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We examine how auditors' use of limited liability agreements (LLAs) impact perceptions of private company creditworthiness in a 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment. Ninety-three United States-based bank loan officers evaluate whether LLA clauses and the size of the company's external auditor impact lending decisions. We use signaling theory to predict, and we find that LLAs decrease perceived creditworthiness, mainly when the company engages a Non-Big4 auditor. We find no difference in perceived creditworthiness when the company employs a Big4 firm, irrespective of including an LLA clause. Supplemental analyses show that lenders perceive that LLA clauses signal higher credit risk and, in turn, decrease perceived creditworthiness. We offer insights into how lenders integrate information about privately held companies into their decisions, which could impact the cost of capital for private companies. Our study should be of interest to preparers and the varied users of financial statements and regulators.

Prior research finds evidence that audit quality is positively associated with the joint purchase of tax nonaudit services (NAS) and concludes that jointly provided tax services result in audit-related knowledge spillovers that lead to improved audit quality. We extend this line of research. We examine the relation between auditor-provided tax services and restatements and determine whether this relation differs when the auditor is a small or large accounting firm. We also examine whether the Securities Exchange Commission’s restrictions on certain tax consulting practices (SEC, 2006) altered this relation. Specifically, we measure whether the probability of financial statement restatements varies with (1) variation in accounting firm size (measured as PCAOB annually inspected firms versus PCAOB triennially inspected firms), and (2) the joint provision of audit and tax services. We find a negative relation between auditor-provided tax services and restatements which is consistent with prior research. We also find that this relation is significantly more negative when the auditor is a small accounting firm. Finally, we find that the lower probability of a restatement associated with the joint provision of audit and tax services persists regardless of auditor size after the SEC-imposed restrictions on certain tax consulting services in 2006. Our study provides evidence that accounting firms, and particularly small accounting firms, benefit from knowledge spillovers when jointly providing audit and tax services and these benefits lead to improved audit quality. Prior research concludes that large auditors provide higher audit quality and that the provision of tax services improves audit quality. Our results provide evidence that audit quality improvements are greater for small auditors and their clients. This improvement narrows that audit quality gap between large and small auditors. We do not find evidence that the SEC’s restrictions on certain tax consulting services altered the relation between audit quality and tax services.

National differences in the demand for voluntary external audits have been linked to multiple factors, such as differences in a country's rate of growth, access to external credit, and institutional quality. Audits, however, also have a psychological cost, whose intensity is genetically and culturally hereditary. Using a sample of 3,072 private firms across 34 industries in seven countries, including five countries or regions from the former Soviet Comecon, we find that a country's share of firms choosing to undergo external audits is negatively related to the prevalence of carriers of the G allele in the mu-opioid receptor gene's A118G polymorphism, also known as the “social sensitivity” gene. Furthermore, the relationship between the prevalence of the social sensitivity gene and audits is fully mediated by a national culture's degree of collectivism. The results are statistically and economically highly significant and remain robust to the introduction of a set of confounding factors at the firm and country levels. Our results have practical relevance in recognizing psychological diversity when conducting audits and, more generally, preventing burnout in the workplace.

Purpose – This study examines the factors influencing Corporate disclosure transparency as measured by the level of voluntary disclosure (VD) in the annual reports of the active share trading firms in Egypt.

Design/methodology/approach – The design and research method are empirical using archival data to collect information on the dependent variable (VD) and independent variables (corporate governance characteristics and company characteristics). A transformed multiple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model was used to test the association between the dependent variable of VD and the independent variables.

Findings – The findings indicate that the extent of VD is affected by the highly secretive Egyptian culture. This implies that the introduction of a new corporate governance code has not improved information symmetry as the overall level of VD is very low at just 19.38%. In addition, several corporate governance and company characteristics variables were found significant in explaining levels of VD by the sample companies.

Research limitations – The findings have generalizability limitations as the study focuses only on the actively traded companies operating in the Egyptian stock market.

