Search results

The study aims to evaluate and compare the mergers and acquisitions (M&As) performance utilising a sample of deals originating from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). In addition to nation-wise performance analysis, a further sub-sample analysis is conducted based on the target location (domestic and cross-border), development status (developed and emerging) and the acquired ownership stakes (majority and minority).

The final sample of the study includes 7,105 deals announced between 2000 and 2019. M&A performance is proxied by the abnormal returns earned over the select event windows. Multiple parametric and non-parametric tests are employed for testing the robustness.

The results indicate significant performance differences across BRICS markets, with the highest and lowest abnormal returns reported for Chinese and Russian acquirers, respectively. The disaggregated analysis also affirms the performance differences for the select sub-samples.

The study highlights the need for acknowledging and expounding the differences in M&As across emerging markets. Further, the results of the study provide a possible explanation of the disagreement over the M&A performance results reported in the previous literature.

Acknowledging and understanding the potential performance differences based on location, ownership strategies and development status can aid executives in sharpening decision-making and also help general investors.

The study contributes by examining a comprehensive sample of deals across five major emerging economies, as against the majority of previous studies which have their results based on either single nation samples or have utilised only a sub-sample of domestic or foreign acquisitions.

This study aims to explore the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) power and stock price crash risk in India. Furthermore, it seeks to analyse how insider trades may moderate the impact of CEO power on stock price crash risk.

A study of 236 companies from the S&P BSE 500 Index (2014–2023) have been analysed through pooled ordinary least square (OLS) regression in the baseline analysis. To enhance the results' reliability, robustness checks include alternative methodologies, such as panel data regression with fixed-effects, binary logistic regression and Bayesian regression. Additional control variables and alternative crash risk measure have also been utilised. To address potential endogeneity, instrumental variable techniques such as two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) and difference-in-difference (DiD) methodologies are utilised.

Stakeholder theory is supported by results revealing that CEO power proxies like CEO duality, status and directorship reduce one-year ahead stock price crash risk and vice versa. Insider trades are found to moderate the link between select dimensions of CEO power and stock price crash risk. These findings persist after addressing potential endogeneity concerns, and the results remain consistent across alternative methodologies and variable inclusions.

This study significantly advances research on stock price crash risk, especially in emerging economies like India. The implications of these findings are crucial for investors aiming to mitigate crash risk, for corporations seeking enhanced governance measures and for policymakers considering the economic and welfare consequences associated with this phenomenon.

The purpose of our study is to investigate the effects of politically-connected boards (PCBs) on over-(under-)investment in labor. We also examine the impacts of the supervisory board (SB)’s optimal tenure on the association between PCBs and over-investment in labor.

We constructed the proxy for PCBs using a dummy variable set to 1 (one) if a firm has politically-connected boards and zero (0) otherwise. For the robustness check, we used the number of politically-connected members on the boards as the proxy for PCBs.

We find that the presence of PCBs reduces over-investment in labor. Consistent with our prediction, we found no significant association between PCBs and under-investment in labor. We also find that the SB with optimal tenure strengthens the negative association between PCBs and over-investment in labor. In our channel analysis, we find that the presence of PCB mitigates over-investment in labor through a higher dividend payout ratio.

Due to the unavailability of data in firms’ annual reports regarding the number of poorly-skilled and highly skilled employees, we were not able to examine the effect of low-skilled and high-skilled employees on over-investment in labor. Also, we were not able to examine over-(under-)investment in labor by drawing a distinction between general (generalist) and firm-specific human capital (specialist) as suggested by Sevcenko, Wu, and Kacperczyk (2022). Generally, it is more difficult for managers to hire highly-skilled employees, specialists in particular, thereby driving the choice of either over- or under-investing in the labor forces. In addition, in the firms’ annual reports, there is no information regarding temporary employees. Therefore, if and when such data become available, this would provide another avenue for future research.

