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The purpose of this analysis is to present the history of anti‐money laundering efforts in the United States as it applies both domestically and internationally, and demonstrate how this new legislation, if enacted, will mark a dramatic change in the customary treatment of international financial transactions and to international long‐arm jurisdiction and law enforcement. If enacted as proposed, this legislation may provide the tools necessary to achieve substantial progress in this effort.

This paper aims to analyze thoroughly all of the sources of research used to develop the money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) low-risk rating, a rating attained by Norway according to the Basel Institute of Governance, and determine the reasons why Norway is one of only two countries in the world according to the 2012 report, with the other being Estonia, to gain an overall low-risk ML and TF rating.

The differences between the USA and Norway which has obtained a low-risk ranking, were compared and contrasted.

Beginning with the Basel Institute Rating index as a legitimate source for use in assessing anti-money-laundering (AML)/TF risk, and the amount of documentation used in the index’s methodology, it has been proven that the low-risk rating Norway has received is well deserved, and that the US rating of medium risk is also deserved for the time the report was published. Achieving a low-risk rating is not as ambiguous as recently thought and neither is its application on a global scale.

The paper identifies practical areas of improvement and concerns in addressing the overall issue of ML and terrorist financing.

Summarises UK legislation, including the duty to disclose information regarding the main offence, obtaining information and evidence by search and seizure, customer information orders, and account monitoring orders; and control of terrorist cash, including modes of control ‐ seizure, forfeiture of detained cash, account freezing and restraint orders. Reviews the Financial Action Task Force and Financial Services Agency rules on terrorist financing, the Data Protection Act, and the JMLSG Guidance Notes. Moves on to US anti‐money laundering regulation: 18 USC Sections 1956 and 1957 and the Bank Secrecy Act 1970, all amended by the Patriot Act 2001 Title III, the International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti‐Terrorist Financing Act 2001. Outlines the provisions for anti‐money laundering compliance, foreign shell banks, enhanced due diligence for private banking and correspondent bank accounts, provision of information, suspicious activity reports, know your customer requirements, and information sharing.

In 2012, the New York Department of Financial Services threatened to revoke Standard Chartered Bank’s U.S. license for alleged money laundering violations involving Iran. The bank’s settlement with US regulators and law enforcement cost the bank approximately $1.099 billion. In 2013, as a signal that no bank was too big to jail, the Holding Individuals Accountable and Deterring Money Laundering Act was introduced into the U.S. Congress. We focus on a clinical examination of the Standard Chartered money laundering case and examine the role of the US regulators and law enforcement in the settlement.

One cynic has speculated that years hence people will look back and be forced to conclude that ‘money laundering was one of the greatest problems facing mankind towards the end of the second millennium’. This would be true of lawyers, politicians, economists, sociologists and many others who have sought to examine the problem, each from their own viewpoint. Yet, the persis‐tently non‐definable trend of globalisation has seemingly demonstrated that uni‐causal or uni‐disciplinary explanations of change in the international arena tend to yield unilateral perspectives on problems, solutions to which are subsequently limited in scope.

Money is the lifeblood of all domestic and international organised crime groups regardless of whether the criminal activity giving rise to the proceeds is drug trafficking, arms smuggling, terrorism or white‐collar crime. The flow of criminally tainted money through the international banking and trading system is what sustains these criminal activities. Systemically, however, money laundering harms every legitimate business transaction that it touches. On a macroeconomic level, policy makers have emphasised that it impedes international trade and finance to such an extent as to present a serious threat to the world economy. On a microeconomic level, it can damage an institution's good reputation, the public's confidence, revenues and employee morale. This is why the world has attached heightened significance to the money‐laundering problem.

This study aims to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of auditor mandatory suspicious activity reporting versus the exercise of professional judgement in the anti-money laundering regimes of the UK and the USA.

The research draws upon the following sources. Firstly, statistics provided by the UK National Crime Agency, 2019 (NCA) regarding suspicious activity report (SAR) filing rates. Secondly, anti-money laundering legislation in the USA and UK. Thirdly, statements made in the political domain in the USA, particularly those which raised constitutional concerns during the progress of the Patriot Act 2001. Finally, statements and recommendations by a UK Parliamentary Commission enquiring into the effectiveness of the suspicious activity reporting regime.

