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The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the PCAOB part II report disclosures on US triennially inspected audit firms’ deregistration decisions, the likelihood and the timing of audit firms’ dismissals and resignations.

The paper anchored on US regulations used 158 publicly available records of disclosed PCAOB part II reports from 2004 to 2012.

The number of the quality control deficiencies disclosed in the part II report affects US triennially inspected audit firms’ decisions to deregister from the PCAOB. Additionally, audit firms’ dismissals and resignations, both occur mostly within the first year after the part II report disclosure, although audit firms that subsequently deregister are more likely to be dismissed.

The paper provides support that the disclosure of the PCAOB part II inspection report motivates audit quality improvement.

The PCAOB inspection and subsequent disclosure of the part II inspection report enhances audit quality, which in turn, enhances investor confidence in the accuracy and reliability of audited financial statements.

The paper provides insights about the effect of the disclosures of PCAOB part II report, over and above any benefits from the PCAOB part I report disclosures, which is the dominant focus of related literature.

For the past 10 years, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has operated as an independent overseer of public company audits. Over 70 percent of PCAOB studies have been published since 2010, evidencing the increasing relevance of PCAOB-related research in recent years. Our paper reviews the existing literature on the PCAOB’s four primary functions – registration, standard-setting, inspections, and enforcement. In particular, we examine PCAOB registration trends and evaluate the effects of PCAOB registration requirements on the issuer audit market, as well as discuss the relative costs and benefits (e.g., auditor behavior changes, improvements in audit quality, auditor perceptions) of the 16 auditing standards the PCAOB passed in its first 10 years of operation. Further, we summarize the literature’s findings on the effects of the PCAOB inspection process on various facets of audit quality. Finally, we analyze the research concerning the PCAOB’s enforcement actions to determine how markets have responded to sanctions against auditors and audit firms. We contend that understanding and reviewing the effects of the PCAOB’s activities are important to future audit research because of the PCAOB’s authority over and oversight of the issuer audit profession. We also identify PCAOB-related research areas that have not been fully explored and propose several research questions intended to address these research areas.

This study reviews the existing literature on the U.S. peer review system and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection system to assess our knowledge of audit regulation. The traditional self-regulatory system of the accounting profession came to an end, in 2002, when the PCAOB was established to oversee the audit firms of publicly traded companies. This paper contributes to the controversial debate about self-regulation versus independent regulation by analyzing, categorizing, and comparing the research findings on the peer review system and the PCAOB system along three dimensions: the validity of peer reviews and PCAOB inspections, the recognition of reviews and inspections by decision-makers (e.g., investors, bankers, committees), and the effect of reviews and inspections on audit quality. Synthesizing the research on the regulatory regimes suggests that the notion of external quality control, both through peer reviews and government inspections, is positively linked with an improvement of audit quality. At the same time, the analysis indicates that external users do not seem to recognise peer review and PCAOB reports as very useful instruments for decision-making, which is in line with an identified rather skeptical perception of the audit profession on reviews and inspections. Overall, this study reveals that although the academic literature on peer review and PCAOB inspection is extensive it has not produced definitive conclusions concerning various aspects of audit regulation. This paper shows how this blurred picture is due to conflicting research findings, the dominance of the quantitative research paradigm, and unchallenged assumptions within the literature, and concludes by proposing research opportunities for the future.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the institutional changes accompanying the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) have standardized the audit’s role in the overall financial reporting process, thereby reducing the impact of auditor characteristics on financial reporting quality.

To test this hypothesis, the association between audit quality characteristics (auditor size and industry expertise) and measures of financial reporting quality (analyst earning forecast dispersion and accuracy) are estimated using regression analysis. Results of this analysis are compared across the pre- and post-SOX periods.

The results of the study document a significant relationship between auditor size (Big N vs non-Big N) and financial reporting quality (as proxied by analyst earnings forecast properties) during the pre-SOX period but not in the post-SOX period. Auditor industry expertise is significantly associated with financial reporting quality throughout the entire sample period. Thus, financial reporting quality continues to be dependent on the degree of specialization of an audit firm in both the pre- and post-SOX periods; however, the impact of auditor size as a surrogate for quality has diminished.

The SOX Act of 2002 represented one of the most significant changes in the regulation of audits. This paper adds to the literature by examining the Act’s effects on financial professionals’ perception of the impact of audit firm characteristics on their client’s financial reporting quality.

This paper aims to analyze Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection reports on audit reports of those inspected accounting firms in Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC). In meeting the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the PCAOB conducts inspections on audit reports of firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange.

The reports include those submitted by both the US audit parent firms and their secondary firms located outside the USA. In each PCAOB report, it unravels the nature of audit deficiencies. The focus is on Big Four because they play a dominant role in the marketplace and issuers’ market capitalization. All the seven-year deficiencies are documented since publications of the reports from 2004 to 2012.

Of the 37 reports, 19 (51 per cent) were issued relating to audits conducted by the Big Four. Out of these 19 reports, 10 (53 per cent) contain inspection criticism. These include audit quality and common recurring audit deficiencies.

This paper is based solely on those inspection reports published by the PCAOB.

The findings have significant implications to audit firms and the audit profession on improving audit quality, firms’ internal control and reports.

No known prior research paper is available on the ramifications of the PCAOB’s inspection reports relating to BRIC.

