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In order to deepen our knowledge of governance of family firms, the purpose of this paper is to focus our attention on the relation between family owners who are members of the board of directors and firm performance. Also, this study sheds more light on how the generation in charge of the family firm affects that relationship, as generational involvement may be a unique predictor of governance behavior in these firms.

The authors applied a cross-sectional ordinary least squares regression model to test the hypotheses on a sample of 313 non-listed Spanish family SMEs. The authors suggest the possibility of a non-linear relationship between the percentage of ownership by family members of the board of directors and firm performance, and specifically, the authors propose an S-shaped effect that implies two breakpoints.

The authors find not only that an inverted U-shaped relationship exists, but also an S-shaped relationship between family board members’ ownership and firm performance in family SMEs. Nevertheless, the results are different in comparing first-, second- and later-generation family firms.

This is one of the few empirical studies that examine the relationship between family board ownership and firm performance in the context of non-listed family SMEs. The authors consider that the influences of family directors on the board of directors as well as the concentration of family ownership on the board of directors are worth studying in non-listed family SMEs. Moreover, previous studies have focused mainly on large listed family firms but not on unlisted ones.

Purpose – The relationship between the board characteristics (i.e. board independence, CEO duality, board size, board meeting and board tenure) and the ownership structure (i.e. managerial ownership, family ownership and institutional ownership) and earnings quality is examined.

Design/methodology/approach – Data from 280 non-financial companies listed on Bursa Malaysia's Main Board for the year 2004 is used.

Findings – Significant association was found between board tenure and earnings quality. In addition, a positive significant association was found between outside board ownership and family ownership and earnings quality. However no significant relationship was found between board of directors’ independence and earnings quality.

Research limitations/implications – The association between audit committees’ characteristics and earnings quality was not examined. An examination of the impact of ownership structure on boards of directors and audit committees is warranted. An investigation of the impact of the ownership structure on earnings quality in Malaysia using separate test on family-controlled and non-family-controlled firms is suggested.

Practical implications – The appropriateness of policy directives requiring majority independent directors may be considered by policy makers.

Originality/value – The conflict of interest between outside shareholders and managers in a diffused ownership support the agency theory. However, utility of agency theory to explain the conflicts between the controlling owners and the minority shareholders where ownership concentration is prevalent is limited. Whilst demonstrating the dominant impact of ownership structure on earnings quality in Malaysia the study calls for alternative explanations of corporate governance practices in different institutional settings.

This chapter examines the relationship between corporate governance and agency costs of family and non-family ownership of public listed companies in Malaysia. It presents a longitudinal study of the 290 publicly listed companies in the Main Board of the Bursa Malaysia over the period 1999–2005.The study applies the governance mechanisms such as board size, independent director and duality as a tool in monitoring agency costs based on asset utilization ratio and expense ratio as proxy for agency costs. There is strong evidence that larger board size has a significant effect as a device in mitigating agency costs. The study supports that independent directors and duality are viewed differently by family and non-family ownership. The evidence shows that an independent director in family ownership does not influence agency costs. But non-family ownership needs more independent directors to counsel and monitor the company and thus reducing the agency conflict with shareholders. The study also finds that family ownership experiences less agency conflicts when duality role exists. Contrary, non family ownership experiences high agency costs when duality exists on board.

This study aims to examine the mediating effect of board independence on the relationship between ownership structure and audit quality.

The research uses generalized methods of moments regression to test the relationship between ownership structure and audit quality. The sample consists of 162 non-financial firms listed on the Gulf Cooperation Council stock markets between the years of 2009 and 2016. To test the significance of the mediating effect, this paper uses the Sobel test.

Empirical findings show that companies with higher family ownership are less likely to demand extensive audit services and, as a result, pay lower audit fees. Conversely, this study finds that companies with higher active and passive institutional ownership are more likely to engage high-quality auditors and pay larger audit fees. As for government ownership, it has no significant impact on audit fees. The results also reveal that the negative (positive) effect of family (institutional) ownership on audit quality follows the path through reducing (enhancing) board independence. Further tests are conducted and support the main findings.

