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1 – 10 of over 2000
Article
Publication date: 9 July 2018

Krista Lewellyn

The purpose of this paper is to draw from regulatory focus theory, to examine the effects of the “gain/no gain” nature of stock options and retirement pay on the decision to…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to draw from regulatory focus theory, to examine the effects of the “gain/no gain” nature of stock options and retirement pay on the decision to engage in cross-border acquisitions. The moderating effects of managerial discretion arising from the external industry context and internal organizational leadership structure are also examined.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors employ random effects negative binomial regression analysis with a longitudinal (2006–2016) data set of US public companies operating in four industries with differing levels of industry discretion: the oil and gas, paper and packaging, aerospace and defense, and telecommunications.

Findings

The findings indicate that both CEO in-the-money stock options and retirement pay are positively related to cross-border acquisition activity. The results also demonstrate that managerial discretion, arising from the firm’s external industry context, accentuates the positive relationship between both the value of CEO in-the-money stock options and retirement pay with cross-border acquisition activity.

Practical implications

The findings provide implication for practice as understanding how retirement pay and stock options, both of which make up a substantial portion of overall CEO pay in the USA, motivate cross-border acquisition activity, may improve decisions by executives. The evidence also provides guidance to boards of directors who are charged with the responsibility of creating CEO compensation contracts.

Originality/value

The paper fills important gaps in the existing research on the influence of compensation elements on firm outcomes, by offering a novel explanation for how in-the-money stock options and retirement pay affect CEOs’ motivations to engage in cross-border acquisitions.

Details

Journal of Strategy and Management, vol. 11 no. 3
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1755-425X

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 13 September 2021

Lee M. Dunham, Tirimba Obonyo and Sijing Wei

The purpose of this paper is to determine if Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are rewarded or punished in the corporate director labor market for engaging in corporate social…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to determine if Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are rewarded or punished in the corporate director labor market for engaging in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors empirically examine the relation between CEOs' CSR engagement and their corporate board appointments in retirement using logit, ordinary least squares (OLS) and Poisson regression models.

Findings

Results indicate that CSR engagement has significant director labor market consequences for retiring CEOs. Specifically, CSR engagement has a favorable impact on the ability of retired CEOs to obtain board seats and board seats at larger firms generally associated with higher pay, even after controlling for firm performance and other determinants previously documented to explain director selection. The authors also find evidence that CEOs of firms with high CSR engagement build up their firms' CSR scores over time as they approach retirement, which is consistent with the labor market for directors providing incentives to attract CEOs to board service in retirement.

Originality/value

By examining the relationship between a CEO's CSR engagement and their external corporate board directorships, this paper advances the understanding of the determinants of corporate board appointments. Further, while most prior research assesses the value of CSR engagement by looking at the relation between CSR engagement and that firm's performance, this is the first study to our knowledge to look outside the firm to determine if CSR engagement has value to the CEO.

Details

Managerial Finance, vol. 48 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0307-4358

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 1 December 2006

Paul Mather and Alan Ramsay

Prior research has shown evidence of earnings management in financial reports of US and Australian firms changing chief executive officer (CEO). This paper examines whether…

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Abstract

Prior research has shown evidence of earnings management in financial reports of US and Australian firms changing chief executive officer (CEO). This paper examines whether corporate boards, with certain characteristics associated with strong corporate governance, are effective in controlling any earnings management in the financial reports of Australian firms that change CEOs. Since hiring, monitoring and replacing the CEO are key roles of the board of directors, research in this specific context is considered particularly appropriate. After controlling for contemporaneous and lagged profitability in the year of CEO change, we find evidence of negative unexpected accruals in our sub‐sample of firms where the CEO resigned. For this group, larger boards and a higher proportion of independent directors appear to limit observed negative earnings management. In the case of CEO retirements there is evidence of positive unexpected accruals in the period of CEO change. However, none of the board characteristics show any significant relationship with unexpected accruals. In the period after CEO change, we find no evidence of positive unexpected accruals for CEO resignations and none of the board characteristics show any significant relationship with unexpected accruals. For CEO retirements, our analysis indicates that a higher proportion of executive and affiliated director shareholding goes some way towards counteracting the observed positive unexpected accruals. When lagged unexpected accruals are included in the regression equation to control for accrual reversals, CEO duality significantly increases the already positive earnings management found in CEO retirements in the period following CEO change.

