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The purpose of this paper is to investigate Chinese teachers’ attitudes toward performance pay. Specifically, this study examined the extent to which Chinese teachers supported performance-pay programs. The study also examined the effects of these programs on teachers, particularly on their levels of collaboration, work motivation, and job stress.

This research was conducted in a northeastern city of China. Criteria sampling and maximum variation sampling techniques were used to select three schools, representing different characteristics of teacher performance pay (TPP) programs. In all, 150 questionnaires were administered to each of the three schools. The questionnaire contained three parts. Part 1 asked about respondents’ overall attitude toward pay-for-performance in general. Part 2 was composed of 20 closed-ended items asking respondents to rate their levels of agreement with various aspects of implementation of performance pay. Part 3 of the questionnaire comprised open-ended items.

Approximately 48.5 percent of the teachers supported the teacher-performance-pay programs. This indicated a low support of Chinese teachers in comparison to that in some countries. Regarding how teachers’ attitudes toward performance pay are related to teacher characteristics (e.g. teaching experience, professional ranking), the ANOVAs results showed no significant differences in any of the factors. This quantitative result was different from the qualitative result of this study (e.g. veteran teachers complained about the implementation of performance pay). In spite of the differences between quantitative and qualitative findings, some findings from the current study are consistent with those found in western countries.

One limitation of this study was the small sample size for quantitative analyses. Future research should consider a larger sample size to conduct more advanced statistical analyses such as structural equation modeling to examine further the relations among, for example, how much the incentive pay should be, and what proportion of teachers should receive it, the level of teacher stress, their work enthusiasm, and peer relationships. Another limitation of this study was that the qualitative data were collected through open-ended questions of the questionnaire. Future research should interview teachers and principals to obtain richer voices from the teachers.

Very few articles published in Chinese journals surveyed the implementation of TPP. In addition, these few articles were not well-designed from an empirical sense. So far research of teacher opinions about performance pay was a missing area in China’s educational discourse. The present study provides information to non-Chinese readers who are interested in Chinese teachers’ attitudes toward TPP. It is hoped the present study adds knowledge to the literature of TPP from the perspective of Chinese teachers.

Performance pay is growing in importance. Even in a centralised economy such as the Norwegian economy, the prevalence of performance pay has increased significantly from 1997 to 2003, and internationally changes in payment methods also occur increasingly. The purpose of this paper is to analyse how performance pay and team organisation and the interaction between these affect publicly‐financed sickness absences of workers.

Standard panel and cross‐section non‐linear and linear regression techniques are applied to Norwegian panel register and questionnaire data on private sector workers and workplaces during 1996‐2005.

Team organisation and performance pay are found to be negatively related to sickness absence incidence rates and sick days, partly due to strong negative relationships in workplaces providing jointly performance pay and team organisation. The negative effect of performance pay on sickness absence survives even when fixed job effects are taken into account. The negative effects were stronger for weak incentives than stronger, and they are primarily related to group‐based incentive schemes.

Introducing weak group‐based incentive schemes might be one way to successfully tackle absenteeism for firms.

The paper's findings contribute to the growing literature on how performance pay and team organisation affect absenteeism.

The purpose of this paper is to improve our understanding of why some firms tie compensation to worker performance as well as the variation in type of performance pay system across firms.

The study first presents a theoretical framework that motivates n empirical study of performance‐related pay. The data are based on Norwegian establishment surveys from 1997 and 2003. The empirical analysis addresses determinants of adoption of performance pay systems.

Performance‐related pay is more prevalent in firms where workers of the main occupation have a high degree of autonomy in how to organise their work. Performance pay is also more widespread in large firms, but is less common in highly unionised firms and in firms where wages are determined through centralised bargaining. Results show that performance pay is on the rise in Norway, even after accounting for changes in industry structure, bargaining regime, and union density. Finally, it is found that the incidence of performance‐related pay relates positively to product‐market competition and foreign ownership.

The paper provides new empirical evidence on the use of performance‐related pay. The results support an interpretation of incentive pay as motivated by agency problems, and provide new evidence on the relationship between payment schemes and institutions such as unions and bargaining framework.

Examines performance pay as a means of motivation in the health sector, and indicates possible reasons for its ineffectiveness. Points out that there are various means of motivating employees, with pay being just one of these. Suggests that this is the reason why performance pay has little impact. Concludes that the NHS is about to implement performance pay within its system. Predicts that this may be problematic.

