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The purpose of this paper is to examine whether board characteristics moderate the relationship between capital adequacy regulation and bank risk-taking of universal banks in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).

The paper uses 700 bank-year observations of universal banks in SSA between 2009 and 2019. The paper further uses the two-step generalized method of moments as the baseline estimator.

The paper finds that capital adequacy regulation is positively related to overall bank and liquidity risks. Nonetheless, capital adequacy regulation increases credit risk in the sampled banks. The paper further reports that board characteristics individually and significantly moderate the relationship between capital adequacy regulation and risk-taking.

The findings have implications for regulators of universal banks that board characteristics matter for capital adequacy regulation to impact risk-taking behavior.

The paper extends the existing literature on the effect of board characteristics on the capital adequacy regulations and risk-taking behavior nexus of universal banks.

The FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 sets out five categories of capital and mandates corrective action for banks. Each bank based on its capital amount fall in the certain categories or states. The purpose of this paper is to consider the effect of banking regulations and supervisory practices on capital state transition.

First, the authors investigate how much the practices influence banks' capital adequacy using a dynamic panel data method, the generalized method of moments. Then, to scrutinize the results of the first phase, the authors estimate the effect of practices on some characteristics of capital state transition such as transition intensity, transition probability and state sojourn time using multi-state models for panel data in 107 developing countries over the period 2000 to 2012.

The dynamic regression results show that capital guidelines, supervisory power and supervisory structure can have significantly positive effects on the capital adequacy state. Moreover, the multi-state Markov panel data model estimation results show that the significantly positive-effect practices can change the capital state transition intensity considerably; for example, they can transmit the critical-under-capitalized (the lowest) capital state of banks directly to a well or the adequate-capitalized (the highest) capital state without passing through middle states (under-capitalized and significantly-undercapitalized). Moreover, the results present some new evidence on transition probability and state sojourn time.

The main contribution of this paper, unlike the existing literature, is to consider the power of banking regulations and supervisory practices to improve the capital state using a multi-state Markov panel data model.

The Federal Reserve regulates U.S. commercial banks using a system of risk-based capital (RBC) regulations based on the Basel Accords. Unfortunately, the Fed’s mis-rating of several assets such as mortgage-backed securities encouraged the build-up of these assets in the banking system and was a major contributing factor to the 2008 financial crisis. The Basel system of RBC regulation is a prime example of a Hayekian knowledge problem. The contextual, tacit, and subjective knowledge required to properly assess asset risk cannot be aggregated and utilized by regulators. An effective system of banking regulation must acknowledge man’s limited knowledge and place greater value on individual decisions than on top-down planning.

The most significant recent reform in international bank regulation has been in the area of capital adequacy, first instigated by the BASLE Committee and formally introduced in 1988. These reforms have had, and continue to have, significant economic consequences. However, the concept of capital adequacy and its usefulness in bank regulation has attracted a significant amount of criticism from the academic community. This raises the question as to why it was that capital adequacy was adopted as a tool for international bank regulation, despite major concerns with its rationale and effectiveness. Although the topic of capital adequacy has attracted an increasing body of research, the reasons behind the adoption and implementation of capital adequacy by international bank regulators have remained unexamined in the literature. This paper investigates the rationale for capital adequacy, citing documentary and interview evidence surrounding the key decisions, and in the process traces the dynamics of international bank regulation. The principal finding is that regulatory reform was influenced by tradition, convenience and likely acceptability rather than by any serious considerations of regulatory objectives and potential effectiveness of the capital adequacy reforms. This corresponds to findings about the origin and dynamics of regulation in the political economy literature.

Following the recent global financial crisis, US regulatory agencies issued laws to implement the Basel III accords to ensure the resiliency of the US banking sector. Theories predict that enhanced regulations may alter credit issuance of the regulated banks due to increased capital requirements, but the direction of changes might not be straightforward especially with respect to the agricultural loans. A decrease in credit availability from banks might pose a serious problem for farmers who rely on bank credit especially during economic recessions. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

In this study, the impact of Basel III regulatory framework implementation on agricultural lending in the USA is examined. Using panel data of FDIC-insured banks from 2008 to 2017, the agricultural loan volume and growth rates are examined for agricultural banks and all US banks.

The results show that agricultural loan growth rates have slowed down, but the amount of agricultural loan volume issuance still remained positive. More detailed examination finds that regulated agricultural banks have decreased both the agricultural loan volume and their loan exposure to the agricultural sector, showing a possible sign of credit crunch.

This study examines whether the implementation of the Basel III regulation has resulted in changes in agricultural loan issuance by US banks as predicted by the lending channel theory.

The purpose of this study is to replicate Avery and Berger’s (1991) analysis using data from 2001 through 2011. Although risk-based capital (RBC) regulation is a key component of US banking regulation, empirical evidence of the effectiveness of these regulations has been mixed. Among the first studies of RBC regulation, Avery and Berger (1991) provide evidence from data on US banks that new RBC regulations outperformed old capital regulations from 1982 through 1989.

Using data from the Federal Reserve’s Call Reports, the authors compare banks’ capital ratios and RBC ratios to five measures of bank performance: income, standard deviation of income, non-performing loans, loan charge-offs and probability of failure.

Consistent with Avery and Berger (1991), the authors find banks’ risk-weighted assets to be significant predictors of their future performance and that RBC ratios outperform regular capital ratios as predictors of risk.

