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We take Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) seriously by rigorously estimating structural models using the full set of CPT parameters. Much of the literature only estimates a subset of CPT parameters, or more simply assumes CPT parameter values from prior studies. Our data are from laboratory experiments with undergraduate students and MBA students facing substantial real incentives and losses. We also estimate structural models from Expected Utility Theory (EUT), Dual Theory (DT), Rank-Dependent Utility (RDU), and Disappointment Aversion (DA) for comparison. Our major finding is that a majority of individuals in our sample locally asset integrate. That is, they see a loss frame for what it is, a frame, and behave as if they evaluate the net payment rather than the gross loss when one is presented to them. This finding is devastating to the direct application of CPT to these data for those subjects. Support for CPT is greater when losses are covered out of an earned endowment rather than house money, but RDU is still the best single characterization of individual and pooled choices. Defenders of the CPT model claim, correctly, that the CPT model exists “because the data says it should.” In other words, the CPT model was borne from a wide range of stylized facts culled from parts of the cognitive psychology literature. If one is to take the CPT model seriously and rigorously then it needs to do a much better job of explaining the data than we see here.

Do women exhibit greater financial risk aversion than men? We answer this question using attitudinal and behavioral specifications of risk aversion drawn from the 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). To approximate attitudinal specification of risk aversion, we use individuals’ self-reported financial risk tolerance. We use individuals’ relative risk aversion, that is, the effect of wealth on the proportion of assets categorized as risky as behavioral specification of risk aversion. We find that while women display greater attitudinal risk aversion, gender difference in behavioral risk aversion depends upon individuals’ marital status and role in household finances. Single women exhibit greater behavioral risk aversion compared to single men. However, this gender difference does not exist when we compare behavioral risk aversion of married women and men in charge of household finances.

We review the experimental evidence on risk aversion in controlled laboratory settings. We review the strengths and weaknesses of alternative elicitation procedures, the strengths and weaknesses of alternative estimation procedures, and finally the effect of controlling for risk attitudes on inferences in experiments.

Supposing that decisionmakers in any country and at any point in time tolerate a certain fixed level of perceived poverty, differences in poverty aversion are called for to explain observed international and intertemporal variations in poverty statistics. Under the Natural Rate of Subjective Poverty hypothesis advanced in this paper, variations in the degree of poverty aversion are estimable and can be explained by political and socioeconomic factors. The methodology is applied to US data from 1975 to 1998 and across nations using cross-section data from the mid-1990s. Factors such as the political affiliation of government officials, public expenditure, per capita income, and economic growth account for much of the variation in poverty aversion implied by our hypothesis. The relationship between inequality aversion and poverty aversion is also explored, with the aid of a parallel “natural rate” hypothesis for inequality (Lambert et al., 2003). Our findings provide a new framework in which to interpret observed correlations between poverty, inequality, and social welfare.

We demonstrate in a laboratory experiment that the effectiveness of performance-contingent incentives is inversely related to risk-aversion levels. For about 16.5% of participants, performance fails to improve under performance-pay, and the probability of such failure increases with risk-aversion. This phenomenon works in part through the reduced effort level of more risk-averse individuals when effort level is positively correlated with risk exposure. It is also associated with higher self-reported levels of stress by more risk-averse people working under performance-contingent pay. We find no evidence of such stress causing decrements in the quality of effort affecting performance after controlling for effort level. However, controlling for effort, more risk-averse participants perform better under a fixed salary, leaving less room for improvement under performance-pay.

This paper studies the empirical application of an asset pricing model derived from the irrational individual behavior of loss aversion. Previous research using loss aversion asset pricing finds conclusive evidence that estimations match market equity premium and volatility using simulation data. We find that within its empirical application, the estimated errors are comparable to errors estimated from the capital asset pricing model. This study of the correlations between rational and irrational asset pricing model from the empirical results finds validity for both estimated values. Finally, we see the importance of cultures, economic development and financial development on asset pricing through an empirical examination of five pacific-basin countries in the estimation of asset pricing models.

Law enforcement agents enforce rules that they might transgress in their private lives. Building from a theory of “hypocrisy aversion” where agents incur psychological costs from imposing a sanction on others for rules that they might break, the authors design a two-player game in which players are simultaneously placed in the roles of enforcer and potential transgressor. In this model, discretionary enforcement is endogenous to the size of the sanction. Conditional on rewards to enforcement and punishment that are both sufficiently small in the status quo, the authors demonstrate that price effects can be dominated by second-order hypocrisy effects, leading to rates of transgression that increase with larger sanctions. The authors test the model within a laboratory experiment where individuals can simultaneously gamble at the expense of a third party and punish those they observe gambling. Examining the comparable testable predictions of models of (i) selfish agents, (ii) pro-social agents, and (iii) pro-social agents who are averse to hypocrisy, the authors find evidence of hypocrisy aversion in the rates of gambling, sanctioning, and the changing composition of agent strategies. Our results suggest that increasing sanctions can backfire in the deterrence of common criminal and non-criminal offenses.

We estimate a dynamic programming model of schooling decisions in which the degree of risk aversion can be inferred from schooling decisions. In our model, individuals are heterogeneous with respect to school and market abilities but homogeneous with respect to the degree of risk aversion. We allow endogenous schooling attainments to affect the level of risk experienced in labor market earnings through wage dispersion and employment rate dispersion. We find a low degree of relative risk aversion (0.93) and the estimates indicate that both wage and employment rate dispersions decrease significantly with schooling attainments. We find that a counterfactual increase in risk aversion will increase schooling attainments. Finally, the low degree of risk aversion implies that an increase in earnings dispersion would have little effect on schooling attainments.

Although most of the traditional economic theories used to explain investor behaviour assume full investor rationality, experience proves otherwise. In this study, we examine a number of important determinants of risk appetite and tolerance, including gender, education and knowledge of financial services and loss aversion. We do this by designing a questionnaire to measure the level of risk appetite and tolerance, together with various demographic characteristics and loss aversion. The survey is administered among a random sample of 1,648 respondents from Turkey. We find that on average men exhibit a higher level of risk appetite and tolerance than women, thus suggesting a clear gender divide in terms of investment behaviour. Furthermore, knowledge of financial services is associated with higher levels of both risk appetite and tolerance, with younger respondents also exhibiting similar patterns of behaviour. By contrast, loss-averse respondents are less open and tolerant of risk, which indicates that behavioural biases such as loss aversion can have a meaningful impact on investment decisions, at odds with traditional models based on rational choice theory. The findings have a number of important implications for investment behaviour and education, including the importance of gender balance within investment committees in order to ensure a more even distribution of risk behaviour, as well as the need to incorporate considerations related to loss aversion in all aspects of policymaking and regulation.

Measuring risk aversion is sensitive to assumptions about the wealth in subjects’ utility functions. Data from the same subjects in low- and high-stake lottery decisions allow estimating the wealth in a pre-specified one-parameter utility function simultaneously with risk aversion. This paper first shows how wealth estimates can be identified assuming constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). Using the data from a recent experiment by Holt and Laury (2002a), it is shown that most subjects’ behavior is consistent with CRRA at some wealth level. However, for realistic wealth levels most subjects’ behavior implies a decreasing relative risk aversion. An alternative explanation is that subjects do not fully integrate their wealth with income from the experiment. Within-subject data do not allow discriminating between the two hypotheses. Using between-subject data, maximum-likelihood estimates of a hybrid utility function indicate that aggregate behavior can be described by expected utility from income rather than expected utility from final wealth and partial relative risk aversion is increasing in the scale of payoffs.