This study has important implications for policymakers and regulators to address the conflict between controlling shareholders and minorities by promoting higher standards of audit quality. The study findings may be useful to investors, assisting them in making better-informed decisions and aids other interested parties in gaining a better understanding of the role played by ownership structure in audit quality. The study also contributes to the strategic board behavior by bringing a new perspective on how boards engage in monitoring by requesting external audit services. This behavior is likely to be influenced by the type of controlling shareholder.

The main contribution of the present paper is to examine the board composition as a potential mediating variable between ownership structure and audit quality. Moreover, it highlights the issue of improving governance mechanisms.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of audit committee independence, board ethnicity and family ownership on earnings management in Malaysia.

The effect of audit committee independence, board ethnicity and family ownership on corporate governance is investigated via 1,206 firm-year observations between the fiscal years of 2004 and 2009 of Bursa Malaysia listed firms. Panel data regression analysis is used to analyze the relationship.

The findings of this study fail to associate the role of audit committee independence as proposed under RMCCG (2007) in curtailing earnings management activities, thus supporting the findings on power distance scores that power granted to the top management may result in less effective independent directors. Nonetheless, in support of the alignment effect theory, family ownership is found to reduce earnings management activities. The findings show that corporate governance is more effective in developing country family firms due to their long history of family reputation and the importance of institutional culture factors.

This study focuses on board ethnicity, family ownership and its influence on earnings management.

This study offers insights into the importance of family institutional structures on corporate governance reforms in Malaysia as Malaysian family firms are mostly traditional firms that have built their reputation and strength in the industry for many generations.

This study aims at examining the level of risk of disclosure practices and the effect of four board of directors' characteristics (board size, board meetings, CEO duality and board expertise) on these practices in the Jordanian context. This study also adds to the body of literature by examining the moderating effect of family ownership on the relationship between the board of directors' characteristics and the corporate risk disclosure.

The sample of this study contains the non-financial Jordanian firms listed on Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). 376 annual reports of the sampled firms over four years from 2014 to 2017 were used. The content analysis approach was used to collect data and to determine the level of risk disclosure by computing the number of risk-related sentences in the annual reporting. To test the study's hypothesis, the random effect model was employed.

The empirical results show that the total of the risk disclosure sentences for each firm ranges from a minimum value of 2 sentences to a maximum value of 61 sentences, and the mean of CRD is 28 sentences. The results also indicate that the board expertise is positively related with the level of risk disclosure. Conversely, CEO duality has a negative impact on the risk disclosure practices. However, the results failed to support that the board size and the board meetings have a significant effect on the level of risk disclosure. Furthermore, the study demonstrated that the family ownership moderates the relationship between the board of directors and the corporate risk disclosure.

The finding of this study is more likely be useful for many concerned parties, researchers, authorities, investors and financial analysts alike in understanding the current practices of the risk disclosure in Jordan, thus helping them in reconsidering and reviewing the accounting standards and improving the credibility and transparency of the financial reports in the Jordanian capital market.

The current study contributes to the literature of risk disclosure because the previous research has paid little attention to this topic in Jordan. To the best knowledge of the researcher, this study is the first Jordanian study that focuses on examining the relationship between the board of directors' characteristics and the corporate risk disclosure in the non-financial sector. Furthermore, it is the first study that examines the moderating role of family ownership on such relationships. Consequently, the results of the current study draw attention to the CRD practices and the monitoring role of board of directors in Jordan.

This study investigates effects of corporate governance on the financial performance of family-controlled firms and how these effects differ between common law and civil law jurisdictions.

This study applies a number of corporate governance measures to the largest 243 publicly listed family-controlled businesses worldwide from 2009 to 2018. The corporate governance measures include board independence, board gender diversity, corporate governance index (CGI) and the percentage of family ownership.