Details

Accounting Research Journal, vol. 19 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1030-9616

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 29 January 2021

Ruonan Liu

This study aims to examine whether compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in mitigating the CEO horizon problem.

Abstract

Purpose

This study aims to examine whether compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in mitigating the CEO horizon problem.

Design/methodology/approach

The author uses a sample of 7,280 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2011.

Findings

In this study, the author finds evidence of opportunistic research and development (R&D) reduction and accruals management in firms with retiring CEOs and compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors. Moreover, it is found that R&D reduction and income-increasing accruals are less discouraged when determining the compensation for retiring CEOs by compensation committees that are dominated by co-opted directors. The results suggest that compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in adjusting CEO compensation to mitigate the CEO horizon problem.

Originality/value

The study reveals that co-opted directors are weak monitors. Moreover, the study adds empirical evidence to the debate of organizations’ CEO horizon problem. Finally, the study adds to the literature on corporate governance, revealing that compensation committees play an important role in mitigating an organization’s CEO horizon problem by adjusting CEO compensation.

Details

Accounting Research Journal, vol. 34 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1030-9616

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 5 June 2009

Neophytos Lambertides

The aim of this paper is to examine the long‐term abnormal returns of firms that have experienced chief executive officer (CEO) succession. According to Chief Executive magazine…

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Abstract

Purpose

The aim of this paper is to examine the long‐term abnormal returns of firms that have experienced chief executive officer (CEO) succession. According to Chief Executive magazine, directors rank CEO succession as the second most important issue their firms face, the first being strategic planning.

Design/methodology/approach

This study examines 202 CEO succession announcements. It utilizes two returns‐generating models to calculate abnormal returns for two estimation windows of 200 trading days before and after the succession event.

Findings

The results support the theory first developed by Guest (1962) that succession is an adaptive event. Specifically, this study shows that firms that experience a CEO change have positive abnormal returns, suggesting that new CEOs raise the firm performance. Moreover, this study shows that firms that experience CEO change due to CEO retirement improve firm performance in the post‐succession period, whereas succession due to CEO sudden death or illness seems to have no direct effect on the long‐term performance of these firms. Finally, this study provides strong evidence that outside successions help firms raise performance more than inside successions.

Research limitations/implications

Like any empirical event‐study, the validity of the results depends on the absence of confounding events. Future research could be to explore the relationship between the information content of the CEO succession announcement and the market reaction.

Originality/value

This paper is believed to be the first attempt to empirically examine the relation between CEO turnover and long‐term firm performance through the analysis of the successor's origin and of the force initiating the change, by using an event study methodology.

Details

Managerial Finance, vol. 35 no. 7
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0307-4358

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 3 April 2020

Salau Olarinoye Abdulmalik, Noor Afza Amran and Ayoib Che-Ahmad

This study aims to examine the unique nature of family firms by investigating the moderating effect of chief executive officer (CEO) identity on CEO career horizon and the…

Abstract

Purpose

This study aims to examine the unique nature of family firms by investigating the moderating effect of chief executive officer (CEO) identity on CEO career horizon and the auditor’s client risk assessment. Consistent with literature on family businesses, the level of CEO attachment to socio-emotional wealth (SEW) varies among family businesses.

Design/methodology/approach

This study used a longitudinal sample of 2,063 non-financial family firm-year observations from 2005 to 2016 listed on the Bursa Malaysia. The study used the general method of moments (GMM), which controls for endogeneity concerns.