We demonstrate in a laboratory experiment that the effectiveness of performance-contingent incentives is inversely related to risk-aversion levels. For about 16.5% of participants, performance fails to improve under performance-pay, and the probability of such failure increases with risk-aversion. This phenomenon works in part through the reduced effort level of more risk-averse individuals when effort level is positively correlated with risk exposure. It is also associated with higher self-reported levels of stress by more risk-averse people working under performance-contingent pay. We find no evidence of such stress causing decrements in the quality of effort affecting performance after controlling for effort level. However, controlling for effort, more risk-averse participants perform better under a fixed salary, leaving less room for improvement under performance-pay.

The NHS is about to embark on the widescale introduction of performance‐related pay. A number of recent studies have seriously questioned the efficacy of merit pay. Utilizing the expectancy theory of motivation, explains why performance pay is unlikely to motivate NHS staff.

A growing number of econometric examinations show that works councils substantially shape the personnel policy of firms in Germany. Firms with works councils make greater use of various human resource management (HRM) practices. This gives rise to the question of whether employers view the shaping of personnel policy positively or negatively. Against this background, the purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of works councils on employer attitudes toward HRM practices.

Using data from manufacturing establishments, multivariate and recursive multivariate models are applied to estimate the determinants of employer attitudes toward HRM practices.

The incidence of a works council increases the probability of positive employer attitudes toward the incentive effects of performance pay, profit sharing, promotions, further training and worker involvement in decision making. However, it decreases the probability of positive employer attitudes toward high wages. The results suggest that works councils play a redistribution role in wages and a collective voice role in the other HRM practices.

The study complements examinations focusing on the influence of works councils on the formal presence of HRM practices. There are two potential limitations of focusing solely on formal HRM practices. First, the formal presence of a practice does not necessarily mean that the practice is effectively used. Second, a firm may informally use HRM practices even though the practices have not been formally adopted. The study provides insights into the question of whether or not works councils influence employers’ support for the various practices. This support can be important for the effective use of the practices, regardless of whether they are of formal or informal nature.

In this paper, we review the literature on pay variation (e.g., pay dispersion, pay compression, pay range) in organizations. Pay variation research has increased markedly in the past two decades and much progress has been made in terms of understanding its consequences for individual, team, and organizational outcomes. Our review of this research exposes several levels-related assumptions that have limited theoretical and empirical progress. We isolate the issues that deserve attention, develop an illustrative multilevel model, and offer a number of testable propositions to guide future research on pay structures.

While there have been extensive empirical investigations of pay-performance sensitivity, the perspective of performance-pay has received less attention to date. While executive compensation is sensitive to firm performance, firm performance is also likely to be affected by executive compensation. Adopting multiple theoretical perspectives, the purpose of this paper is to examine whether executive compensation has a greater influence on firm performance or whether the latter has a greater influence on compensation.

Using data from a five-year period (2010-2014) for Financial Times and Stock Exchange 350 companies, the authors employ a set of simultaneous equation modelling to jointly investigate, after accounting for endogeneity problem, the mutual association of executive compensation and firm performance by employing four control variables (board size, non-executive directors, leverage and boardroom ownership).

The authors find strong evidence for the greater influence of executive compensation on firm performance than the pay-performance framework. This finding supports the tournament theory compared with the agency perspective.

Inevitably, there are limitations in a wide-ranging study of this nature that could be addressed in future research. As any empirical study utilising company data, there may be concerns to the effect of survivorship bias and the manner in which companies have reorganised, if there is any, themselves during the period under examination. There are also issues as to missing data, some measures relating to both executive compensation and corporate governance are not provided by the BoardEx database.

The study results provide evidence that using the tournament perspective by remuneration committees as a guide for determining executive compensation helps in achieving better performance. This helps in developing appropriate mechanisms for setting executive remuneration.

This paper combines an empirical investigation of the frameworks of pay-performance and performance-pay and develops a system of six simultaneous equations to examine the associations between executive compensation and firm performance.

This paper explores the consequences of the introduction by National Health Service (NHS) trusts (i.e. hospitals) of their own pay systems. It is based on case studies of ten NHS trusts and involved 73 interview sessions with a variety of stakeholders and the examination of employment data and performance indicators. The research revealed the tensions and countervailing forces inherent in NHS pay: the tension between national and local pay; the tension between simplification and the need to address the different requirements of the many occupational groups in the NHS; the tension between performance pay and feelings of equity; and the tension between equal pay and the traditional pay determination arrangements. These findings are discussed in the context of the proposed new NHS pay system.