The UK reporting regime does not accommodate professional judgement, resulting in the filing of SARs with limited intelligence value. This contrasts with discretionary reporting in the USA: voluntary reporting guides and influences auditor behaviour rather than mandating it. Defensive filing by UK auditors (defence to anti-money launderings [DAMLs]) has increased in recent years but the number of SARs filed has declined.

The study evaluates auditor behavioural responses to legislative regimes which mandate or alternatively accommodate discretion in the reporting suspicion of money laundering. Consideration of constitutional and judicial activism in this context is a novel contribution to the literature. For its theoretical framework the study uses Foucault’s concept of discipline of the self to evaluate auditor behaviour under both regimes.

Money laundering, casinos and the Internet may become unavoidably intertwined in the next decade. Money laundering is the process by which criminals transform the money that they receive from criminal activities into funds that appear to have been generated by lawful means and cannot be traced by law enforcement to their illicit sources. While the magnitude of money laundering is unknown, law enforcement authorities estimate that it consists of an annual $100bn‐$300bn in US currency, and a rough estimate of an ‘annual worldwide … range of $300 to $500 billion’.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the extent of anti-Money laundering (AML) disclosures in the annual reports and websites by differentiating between UAE Islamic and conventional banks, and examine the effect of AML disclosure on UAE bank’s performance.

This study uses content analysis to explore the extent of AML disclosure in the annual reports and the dynamic panel data two-step robust system to study the impact of the AML disclosures on banking performance.

The findings show that AML disclosure is at a low level for all UAE banks, conventional and Islamic banks. The results also show that the degree of AML disclosure on the websites of the banks is higher than that in the annual reports.

The sample for this study comes only from banks traded on UAE markets. Thus, the results may not be generalizable to banks traded on other financial markets.

Because of the cross-border character of the money laundry practices, our study suggests the UAE central bank to internationalize the AML regulations and develop an international AML regime as efforts to respond to the international development of the money laundry practices.

This is the first study that develops an index to measure the AML disclosure and contributes significantly in providing greater insight in respect to AML disclosure in banking industry within the emerging markets.

This paper aims to evaluate the use of Intelligence gathering, especially the exercise of customer due diligence (CDD), enhanced due diligence (EDD), know your customer (KYC) and recordkeeping as effective anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorism financing (CTF) measures. It re-appraises the risk of breach of privacy associated with recordkeeping of clients’ information in countries where there are no data protection laws and the role of the EGMONT group against the backdrop of the recent suspension of Nigeria from the group; it argues that, in view of other existing liberal punitive measures, suspending a developing nation like Nigeria by the EGMONT group (arising from a rigid demand for an autonomous financial intelligence unit (FIU)) is draconian and counterproductive. Finally, it argues that the fundamental needs and challenges of developing member states of the EGMONT group, particularly members that are battling with weak and non-transparent investigation process and terrorism require, inter alia, technical and manpower assistance to disrupt financial crime and financing of terrorism.

A doctrinal approach is utilised to analyse AML and CTF from the social and historical perspectives. A comparative analysis of international control of money laundering and terrorist financing, appraising the challenges of developing member states in complying with the Financial Action Task Force regulations and the principles of the Egmont group.

There are liberal punitive measures than suspension which the EGMONT group could apply when dealing with developing members of the group, especially on the issue of rigid demand for an autonomy of a national FIU. The fundamental needs and challenges of developing member states of the Egmont group, particularly members that are battling with weak and non-transparent investigation process and terrorism require, inter alia, technical and manpower assistance to disrupt financial crime and financing of terrorism.

The paper queries the appropriateness of the decision to suspend Nigeria by the Egmont group for failure to comply with its policy autonomy of its FIU when there are other liberal disciplinary measures that could have been applied. And, it suggests the need to lay more emphasis on technical assistance for member states to achieve the objectives of the group.