Our study offers several practical implications and insights to stakeholders (e.g. insiders or management, shareholders, investors, analysts and creditors) in the following ways. First, our study highlights significant differences between capital investment and labor investment. For instance, labor investment is considered an expense rather than an asset (Wyatt, 2008) because, although such investment is human capital and is not recognized on the firm’s balance sheet (Boon et al., 2017). In addition, labor investment is characterized by: its flexibility which enables firms to make frequent adjustments (Hamermesh, 1995; Dixit & Pindyck, 2012; Aksin et al., 2015), its non-homogeneity since every employee is unique (Luo et al., 2020), its direct impact on morale and productivity of a firm (Azadegan et al., 2013; Mishina et al., 2004; Tatikonda et al., 2013), and its financial outlay which affects the ongoing cash flows of a firm (Sualihu et al., 2021; Khedmati et al., 2020; Merz & Yashiv, 2007). Second, our findings reveal that the presence of PCBs could help to reduce over-investment in labor. However, if managers of a firm choose to under-invest in labor in order to obtain better profit in the short-term through cost saving, they should be aware of the potential consequences of facing a financial loss when a new business opportunity suddenly arises which requires a larger labor force. Third, our findings help stakeholders to re-focus on the labor investment. This is crucial due to the fact that labor investment is often neglected by those stakeholders because the expenditure of labor investment is not recognized on the firm’s balance sheet as an asset. Instead, it is written off as an expense in the firm’s income statement. Fourth, our findings also provide insightful information to stakeholders, suggesting that an SB with optimal tenure is more committed to a firm, and this factor plays an important role in strengthening the negative association between PCBs and over-investment in labor.

First, our findings provide a valuable understanding of the effects of PCBs on over-(under-)investment in labor. Stakeholders could use information disclosed in the financial statements of a publicly-listed firm to determine the extent of the firm’s investment in labor and PCBs, and compare this information with similar firms in the same industry sector. Second, our findings give a better understanding of the association between investment in labor and political connections , which are human and social capital that could determine the long-term survival and success of a firm. Third, for shareholders, the appointment of board members with political connections is an important strategic decision to build political capital, which is likely to have a long-term impact on the financial performance of a firm; therefore, it requires thoughtful consultation with firm insiders.

Our findings highlight the role of PCBs in reducing over-investment in labor. These findings are significant because both investment in labor and political connections as human and social capital can play an important role in determining the long-term survival and success of a firm.

How much variance in firm performance can be attributed to firms’ corporate political activities (CPA)? Under what conditions does CPA contribute to firm performance? To theorize and empirically tackle these questions, we build on the resource-based view (RBV) to theorize how CPA might improve or hinder firm performance, and specifically examine the direct relationship between firms’ investments in lobbying activities and their performance. We also expect firm growth rate to moderate the relationship between lobbying and performance.

We empirically test our hypotheses using large-scale longitudinal panel data from publicly traded US firms from 2008 to 2018.

Our analyses support our predictions of the double-edged sword effect of lobbying on firm performance. Moreover, our results show that this effect is steeper for firms with higher growth rates.

Our study contributes meaningful insights to strategy scholarship on the influence of nonmarket strategies, highlighting the relevance of firm-specific conditions in shaping the performance outcomes of such strategies. In particular, we make a contribution by identifying a nonlinear relationship between lobbying and firm performance, which is amplified in fast-growing firms compared to stagnant ones.

The paper is devoted to modeling a pricing policy of competitive firms in a “closed” economy framework.

The proposed model can be regarded as an analog to CGE model and is based on the intersectoral balance methodology incorporating linear demand functions for goods and services.

By performing different model experiments, we show that a certain degree of competition can bring more profit to all competing firms, than in case of complete absence of such competition, what is also supported by empirical investigation. This finding implies that monopolies may perform worse than competitive firms, what contradicts with the modern provisions of economic theory, stating that monopoly is the most lucrative type of market structure for a producer. The discovered effect occurs due to the aggressive pricing policy, adopted by monopolies, spurring up the inflation spiral, which is most obvious if monopolies are strongly interdependent in terms of production matrix. This inflation spiral drives prices too high, what negatively reflects on firms’ costs and, consequently, results in monopolies receiving less profit.

