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Recent events demonstrate that problems in the banking system pose a significant threat to the health of the global economy. Despite several shortcomings the Basel Accord thus emerges as an attempt to protect banking systems. The purpose of this study is to shed light on potential barriers to implementation of the Basel Accord in emerging countries. Several issues of wider interest to risk management and financial regulation also emerge.

The paper maps implementation of the Basel Accord against the wider regulatory context. Against this backdrop, the Basel Accord appears well‐motivated but is limited by several practical considerations. These factors, amidst other practical implications, are identified as the paper applies rigorous statistical methods to novel primary survey data from risk managers.

The Basel Accord is generally well‐received due its dual aims of improved capital administration and scientific risk management. Operational risk is a significant barrier to implementation, with a number of further issues only partially addressed (see below). Equally supported by both public and private sector banks the reasons for delay appear due to lack of technical expertise and the level of preparation. Results highlight credit risk, practical implementation issues (IT and HR), minimal capital requirements, data security and operational risk as issues of critical importance.

The originality of the contribution lies in the scientific treatment of novel primary data from risk managers tasked with implementation of the Basel Accord. Findings suggest several important practical implications discussed above.

The 1988 Basel Accord and the proposed revisions to the Accord represent some of the most significant international regulations impacting the financial decisions of firms, in this case, financial services firms, in recent years. The revisions to the Accord incorporate operational risk into the capital, supervisory and market requirements. In our review of the issues in this area, we provide insight into the workings of an important international regulation. We also present suggestions for further research in this area that will become feasible when data on the impact of the new regulations become available after the proposed implementation in 2006.

This paper not only aims to trace developments from the inception of the 1988 Basel Accord to its present form (Basel II), but also to highlight flaws inherent in the 1988 Accord and Basel II, by way of reference to developments which occurred during the Northern Rock Crisis.

The paper highlights the importance of risks through a reference to the crucial role played by capital adequacy. In drawing attention to the importance of such a role and tracing developments which have taken place since the inception of the 1988 Basel Accord, it explores and analyses efforts of the Basel Committee to address capital measurement problems and assesses the success of such efforts through an illustration of capital measurement problems which still persist. An evaluation is made of the Basel Committee's efforts to address weaknesses of the 1988 Basel Accord through Basel II. Greater in‐depth evaluation of the effectiveness of the Basel Committee's efforts are undertaken through reference to developments which occurred during the Northern Rock Crisis, which is complemented by graphs and figures.

Whilst considerable progress has been achieved, the paper concludes on the basis of the principal aim of these Accords and failures of capital adequacy to address problems related to risk, that more work is still required particularly in relation to hedge funds, liquidity risks, and those risks attributed to non‐bank financial institutions.

The paper not only highlights existing problems with Basel II, as revealed in the aftermath of the Northern Rock Crisis, but also draws attention to other areas which the Basel Committee and regulators need to focus on.

The Basel Committee has proposed a new capital framework to respond to the deficiencies of the 1988 Capital Accord (Basel I). The 1988 Accord has been criticised for its crude assessment of risk and for creating opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. In principle, the new approach, often referred to as Basel II, is not intended to raise or lower the overall level of regulatory capital currently held by banks, but to make it more risk sensitive. The spirit of the new Accord is to encourage the use of internal systems for measuring risks and allocating capital (the Accord extends the use of internal models from market risk to credit risk). A number of issues have been raised, however, with regard to its complexity, its cost, its impact on procyclicality, the possibility that it can lead to competitive distortions if some countries do not apply it (some big emerging economies) or apply it differently to small and big institutions (the USA) and others. Banks in Europe will also be obliged to comply with the new Capital Directive, often referred to as CAD III, which is the means by which the EU will implement the new Basel Capital Accord. CAD III will apply to all credit institutions and investment firms and not only to internationally active banks, as Basel does. This paper presents a critical approach to these developments and examines their impact upon the banking industry.

This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the gradual evolution of the supervisory policy adopted by the Basel Committee for the regulatory treatment of asset securitisation. The pathology of the new “securitisation framework” is carefully highlighted to facilitate a general understanding of what constitutes the current state of computing adequate capital requirements for securitised credit exposures. Although a simplified sensitivity analysis of the varying levels of capital charges depending on the security design of asset securitisation transactions is incorporated, the author does not engage in a profound analysis of the benefits and drawbacks implicated in the new securitisation framework.

The purpose of this paper is to describe a theoretical model for banking regulation in relation to Basel accords implementation. As a risk manager practitioner at a financial institution and in-charge of Basel implementation in a Basel accords environment of banking regulation, the author has been intrigued by the theoretical basis of the design of Basel accords. The objective was to investigate a theoretical model in the literature according to which the accords were designed. In case of deficiency in the literature of this model, the author seeks to provide a juxtaposition to the theoretical model that explains the accords adoption and implementation by regulators.

