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Recent US reforms aimed at strengthening audit committees and their structure grant independent audit committees the responsibility to appoint, dismiss, and compensate auditors. The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between audit committee characteristics and auditors' compensation and dismissals following the enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX).

A series of linear and logistic regression models were employed in a unique sample comprising of 2,393 observations.

It was observed that stronger audit committees demand a higher level of assurance and are less likely to dismiss their auditors. Further, an increase was found in auditor independence as measured by reduced board involvement and less dismissals following an unfavorable audit opinion. Overall results suggest that increased audit committee roles and independence after SOX contribute to auditor independence and audit quality.

This research has implications for regulators, auditors, boards and academics. The paper highlights that although all audit committees had to improve as a result of SOX, the remaining variation in audit committee characteristics continue to be important to the demand for auditor and audit quality.

This study is the first to consider the association between audit committee characteristics and its extended responsibilities after SOX.

The objective of this research study is to investigate the impact of auditor dismissals and resignations on commercial lending decisions. The study also examines whether a reason given for a dismissal or resignation affects commercial lending decisions. Eighty-five commercial loan officers were given a scenario involving a hypothetical company loan applicant and were first asked to assess the level of risk associated with granting a line of credit. Next, they were asked to assess the probability that they would grant the line of credit. Five different questionnaire versions were created by varying information about an auditor change and the reason for the change. The study finds that risk assessments of and the probability of granting credit to the applicant company do not significantly differ due to knowledge about auditor changes. In addition, participants did not view auditor resignations differently than auditor dismissals. Finally, disclosure of a disagreement as a reason for an auditor change did not have an impact on lending decisions.

This study aims to examine whether the industry characteristics of homogeneity, product competition, high auditor competition and accounting standards complexity are associated with auditor changes.

Logistic regressions test for significance of the industry characteristics on resignations, dismissals and directional changes to and from Big 4 and nonBig 4 auditors after controlling for client, auditor and engagement factors.

The authors report a lower likelihood of auditor resignations with greater accounting standards complexity. The authors also report a greater likelihood of auditor dismissals with greater industry homogeneity, greater product competition and greater auditor competition. Results also show that accounting standards complexity is associated with a lower likelihood of changes from Big to nonBig auditors, and industry homogeneity is associated with a greater likelihood of changes from Big to nonBig. Also, greater auditor competition is associated with a lower likelihood of changes from nonBig to Big auditors.

Prior research has established the importance of industry characteristics to the market for audit services (Cairney and Stewart, 2015; Wang and Chui, 2015; Cahan et al., 2011; Bills et al., 2015). The authors report that industry characteristics also impact auditor changes. Second, previous research has used various methods that indicate general industry effects on changes. The paper contributes to this research by specifying industry characteristics. Limitations include the reliance on the self-reporting in 8-Ks to identify auditors resigning and firms dismissing auditors. Also, the paper relies on proxies for industry characteristics that were developed in prior research.

Regulators have expressed concern over the relatively low rates of auditor changes and the problem of lack of auditor choice. By demonstrating a significant effect of industry characteristics on changes, the authors indicate some levers that may be available to influence rates of auditor changes, especially realignments to nonBig.

This is one of the first studies to examine how specific industry characteristics impact auditor changes. The study may be of interest to academics who are interested in how industry factors influence auditor changes. It may also interest policymakers who could lever the characteristics of industries to address concerns about the low rates of auditor changes.

This paper aims to investigate whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Section 404(b) exemption caused an increase in auditor changes due to changes in expectations for both auditors and their clients.

This paper predicts that this exemption caused a significant amount of auditor changes post-exemption, due to a change in expected future economic rents (audit scope demands) for auditors (clients). Logistic regression analysis is used to examine whether auditor changes increased for non-accelerated filers (public companies with less than $75 million in public float), who were affected by this exemption, compared to auditor changes for accelerated filers (public companies with greater than $75 million in public float), who were not affected by this exemption.

The results show a significant positive association between the exemption and auditor dismissals for non-accelerated filers compared to that of accelerated filers. This finding is robust when sensitivity tests are used.