The proposed model can also be useful for understanding and assessing various economic consequences after different external or internal shocks, what is especially crucial when conducting monetary or fiscal policy.

This study aims to examine the relationship between CEO characteristics and the value of excess cash holdings from the perspective of resource-based view (RBV) theory in the context of Malaysia.

The analyses were made using ordinary least squares across 173 non-financial firms listed in Bursa Malaysia over the period of 2015–2021. The authors address potential endogeneity through the generalized method of moments. The results are also robust to alternative measures of excess cash holdings.

The results showed that female CEOs and CEOs’ educational level are significantly positively related to the value of excess cash holdings. In contrast, CEO tenure and CEO age negatively affect a firm’s excess cash valuation. The results are robust to measurement error and endogeneity issues.

The empirical results have useful policy implications. For practitioners, firms are recommended to prioritize the selection of female CEOs and CEOs with high education levels within their top management, as this initiative can result in improved value associated with excess cash holdings. In addition, policymakers are recommended to guide programs that attempt to improve educational attainment and gender diversity in business leadership. This study also provides investors with insightful information about the possible relationship between CEO traits and company performance, especially with regard to measures for managing surplus capital.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to explore the role of CEO characteristics in the value of excess cash holdings based on the RBV theory.

This study aims to examine the impact of CEO age on corporate financialization by considering the moderating effects of CEO gender, identity and tenure in this relationship.

The analyses use ordinary least squares across 213 nonfinancial firms listed in Bursa Malaysia throughout 2015–2021. The author addresses potential endogeneity through propensity score matching and the generalized method of moments. The results are also robust to alternative measures of corporate financialization and CEO age.

The results show that firms with young CEOs are more likely to avoid taking short-term financial investments and, as a result, inhibit corporate financialization. Furthermore, the findings indicate that firms with female CEOs and those with family members as CEOs are less likely to invest in financial assets. The results also show that corporate financialization is weakened in the early stages of CEO tenure and strengthened in the late stages.

The empirical results have useful policy implications. For researchers, this study finds prominent differences in corporate financialization related to each stage of a person’s career. The study findings can be used by policymakers to guide programs that attempt to undertake the necessary measures to optimize corporate governance standards and restrict managers’ shortsighted conduct. In the long run, these kinds of projects could improve the way surplus financial reserves are used and raise economic output in general. The study also provides investors with insightful information about the possible relationship between CEO traits and company performance, especially with regard to measures for financial resource allocation.

This paper expands the existing research on corporate investment behavior and provides a new theoretical basis for the underlying factors of corporate financialization. It studies the influence of managerial traits on corporate financialization and deepens the understanding of CEO age and companies’ financialization levels.

This paper studies the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay for luck as well as the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay in which good luck is rewarded but bad luck is not penalized symmetrically. We further explore the impact of the regulatory changes on executive compensation taking effect in the 2000s on CEO pay for luck and asymmetry.

In this study, we examine the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay for luck and the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO compensation. The sample consists of DJIA component companies over a 71-year period from 1950 to 2020. CEO pay-performance sensitivity is measured by both delta and Jensen-Murphy pay-performance sensitivity.

We find that an increase in CEO pay-performance sensitivity as measured by both delta and Jensen-Murphy pay-performance sensitivity leads to an increase in the degree of CEO pay for luck but tends to reduce the level of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. In addition, we find that the major pay-related regulatory changes in recent years have mitigated the degree of CEO pay for luck and pay asymmetry, in which CEO pay structure and the associated CEO pay-performance sensitivity are major mechanisms through which the regulatory changes take effect.

Our findings provide empirical evidence supporting the argument that both optimal contracting and rent extraction should be considered as important determinants of CEO compensation.