The study improves on Avery and Berger (1991) by using an updated data set from 2001 through 2011. The authors also discuss some potential limitations of this method of analysis.

This paper aims to investigate the nonlinear effects of bank regulation stringency on bank lending in 23 sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries over the period 1997–2017.

This study employs the dynamic panel threshold regression (PTR) model, which addresses endogeneity and heterogeneity problems within a nonlinear framework. It also uses indices of entry barriers, mixing of banking and commerce restrictions, activity restrictions and capital regulatory requirements from the updated databases of the World Bank's Bank Regulation and Supervision Surveys as measures of bank regulation.

The linearity test results support the existence of nonlinear effects in the relationship between bank lending and entry barriers or capital regulations in the selected SSA economies. The dynamic PTR estimation results reveal that bank lending responds positively when the stringency of entry barriers is below the threshold of 62.8%. However, once the stringency of entry barriers exceeds that threshold level, bank credit reacts negatively and significantly. By contrast, changes in capital regulation stringency do not affect bank lending, either below or above the obtained threshold value of 76.5%.

These results can help policymakers design bank regulatory measures that will promote the resilience and safety of the banking system but at the same time not bring unintended effects to bank lending.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to examine the nonlinear effects of bank regulatory measures on bank lending using the dynamic PTR model and SSA context.

This study aims to investigate the coordinated impact of regulations on the predicted probability of a banking crisis in Africa.

The study used the dynamic panel instrumental variable probit regression model of 52 African economies over the period 2006 to 2018.

The authors observe that banking crisis is persistent for few years but dissipates in the long run. The results show that board mechanism and ownership control are important in reducing the likelihood of banking crisis. The authors found a negative impact of regulatory capital and monetary policy on the predicted probability of a banking crisis while regulatory quality was not strong in reducing the likelihood of banking crisis. There was also evidence to support that regulatory capital and monetary policy augment the negative impact of board mechanism and ownership control on the predicted probability of a banking crisis.

The limitation of the study is that it did not explore all measures of regulatory framework and how they impact banking crisis. However, it has an advantage of using alternative measures of regulations in a banking crisis probability model. Therefore, future studies should include other macro-prudential regulations, regulatory environments and supervision and observe how they are coordinated to reduce possible crisis in a robust methodological framework.

The research has policy implications for monetary authorities and policymakers to set coordinated regulations through internal banking mechanisms that are relevant in sustaining banking system stability goals. Countries in Africa should strengthen their quality of regulation in such a way that it can play a strong and complementary role to a robust internal control mechanisms, so as to maintain stability in the banking system. In general, regulators and policymakers should design greater coordination of external and internal regulations through a single regulatory framework and a common resolution mechanism that make the banking system more robust in curbing possible crisis.

The policy implication of the study is to build banking confidence in the society.

This study analyses the interactions of different components of internal and external regulatory framework in helping to reduce the probability of a banking crisis in Africa.

This study aims to examine the impact of market competition, and capital regulation on the cost of financial intermediation of banks of the Bangladesh banking industry.

This study has used a balanced panel dataset comprised of 340 firm-year observations for 34 commercial banks in the Bangladesh banking industry from 2011 to 2020. The Prais Winsten panel estimator has been used to assess the impact of market competition and capital regulation on the cost of financial intermediation of banks.

Based on the regression results, this study has documented that greater market competition results in a lower cost of financial intermediation for banks. Similarly, an increase in the regulatory capital of banks increases the cost of financial intermediation of banks. The main findings of this study are found robust by using alternative proxies for the cost of financial intermediation, market competition and capital regulation. The regression results also suggest that private commercial banks tend to have a higher cost of financial intermediation than state-owned commercial banks.

The regulatory reforms should aim to foster sustainable and optimal market competition for the Bangladesh banking industry to regulate the market power of banks to reduce the cost of financial intermediation. The regulatory authority of Bangladesh should find the optimal policy measures for implementing the capital regulation in the banking industry which would reduce the cost of financial intermediation margin of banks.

Unlike previous studies which have used structural market competition measures, this study has used non-structural market competition measures to assess the relationship between market competition and cost of financial intermediation in the Bangladesh banking industry.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of diversification, corporate governance and capital regulations on bank risk-taking in Asian emerging economies.

The authors applied the generalized method of moments to analyze a sample of 116 listed banks of ten Asian emerging economies for the years 2010–2018.

The authors found that diversification, board size, CEO duality and board independence, block holders and capital regulations significantly affect bank risk-taking. In particular, nontraditional income sources such as noninterest income and adoption of diversification strategies minimize bank risk-taking.

It is expected that the outcomes of this study can be used by banks in Asian emerging economies that seek to reduce risk-taking by managing the diversification of their income streams and managing the impacts of capital regulation and implementing sound corporate governance features in monitoring their operations. This study suggests practical risk minimizing strategies for banks. First is the sourcing of nontraditional income and adoption of diversification strategies. Second, maintaining nonexecutive directors on the board would enhance monitoring of business activities. Third, maintaining deposit insurance would reduce bank’s risk. Government provides insurance to depositors to motivate them to deposit their funds into the banks. This, in return, facilitates banks to overcome risk. However, banks need to be cautious of any increase in capital ratio, as channeling funds into risky investments would increase risk.

This study is the first to investigate the impacts of corporate governance, diversification and regulation on bank’s risk-taking in a cross-country setting of ten Asian emerging economies.