This paper presents a review of existing literature.

After reviewing of public interest theory, cultural theory, administration theory and the new-institutionalism theory, the author found little application of these theories to the capital-based regulation, particularly in relation to Basel 2 accord. There is deficiency in the literature of a conceptual theoretical framework based on which the author can explain the adoption of Basel accords. The author has provided a theoretical model that links these theories to the practice of banking regulation. This paper found deficiencies in theories of how banks should be regulated as compared to several theories that explains why banks are regulated.

After reviewing of public interest theory, cultural theory, administration theory and the new-institutionalism theory, the author found little application of these theories to the capital-based regulation, particularly in relation to Basel 2 accord. There is deficiency in the literature of a conceptual theoretical framework based on which the author can explain the adoption of Basel accords. The author has provided a theoretical model that links these theories to the practice of banking regulation. This paper found deficiencies in theories of how banks should be regulated as compared to several theories that explains why banks are regulated.

International regulators are due to finalize the New Basel Capital Accord by the end of 2003, for implementation by banks at the end of 2006. Basel II is a response to the need for reform of the regulatory system governing the global banking industry. In this article, we review the New Basel Capital Accord and summarize some of the main implications that we expect it to have on the European banking industry. As was the case for the first Basel Accord (Basel I), we conclude that not only will the new accord have an impact on the amount of book capital that banks are required to hold, but also on the strategic landscape of the banking industry.

The New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) was published in June 2004. This modification of the regulatory framework for banking institutions raises the question to what extent real estate financing will be impacted and how market participants can be adequately prepared. Aims to examine the impact of Basel II on the future pricing and availability of debt capital and on the cost of capital in real estate financing and to present possible reactions for real estate developers.

This research paper follows a deductive approach. First, the New Basel Capital Accord and the main features of commercial real estate financing are presented. On a normative level, the implications for developers are explained. Since no information regarding the behaviour of market participants in commercial real estate financing was available, the authors have ascertained the relevant questions within the framework of an empirical analysis. A total of 205 banking institutions were asked to fill out a survey pertaining to commercial real estate financing. The results of this survey are partly presented and interpreted.

The availability and the pricing of debt capital will be risk‐adjusted and will depend on the amount of regulatory equity banks will have to hold in reserve for a credit engagement. The cost of debt capital in real estate financing will rise due to systemic reasons of the New Basel Capital Accord. Banks are/will be very restrictive with regard to credit allowances. The use of the positive leverage effect will become more difficult. Structured financing, particularly the use of private equity, is the best way to fill a potential financing gap.

The paper is a timely investigation of a significant regulatory framework that is of world‐wide significance. The New Basel Capital Accord is introduced in its fundamental structure and the two relevant rating approaches are described and put into context. The paper reduces the complexity of the comprehensive and sophisticated Basel Capital Accord. Based on the facts that have been analysed, recommendations of how real estate developers can react to the changes in financing that lie ahead are given.

This paper aims to examine the connection between information system (IS) availability and operational risk losses and the capital requirements. As most businesses today become increasingly dependent on information technology (IT) services for continuous operations, IS availability is becoming more important for most industries. However, the banking sector has particular sector-specific concerns that go beyond the direct and indirect losses resulting from unavailability. According to the first pillar of the Basel II accord, IT outages in the banking sector lead to increased capital requirements and thus create an additional regulatory cost, over and above the direct and indirect costs of an outage.

A Bayesian belief network (BBN) with nodes representing causal factors has been used for identification of the factors with the greatest influence on IS availability, thus helping in investment decisions.

Using the BBN model for making IS availability-related decisions action (e.g. bringing a causal factor up to the best practice level), organization, according to the presented mapping table, would have less operational risk events related to IS availability. This would have direct impact by decreasing losses, related to those events, as well as to decrease the capital requirements, prescribed by the Basel II accord, for covering operational risk losses.

An institution using the proposed framework can use the mapping table to see which measures for improving IS availability will have a direct impact on operational risk events, thus improving operational risk management.

The authors mapped the factors causing unavailability of IS system to the rudimentary IT risk management framework implied by the Basel II regulations and, thus, established an otherwise absent link from the IT availability management to operational risk management according to the Basel II framework.

Purpose – To discuss, from the perspective of developing countries, recent proposals for reforming international standards for bank capital requirements.

Methodology/approach – After evaluating, from the viewpoint of developing countries, the effectiveness of capital requirements reforms and progress in implementing existing regulatory accords, the chapter discusses the procyclical effects of Basel regimes, and suggests a reform proposal.

Findings – Minimum bank capital requirements proposals in developing countries should be complemented by the adoption of an incremental, size-based leverage ratio.

Originality/value of chapter – This chapter contributes to enlarge the academic and policy debate related to bank capital regulation, with a particular focus on the situation of developing countries.