When a firm designs the pay packages for its CEO to align CEO wealth to firm performance, CEO pay-performance sensitivity is expected to improve. However, the improved CEO PPS can also lead to an increased CEO pay for non-performance (Luck), which is an undesired outcome from the shareholder view. Therefore, a firm should thoroughly consider various advantages and disadvantages when compensating its top executives. Third, pay-related regulations have indeed achieved some intended outcomes such as the diminished pay for luck and asymmetry, but they also exacerbated the positive relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay. It seems that executive pay-related regulations cannot achieve perfect outcomes without side effects. Continuous reforms and regulations on corporate governance should be a dynamic process under various changing situations.

This study contributes to the literature on executive pay for luck and asymmetry in several ways. First, our study is among the few studies empirically testing the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and pay for luck and asymmetry. We find that CEO pay-performance sensitivity tends to increase the degree of CEO pay for luck but reduce the level of asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay. These findings partly support the rent extraction theory grounded on the managerial power hypothesis and partly support the optimal contracting theory. Our findings confirm that the optimal contracting theory and the rent extraction theory are both important for explaining the practices and historical trends of CEO compensation.

This paper aims to summarize the literature (journal articles and book chapters) on Central and Eastern European (CEE) firms’ outward internationalization failures: definitions and understandings of “failure”, “failed” firms’ internationalization processes, causes of “failed” initial and subsequent foreign activities and consequences of “failed” internationalization.

This systematic-narrative hybrid literature review article focuses on CEE firms’ outward internationalization failures.

The paper demonstrates that different objective and subjective measures were used for defining and measuring “failure”. Consensus regarding which firms (from slow internationalizers to born globals) can be considered “failed” is lacking. In different studies, internal and external causes of CEE firms’ outward internationalization “failure” and internationalization-related and other consequences of “failed” internationalization also vary considerably. Due to the complexity of the “failure” phenomenon, it is impossible to identify the most characteristic type of “failed” internationalization or offer “optimal” advice for avoiding failures.

The author is not aware of any other literature review articles focused on CEE firms’ outward internationalization failures. This article contributes to the (international) business and (international) entrepreneurship literature focused on failures, exits and institutional and other factors affecting them.

This study aims to examine the effect of CEO compensation risk, as measured by the proportion of equity-based pay (option and stock awards) relative to total compensation and pay sensitivity to stock volatility, on CEO pay for luck asymmetry. This paper also empirically examines CEO compensation risk as a mediating variable between the regulatory changes and CEO pay for luck asymmetry.

This paper test the proposed two hypothesis that CEO compensation risk is positively associated with the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry; and the pay related regulations implemented around 2006 could mitigate the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry using the fixed-effects regression models.

Consistent with the managerial talent retention hypothesis, this paper finds that CEO compensation risk, as measured by the equity-based pay as a proportion of CEO total compensation and CEO pay sensitivity to stock volatility, is positively associated with the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. In addition, this paper find that CEO pay for luck asymmetry is significantly reduced by the major regulatory changes on executive compensation implemented around 2006.

This study is among the very few studies exploring the impact of CEO compensation risk on pay for luck asymmetry in the literature. While the major purpose of the widely used stock options is to align executive interests and shareholder values, it also tends to increase the risk level of CEO compensation. So, a well-designed CEO pay package should protect risk-averse CEOs from bad luck for the retention purpose, which is also beneficial to shareholder wealth maximization. Therefore, future research on executive compensation needs to examine the issue from various perspectives.

For board of directors who is responsible for the compensation of CEOs, it is necessary to consider a broad range of factors when designing an optimal CEO pay package.

The findings on the impact of regulations on CEO pay for luck asymmetry suggest that the executive-pay-related regulations around 2006 have indeed achieved some of their intended goals to significantly lower pay for nonperformance asymmetry, whereby CEO pay sensitivity to stock volatility has been identified as a major mediating variable.

This study contributes to the literature on executive pay for luck asymmetry in several perspectives. First, this paper finds that CEO compensation risk has a positive impact on the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. Second, this paper finds that the CEO pay for luck asymmetry has been mitigated after 2006 when various regulatory changes on executive compensation began to be implemented in the USA. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is among the very few studies investigating these issues in the literature.