The empirical evidence indicates that board independence improves financial performance; this positive effect is more pronounced in common law than civil law jurisdictions. Board gender diversity has a negative impact on financial performance under common law but a positive impact in civil law jurisdictions. Moreover, the CGI and family ownership structure are positively associated with financial performance, and no difference is found between the two jurisdiction types. In addition, family ownership negatively moderates CGI in civil law countries only.

This study provides new insight on the relevance of considering jurisdictional differences when examining the effect of corporate governance on performance. The study also addresses important concerns in family business research relating to unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity. Implications of these for research and practice are discussed in the paper.

Because of growing corporate tax scandals, there is an enhanced focus on corporate taxation by governments, institutions and the general public. Transparency in tax matters has been identified as critical for effectively managing and promoting socially responsible tax behaviour. This study aims to explore the impact of ownership structure, board and audit committee characteristics on corporate tax responsibility (CTR) disclosure.

This research collected data from the annual reports of Pakistani-listed firms over 12 years, from 2009 to 2020. Consequently, the data set encompasses a total of 1,800 firm-year observations. This study uses regression analysis to test the relationship between corporate governance and CTR disclosure.

The results show that board gender diversity, managerial ownership and audit committee independence promote tax responsibility disclosure. In contrast, family board membership, CEO duality, foreign ownership and family ownership negatively impact tax responsibility disclosure. Additional analyses reveal the specific information categories that produce the overall effects on tax responsibility disclosure and assess the moderating impact of family firms on the governance and CTR disclosure nexus.

Corporations can use the results to encourage practices that enhance transparency and improve the quality of disclosures. Regulatory authorities can use the findings to stipulate better protocols. Doing so will be vital for developing countries such as Pakistan to improve tax revenue and cultivate economic growth.

While this research represents, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, one of the first empirical investigations of the association between corporate governance and CTR, the results contribute to the corporate governance literature and offer fresh insights into CTR, an emerging dimension of corporate social responsibility.

In times of vivid debates on the inclusion of women on boards, the purpose of this paper is to shed a new light on the composition of boardrooms in emerging market firms by investigating how family and state ownership affect board-gender diversity in the emerging economies.

This study uses Tobit regression to examine the effect of firm ownership on board-gender diversity. A panel data set of Chinese and Indian firms for the period 2004-2013 is used to conduct this study.

The results show a negative and significant impact of family and state ownership on the proportion of women directors. However, this relationship is seen to be reverse if the firm is operating in international markets. Notably, a negative relationship was seen to persist between ownership structure and board-gender diversity for both female executive and independent board members, whereas a positive impact of internationalization was observed only for independent female directors.

This research addresses the board-gender diversity issue in emerging economies by focusing on firm characteristics which are unique to their business context. Further, this study identifies the conditions under which emerging market firms assimilate or proscribe women on their boards by recognizing the salient features of firms from emerging markets. Hence, in doing so, new evidence is added to the studies on the determinants of board-gender diversity. Lastly, it advances the earlier literature based on resource dependency and agency views and demonstrates the importance of internationalization for the inclusion of women on corporate boards.

Ownership structure plays a significant role in determining board demographic diversity. However, it is still unclear how different ownership configurations impact the structures of firm's boards and how board diversity influences firm performance. This study aims to investigate the relationship between family ownership and board diversity. Therefore, in this study, the authors argue that family firms have a lower level of board demographic diversity (in terms of age, gender and nationality) than non-family firms and that board diversity moderates the relationship between ownership and firm performance.

To test the authors’ hypotheses, we draw data from a sample of 341 German family and non-family firms for a period of five years.

The results show that family firms are less diverse in terms of age, gender and nationality diversity than non-family firms.

This study contributes to the general understanding of family firms and in particular the role ownership plays in shaping board demographic diversity.