Prior literature finds that an increase in auditor changes can have various positive and negative effects on the affected companies. Thus, investors will be interested in the results of this paper when making their investment decisions with regard to non-accelerated filers.

The results of this paper will aid policymakers as they consider the pros and cons of this exemption, as it pertains to the affected companies.

This paper is the first to study the effects of this exemption on auditor turnover for the affected companies.

This study aims to examine the consequences when audit committees have different economic incentives (i.e. incentive-based compensation) to switch auditors.

The author focuses on companies experiencing an auditor switching event (client-initiated dismissals) and uses Heckman’s (1997) two-stage estimation procedure to control endogenous bias. Audit committee quality is measured by the level of incentive-based compensation. Accrual quality and abnormal audit fees are examined over the periods of auditor switches.

Using 1,087 US companies between 2006 and 2014, the author found that audit committees’ incentive-based compensation is negatively (positively) associated with accruals quality (abnormal audit fees) only when companies switch from Big 4 to non-Big 4 auditors or switch within non-Big 4 auditors. For companies that switch from non-Big 4 to Big 4 auditors, she found no evidence.

This study provides a detailed discussion of the consequences of audit committee quality. The findings also contribute to the literature by concluding that economic incentives are associated with ineffective oversight, particularly after auditor switches.

Sarbanes–Oxley Act and its associated regulations significantly expanded the oversight role of audit committees. However, regulators bypassed restrictions on audit committee compensation. Accordingly, the author suggests that regulators focus on the issue of economic incentives to improve audit committee quality.

Minimal research has been conducted on the role of audit committees when companies switch to a new external auditor. The author shows that when companies switch auditors, incentive-based compensation significantly affects the monitoring quality of audit committees.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the PCAOB part II report disclosures on US triennially inspected audit firms’ deregistration decisions, the likelihood and the timing of audit firms’ dismissals and resignations.

The paper anchored on US regulations used 158 publicly available records of disclosed PCAOB part II reports from 2004 to 2012.

The number of the quality control deficiencies disclosed in the part II report affects US triennially inspected audit firms’ decisions to deregister from the PCAOB. Additionally, audit firms’ dismissals and resignations, both occur mostly within the first year after the part II report disclosure, although audit firms that subsequently deregister are more likely to be dismissed.

The paper provides support that the disclosure of the PCAOB part II inspection report motivates audit quality improvement.

The PCAOB inspection and subsequent disclosure of the part II inspection report enhances audit quality, which in turn, enhances investor confidence in the accuracy and reliability of audited financial statements.

The paper provides insights about the effect of the disclosures of PCAOB part II report, over and above any benefits from the PCAOB part I report disclosures, which is the dominant focus of related literature.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the stability or loyalty in the auditor‐client relationship. It explores the association between audit fees and auditor loyalty. Specifically, it investigates whether clients paying less audit fees relative to other companies in their industries are more likely to be loyal to their auditors.

Logistic and ordinal regression analyses are used to compare loyal clients to clients that switched audit firms after controlling for factors that are expected to be associated with client loyalty.

Results show that relative audit fees have a significant effect on the degree of loyalty of clients to their audit firms. Additional analysis shows that the loyalty of clients that pay higher audit fees relative to similar clients in their industry are highly affected by increases in audit fees. However, the loyalty of clients who pay lower audit fees compared to similar clients in their industry is not affected by further increases in relative audit fees.

The study does not differentiate between auditor dismissal and auditor resignation in the classification of clients that switched auditors. It also does not classify auditor switches into auditor‐initiated switches and client‐initiated switches.

It is cost effective for clients to stay with the same audit firm. Audit firms should be careful when adjusting their audit fees from one period to another, as there is a higher probability of losing a client, when increasing the audit fees, especially if this client is already paying higher audit fees relative to similar clients.

The findings of this study increase the understanding of how relative audit fees affect client loyalty in the audit market.