Findings

The results reveal that, without the moderating effect of CEO identity, the relationship between CEO career horizon and auditor’s risk assessment is positive, which suggests that the auditor’s risk perception of retiring CEOs is very high. However, the interaction of CEO identity reverses the relationship as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficient on the interacted terms. The finding suggests that the auditor’s perceived risk associated with CEO career horizon is lower in family firms with CEOs affiliated to family members or in which the CEO has an equity stake. Overall, the findings provide compelling evidence that the extent of the CEO’s attachment to the firm’s SEW affects the auditor’s client risk assessment.

Practical implications

The findings of the study serve as an enlightenment to policymakers such as Bursa Malaysia and Security Commission that within the family-controlled firms, differences still exist; therefore, there might be a need for future regulatory initiative to cater for the specific need of family-controlled firms.

Originality/value

The study contributes to prior literature by departing from the agency theory adopted in previous studies on auditor choice in family firms under the assumption that family firms are homogenous.

Details

Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting, vol. 18 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1985-2517

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 27 November 2023

Justin G. Davis and Miguel Garcia-Cestona

Motivated by rapidly increasing CEO age in the USA, the purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of CEO age on financial reporting quality and consider the moderating role…

Abstract

Purpose

Motivated by rapidly increasing CEO age in the USA, the purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of CEO age on financial reporting quality and consider the moderating role of clawback provisions.

Design/methodology/approach

This study uses a data set of 18,492 US firm-year observations from 2003 to 2019. Financial reporting quality is proxied with accruals-based and real activities earnings management measures, and with financial statement irregularities, measured by applying Benford’s law to financial statement line items. A number of sensitivity tests are conducted including the use of an instrumental variable.

Findings

The results provide evidence that financial statement irregularities are more prevalent when CEOs are older, and they suggest a complex relation between CEO age and real activities earnings management. The results also suggest that the effect of CEO age on financial reporting quality is moderated by the presence of clawback provisions which became mandatory for US-listed firms in October 2022.

Originality/value

This study is the first, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, to consider the effect of CEO age on financial statement irregularities and earnings management. This study has important implications for stakeholders evaluating the determinants of financial reporting quality, for boards of directors considering CEO age limitations and for policymakers considering mandating clawback provisions, which recently occurred in the USA.

Details

Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1985-2517

Keywords

Book part
Publication date: 1 January 2014

Moren Levesque, Phillip Phan, Steven Raymar and Maya Waisman

We study the events that motivate CEOs to underinvest in R&D long-term projects (CEO myopia). Based on the existing literature in earnings management and agency theory, myopia is…

Abstract

We study the events that motivate CEOs to underinvest in R&D long-term projects (CEO myopia). Based on the existing literature in earnings management and agency theory, myopia is likely to become more problematic under five circumstances: when the CEO nears retirement (the CEO horizon problem), R&D projects have very long time horizons (the project horizon problem), the firm’s financial health is deteriorating (the cover-up problem), ownership structure is heavily weighted toward insider owners (minority owner oppression problem), and when the threat of hostile takeover increases (the entrenchment problem). We setup a dynamic simulation model in which rational CEOs maximize the total value of their bonus compensation over their tenure. Our findings related to the five circumstances are consistent with the extant literature. However, we found an unexpected stable, nonlinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship between CEO tenure and R&D investment. We discuss the theoretical implications of our model and offer suggestions for future research.

Details

Corporate Governance in the US and Global Settings
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-78441-292-0

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 15 July 2019

Elio Alfonso, Li-Zheng Brooks, Andrey Simonov and Joseph H. Zhang

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of career concerns on CEOs’ use of expectations management to meet or beat analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts. The authors…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of career concerns on CEOs’ use of expectations management to meet or beat analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts. The authors posit that early career-stage CEOs are less (more) likely to use expectations management than are late career-stage CEOs if the market views expectations management as an opportunistic strategy (efficient process) due to reputational capital concerns.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors obtain data for CEO career stages and CEO compensation from ExecuComp, analyst earnings forecasts from the detailed I/B/E/S database, financial statement data from quarterly Compustat and stock returns from the daily CRSP database over the period 1992–2013.