Practical implications – The results of this study should alarm the regulators and financial investors from the quality of financial information being provided in the Egyptian market. These results are more alarming since the investigated companies are the top 30 actively traded companies on the Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX). It is logically expected that the status of disclosure would be lower in the other less actively traded companies on EGX.

Originality/value – This study provides evidence regarding three variables, for the first time in Egypt, namely “ownership structure” and “number of independent directors on the board” and “existence of audit committees” as explanatory variables of the level of VD. This research study will stimulate further research in understanding the importance of the role of corporate governance in promoting more transparency in other emerging economies and the need to build models that include country level factors to explain the level of VD.

The authors’ examination of corporate social responsibility (CSR) scores in dual-class firms provides a window on firms’ CSR performance when insulated from external pressure. Dual-class ownership confers greater voting rights on a superior class of shares held by insiders; consequently, managers of dual-class firms are insulated from external pressure from inferior class shareholders and, potentially, from society. The authors compare CSR scores in dual- and single-class firms and investigate the association between CSR scores and cash flow rights in dual-class firms. This analysis reveals that dual-class firms have lower CSR scores than their single-class counterparts and that CSR scores in dual-class firms are positively related to the relative cost of CSR borne by the superior class of shares. The findings suggest that external accountability encourages CSR performance, and CSR performance is higher when the superior class bears a smaller portion of the cost of CSR activities. It follows that the analysis suggests the importance of governance structures for encouraging CSR, and the dampening impact of cost to CSR performance.

The paper investigates whether firms’ exposure to information security risk influences firms’ costs of capital. Most IT firms highly rely on computer systems and network appliances; it may cause disasters if firms are involved in great information security risk. In the sample of Taiwan’s semiconductor firms during 2005–2016, we show that ISO 27001-certified firms (a well-known information security certificate) have lower costs of debt, but whether firms are ISO 27001-certified is not associated with firms’ costs of equity. Our findings are consistent with modern financial theories: debt holders, as put writers to firms’ value, benefit from firms’ lower information security risk, and better corporate governance, and thus lower firms’ costs of debt. On the other hand, equity holders should hold efficient portfolio through diversification and thus firms’ costs of equity should not be influenced by firms’ information security risk, which belongs to idiosyncratic risk in the portfolio theory.

We investigate the social and legal blame that investors assign to auditors following unfavorable outcomes using the precision of accounting guidance described as principles-based (i.e., less-precise) or rules-based (i.e., more precise), and why investors assign blame at differing levels. We also examine how the precision of accounting guidance is related to perceptions of auditors’ ethical characteristics. We posit that blame assigned to auditors differs based on auditors’ perceived decision-making control. Results indicate a significant association between the precision of accounting guidance and social blame, and a positive association between social blame and legal blame under standards described as less-precise. Investors are also more likely to make negative evaluations of the auditor’s ethical characteristics under less-precise accounting following an unfavorable outcome, which helps explain the association between social and legal blame. Our findings suggest that auditors could face additional blame as a result of a trend toward less-precise accounting guidance, with investors being more likely to question the auditors’ ethical characteristics following unfavorable outcomes.

Ethics play an important role in society; however, many economics models assume that individual players act “economically” rational and ignore situations where an individual may forgo economic benefit for the public good. This chapter models the strategic interaction between auditors and management and allows for management to choose the economically irrational outcome of behaving ethically even when doing so defies their own financial self-interest. One of the model's assumption is that a certain percentage of managers do not engage in a “strategy” to misreport their financial statements because doing so is “unethical”. If recent accounting scandals are indicative of an ethical crisis in this country, this model offers hope because an increase in the percentage of unethical mangers leads to a decrease in fraudulent reporting. The model also illustrates the effects of an increase in the rewards for committing fraud (e.g., greater numbers of stock options, restricted stock, and accounting-based performance incentives) and an increase in the penalty for detected fraud (e.g., stiffer penalties for fraud from Sarbanes–Oxley).