This study aims to investigate the effect of cash versus equity compensation on audit committee decision-making after the Public Companies Oversight Board’s 2007 censure of Deloitte.

Using a sample of 2,588 firms, this paper uses two different compensation measurements to empirically examine the effect of audit committee compensation on decision-making.

The authors find that audit committee compensation effects the post-censure decision-making of Deloitte’s clients. The results support the hypothesis that cash compensation paid to audit committees influences audit committee members to retain their auditors post-censure. Additionally, there is some evidence to support the hypothesis that equity compensation increases the propensity to switch auditors post-censure.

This study will be of interest to regulators, policymakers and researchers as it provides further evidence in the area of audit committee decision-making and the effect of cash and stock compensation paid to audit committee members.

This study provides empirical evidence of the association between audit committee compensation and audit committee decision-making by investigating the effect of cash-based compensation and stock-based compensation on audit committee decision-making.

The purpose of this study is to examine the cost of the introduction of independent audit inspections in New Zealand.

The research is conducted using audit fee data from New Zealand and examines the overall impact of the reforms on the cost imposed on auditees.

The findings show that there was no general increase in audit fees but a significant increase in audit fees for small listed companies compared to audit fees for unlisted companies and large listed companies.

The practical implications of this study suggest that the introduction of independent inspections led to increased costs for some clients, particularly smaller listed companies, and that audit firms were able to pass on these costs to their clients. These results have important implications for policymakers and auditors alike.

This study provides new insights into the cost of the introduction of independent audit inspections, which have been the subject of ongoing criticisms and recommendations for improvement.

We investigate the effect of the PCAOB’s Part II report on annually inspected firms’ audit fees and audit quality. The PCAOB replaced the peer review auditor program with an independent inspection of audit firms. Upon completion of each inspection, the PCAOB issued inspection reports that include a public portion (Part I) of identified audit deficiencies, and (in most cases) a nonpublic portion (Part II) of identified quality control weaknesses. The Part II report is only made public when the PCAOB deems that remediation was insuffcient after at least 12 months have passed. Starting around the time of the 2007 Deloitte censure (Boone et al., 2015), the PCAOB shifted from a soft synergistic approach to an antagonistic approach, such that Part II reports were imminent, despite delays that ultimately led to their release one to four years later than expected. Our study spans the period from 2007 to 2015, and examines the effect on audit fees and audit quality at the earliest date that the Part II report could have been released – 12 months after the Part I report was issued. We find that following the 12 month period, that annually inspected audit firms eventually lost reputation by lower audit fees, while they concurrently made remedial efforts to increase the quality of their client’s financial reporting quality (abnormal accruals magnitude and restatements). However, three years after the Part II report was actually released, audit fees increased.

Prior research finds evidence that audit quality is positively associated with the joint purchase of tax nonaudit services (NAS) and concludes that jointly provided tax services result in audit-related knowledge spillovers that lead to improved audit quality. We extend this line of research. We examine the relation between auditor-provided tax services and restatements and determine whether this relation differs when the auditor is a small or large accounting firm. We also examine whether the Securities Exchange Commission’s restrictions on certain tax consulting practices (SEC, 2006) altered this relation. Specifically, we measure whether the probability of financial statement restatements varies with (1) variation in accounting firm size (measured as PCAOB annually inspected firms versus PCAOB triennially inspected firms), and (2) the joint provision of audit and tax services. We find a negative relation between auditor-provided tax services and restatements which is consistent with prior research. We also find that this relation is significantly more negative when the auditor is a small accounting firm. Finally, we find that the lower probability of a restatement associated with the joint provision of audit and tax services persists regardless of auditor size after the SEC-imposed restrictions on certain tax consulting services in 2006. Our study provides evidence that accounting firms, and particularly small accounting firms, benefit from knowledge spillovers when jointly providing audit and tax services and these benefits lead to improved audit quality. Prior research concludes that large auditors provide higher audit quality and that the provision of tax services improves audit quality. Our results provide evidence that audit quality improvements are greater for small auditors and their clients. This improvement narrows that audit quality gap between large and small auditors. We do not find evidence that the SEC’s restrictions on certain tax consulting services altered the relation between audit quality and tax services.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent to which the transition from self-regulation to heteronomy has changed the gap in audit quality between Big Four and non-Big Four auditors.

This study analyzes publicly held companies in the USA between 1999 and 2012 using univariate analysis, multivariate analysis and quantile regression analysis. Audit quality is measured with discretionary accruals.

This study shows an insignificant difference in audit quality between the clients of Big Four and non-Big Four auditors after Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (hereafter, PCAOB) began its operations. In the analysis of the effects of PCAOB inspections on the audit quality of audit firms that are inspected annually and triennially, the findings show that the inspections have more positive effects when carried out annually. This suggests that the frequency of inspection is positively associated with audit quality. Overall, these results provide evidence that recent improvements in audit quality have been caused by changes in regulatory standards.

The paper provides three major original contributions. First, the authors add to the literature on audit quality by further demonstrating a reduced gap in audit quality between Big Four and non-Big Four audit firms due to heteronomy. Secondly, this study contributes to the debate as to whether independent inspections on audit firms are beneficial or not and suggests that the PCAOB inspections help increase audit quality. Finally, the results of this work contribute to the growing literature examining discretionary accruals.