Findings

The results are consistent with the opportunistic hypothesis and early-stage CEOs seeking to build reputational capital by avoiding the perception of engaging in an inefficient managerial strategy. The authors find robust evidence that late career-stage CEOs are more likely to engage in expectations management than early career-stage CEOs. Furthermore, the authors show that late career-stage CEOs tend to employ expectations management to boost the value of their equity-based compensation.

Research limitations/implications

The findings have important implications because the authors document a different implication of the “horizon problem” related to CEOs’ opportunistic forecasting behavior and the manipulation of analysts’ forecasts for CEOs who are approaching retirement.

Practical implications

The results have practical implications for analysts who provide earnings forecasts for firms whose CEOs are in early or late career stages and for investors who use such analysts’ forecasts in firm valuation models.

Originality/value

The authors contribute to the literature on expectations management by documenting how reputational incentives of CEOs affect the likelihood that managers engage in expectations management. The authors show that an important managerial incentive to engage in expectations management is CEO career concerns. Furthermore, the authors show that CEOs who are in early stages of their careers choose not to engage in expectations management due to the market’s perceived degree of opportunism pertaining to this strategy.

Details

Journal of Applied Accounting Research, vol. 20 no. 3
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0967-5426

Keywords

Content available
Article
Publication date: 14 August 2023

Christiana Osei Bonsu, Chelsea Liu and Alfred Yawson

The role of chief executive officer (CEO) personal characteristics in shaping corporate policies has attracted increasing academic attention in the past two decades. In this…

Abstract

Purpose

The role of chief executive officer (CEO) personal characteristics in shaping corporate policies has attracted increasing academic attention in the past two decades. In this review, the authors synthesize extant research on CEO attributes by reviewing 232 articles published in 29 journals from the accounting, finance and management literature. This review provides an overview of existing findings, highlights current trends and interdisciplinary differences in research approaches and identifies potential avenues for future research.

Design/methodology/approach

To review the literature on CEO attributes, the authors manually collected peer-reviewed articles in accounting, finance and management journals from 2000 to 2021. The authors conducted in-depth analysis of each paper and manually recorded the theories, data sources, country of study, study period, measures of CEO attributes and dependent variables. This procedure helped the authors group the selected articles into themes and sub-themes. The authors compared the findings in various disciplines and provided direction for future research.

Findings

The authors highlight the role of CEO personal attributes in influencing corporate decision-making and firm outcomes. The authors categorize studies of CEO traits into three main research themes: (1) demographic attributes and experience (including age, gender, culture, experience, education); (2) CEO interactions with others (social and political networks) and (3) underlying attributes (including personality, values and ideology). The evidence shows that CEO characteristics significantly affect a wide range of specific corporate policies that serve as mechanisms through which individual CEOs determine firm success and performance.

Practical implications

CEO selection is one of the most crucial decisions made by corporations. The study findings provide valuable insights to corporate executives, boards, investors and practitioners into how CEOs’ personal characteristics can impact future firm decisions and outcomes that can, in turn, inform the high-stake process of CEO recruitment and selection. The study findings have significant practical implications for corporations, such as contributing to executive training programs, to assist executives and directors attain a greater level of self-awareness.

Originality/value

Building on the theoretical foundation of upper echelons theory, the authors offer an integrated theoretical framework to consolidate existing empirical research on the impacts of CEO personal attributes on firm outcomes across accounting and finance (A&F) and management literature. The study findings provide a roadmap for scholars to bridge the interdisciplinary divide between A&F and management research. The authors advocate a more holistic and multifaceted approach to examining CEOs, each of whom embodies a myriad of personal characteristics that comprise their unique identity. The study findings encourage future researchers to expand the investigation of the boundary conditions that magnify or moderate the impacts of CEO idiosyncrasies.

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