This study aims to examine the Taiwan setting, where audit partners’ names are presented in the audit report and where audit committee formation is voluntary in the initial stage of audit committee reform. This paper investigates the effects of the formation of voluntary audit committees on the selection of individual audit partners, and, in turn, the audit quality. This contrasts with previous studies investigating the relationship between audit committees and auditor selection at the audit firm level.

This paper samples all of Taiwan’s publicly listed firms for the period 2007–2012 and uses Heckman’s (1979) two-stage estimation model to achieve our objectives.

Using different characteristics of individual engagement partners as proxies for a higher quality auditor, the main empirical results show that voluntary audit committee formation is positively related to an industry specialist lead partner and a lead partner that has a larger number of clients. In addition, this paper also finds that voluntary audit committee formation has a positive impact on audit quality (proxied by discretionary accruals). The results suggest that the voluntary formation of an audit committee contributes positively to both auditor selection and audit quality. Furthermore, an additional test shows that the main empirical results are robust to a validity threat that firms that have good corporate governance prior to the formation of voluntary audit committees tend to select high-quality audit partners.

The paper contributes to the audit committee literature in the following ways: this paper takes advantage of Taiwan’s unique setting, where forming an audit committee is not compulsory in the initial stage of audit committee reform, to investigate the voluntary audit committee, auditor selection and audit quality; this paper expands on Abbott and Parker’s (2000) study of audit committee characteristics and auditor selection at the audit firm level by examining this relationship at the individual audit partner level; this paper responds to the call by Church et al. (2008) and DeFond and Francis (2005) who propose more studies on audit quality at the individual engagement partner level.

This paper aims to examine how compensation committees perceive audit quality as indicated by audit firm tenure. Using the contracting weight attached to earnings and cash flows in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation as proxy for the compensation committee’s perception of audit quality, the study examines whether compensation committees perceive performance metric informativeness as being affected by auditor tenure.

The paper regresses CEO cash compensation on accounting-based performance metrics and on interactions between auditor tenure and accounting-based performance metrics while controlling for other factors previously shown to affect CEO pay. Auditor tenure is measured using continuous and dichotomous variables.

Auditor tenure is associated with a reduced (positive) weight on earnings (operating cash flows), which suggests lower perceived audit quality as tenure lengthens consistent with the auditor closeness argument. This relation is asymmetric, i.e. the negative effect of longer auditor tenure on incentive contracting is more pronounced for positive earnings. The results are robust to using CEO total compensation as the compensation measure, as well as using level and change specifications.

The inability to control for audit partner tenure in assessing the effect of audit firm tenure on incentive contracting and the potential endogeneity between auditor tenure choice and incentive contracting are the main limitations of this study. Given the lack of information on US audit partner tenure, the study could not control for the audit partner tenure issue. However, the study has attempted to mitigate the endogeneity issue by using a Heckman selection model that includes in the first-stage a regression of auditor tenure on various firm, performance measure and CEO-related governance characteristics, based on existing models (Li et al., 2010).

Compensation committees view auditor tenure as an indicator of accounting quality in setting CEO pay. Further, long auditor tenure is perceived as detrimental to financial reporting integrity, particularly when earnings numbers suggest positive managerial performance and innovations.

This study provides empirical evidence that auditor tenure matters in setting executive pay. Further, this study shows evidence on the link between auditor tenure and audit quality from an internal user’s perspective. Prior studies have focused either on external users (investors, creditors) or on the preparer (using measures such as discretionary accruals or meet/beat analysts’ forecasts or forecast guidance).

This paper reviews key aspects of the regulatory response in the UK and the USA to the apparent crisis of confidence in auditing stimulated by Enron and other recent corporate scandals. Drawing on a consideration of the nature of the market for auditing services and the regulatory and corporate governance structures in which auditing is embedded, the paper argues that the bulk of recent regulatory attention appears to have been on matters of auditor independence rather than auditor competence. Such a focus is seen to have parallels with former ‘crisis’ eras in the auditing arena, while the analysis presented also raises questions about the status of the auditing function within accounting firms and the capacity of regulatory reform to deliver a fundamentally enhanced auditing function. The paper concludes by stressing the importance of making more transparent what is being done in the name of auditing and audit regulation.