness tests, the research conclusions remain valid.

To extend the upper echelons perspective of existing research into CEO−green innovation, the authors make important contributions in four ways. First, this study contributes to green innovation literature by adding an unexplored yet increasingly important managerial determinant. Second, it advances research on the role of the CEO in green innovation by revealing a new theoretical mechanism. Third, it deepens the understanding of CEO career horizon by exploring its influence on innovations in the context of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Fourth, it identifies boundary conditions that motivate CEOs in distinguishable ways, to provide a nuanced understanding of the relationship between CEO career horizon and green innovation.

This study examines the impact of female CEO on firm community engagement. By drawing on the stakeholder-agency paradigm, the author proposes that female CEOs feel more pressure to deliver favorable firm performance, thus resulting in less community engagement in firms with female CEOs. The author also examines circumstances surrounding the CEO as boundary conditions that can promote the extent that female CEOs engage in community initiatives.

The author collected panel data on a sample of firms listed in the S&P 500 index during the years 2009–2013. The author tested the hypotheses using firm fixed-effects models.

The results show that firms with female CEOs pursue less community engagement. CEO career horizon and CEO unexercisable stock options are boundary conditions that weaken the negative relationship between female CEOs and community engagement, while board independence does not have a significant moderating effect.

This study sheds light on the roles of female CEOs on firm community engagement as a distinct firm strategic action. Furthermore, this study provides a better understanding of the relationship by examining different factors that can promote community engagement by female CEOs, which include CEO career horizon and compensation incentive.

The purpose of the paper is to examine the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) succession on environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance and whether the characteristics of the incoming CEO, in terms of both gender and career horizon, are able to affect the relationship between CEO succession and ESG score.

The paper investigates a sample of European-listed companies between 2010 and 2021. Difference-in-difference and fixed-effects regressions are employed as the base empirical methodology. In addition, the robustness of the empirical findings is assessed by employing alternative methodologies and a different ESG proxy.

The empirical findings show the existence of a positive link between CEO succession and ESG performance and that this relationship is affected by two characteristics of the incoming CEO. Specifically, the empirical evidence indicates that the positive effect is magnified by the gender and the career horizon of the incoming CEO.

Considering the lack of research, this paper is the first one that opens a debate about the effects of CEO succession on corporate ESG performance in several European countries. By employing a unique sample of European listed firms, which has never been examined in other empirical research, this study highlights the importance of the demographic features of the incoming CEOs that should be taken into consideration during their selection process.

Motivated by rapidly increasing CEO age in the USA, the purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of CEO age on financial reporting quality and consider the moderating role of clawback provisions.

This study uses a data set of 18,492 US firm-year observations from 2003 to 2019. Financial reporting quality is proxied with accruals-based and real activities earnings management measures, and with financial statement irregularities, measured by applying Benford’s law to financial statement line items. A number of sensitivity tests are conducted including the use of an instrumental variable.

The results provide evidence that financial statement irregularities are more prevalent when CEOs are older, and they suggest a complex relation between CEO age and real activities earnings management. The results also suggest that the effect of CEO age on financial reporting quality is moderated by the presence of clawback provisions which became mandatory for US-listed firms in October 2022.

This study is the first, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, to consider the effect of CEO age on financial statement irregularities and earnings management. This study has important implications for stakeholders evaluating the determinants of financial reporting quality, for boards of directors considering CEO age limitations and for policymakers considering mandating clawback provisions, which recently occurred in the USA.