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The author develops a bilateral Nash bargaining model under value uncertainty and private/asymmetric information, combining ideas from axiomatic and strategic bargaining theory. The solution to the model leads organically to a two-tier stochastic frontier (2TSF) setup with intra-error dependence. The author presents two different statistical specifications to estimate the model, one that accounts for regressor endogeneity using copulas, the other able to identify separately the bargaining power from the private information effects at the individual level. An empirical application using a matched employer–employee data set (MEEDS) from Zambia and a second using another one from Ghana showcase the applied potential of the approach.

The purpose of this study is to examine the role of reducing information asymmetry (IA) on conditional financial sector development in 53 African countries for the period 2004-2011.

The empirical evidence is based on contemporary and non-contemporary quantile regressions. Instruments for reducing IA include public credit registries (PCRs) and private credit bureaus (PCBs). Hitherto unexplored dimensions of financial sector development are used, namely, financial sector dynamics of formalization, informalization, semi-formalization and non-formalization.

The following findings are established. First, the positive (negative) effect of information sharing offices (ISO) on formal (informal) financial development is consistent with theory. Second, ISOs consistently increase formal financial development, with the incidence of PCRs higher in terms of magnitude, and financial sector formalization, with the impact of PCBs higher for the most part. Third, only PCBs significantly decrease informal financial development and both ISOs decrease financial sector informalization. Policy implications are discussed.

The study assesses the effect of reducing IA on financial development when existing levels of it matter because current studies based on mean values of financial development provide blanket policy implications which are unlikely to be effective unless they are contingent on prevailing levels of financial development and tailored differently across countries with high, intermediate and low initial levels of financial development.

This paper investigates the use of deception in two negotiation studies. Study 1 (N = 80) demonstrates that direct questions and solidarity curtail deception. Study 2 (N = 74 dyads) demonstrates that direct questions are particularly effective in curtailing lies of omission, but may actually increase the incidence of lies of commission. These findings highlight the importance of misrepresentation to the negotiation process and suggest approaches for contending with deception.

Trust is the glue that holds cooperative relationships together and often exists in an asymmetric manner. The purpose of this study is to explore how to mitigate the issue of losses or increased transaction costs caused by opportunistic behavior in a soft environment where trust asymmetry is quite common and difficult to avoid.

This study focuses on examining asymmetric trust between the government and the private sector in public-private partnership (PPP) projects. Drawing upon both project realities and relevant literature, the primary conditional variables influencing asymmetric trust are identified. These variables encompass power perception asymmetry, information asymmetry, interaction behavior, risk perception differences and government-side control. Subsequently, through the use of a survey questionnaire, binary-matched data from both the government and the private sector are collected. The study employs fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to conduct a configurational analysis, aiming to investigate the causal pathways that trigger asymmetric trust.

No single conditional variable is a necessary condition for the emergence of trust asymmetry. The pathways leading to a high degree of trust asymmetry can be categorized into two types: those dominated by power perception and those involving a combination of multiple factors. Differences in power perception play a crucial role in the occurrence of high trust asymmetry, yet the influence of other conditional variables in triggering trust asymmetry should not be overlooked.

The findings can contribute to advancing the study of trust relationships in the field of Chinese PPP projects. Furthermore, they hold practical value in facilitating the enhancement of trust relationships between the government and the private sector.

A lack of visibility into the manufacturer’s production cost information impedes a retailer’s ability to maximize her own profits, especially when market demand is uncertain. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the use of an option contract within a one-period two-echelon supply chain in the presence of asymmetric cost information.

Based on the principal-agent model, the retailer, acting as a Stackelberg leader, offers a menu of option contracts to mitigate the risk of uncertain demand and reveal asymmetric production cost information. The optimal contract in asymmetric and symmetric information scenarios is derived. Finally, the impact of production costs on the optimal contracts and the actors’ profits is explored by numerical experiments.

By comparing the optimal equilibrium solutions in two scenarios, the authors show that asymmetric cost information has a large impact on the optimal option contract and profits. In addition, information rent is affected by the type differential. The results prove that the level of information asymmetry plays a vital role in option contracts and profits.

Different from the existing literature on private demand information, this paper considers a supply chain with asymmetric cost information in the context of option contracts. Interestingly, not only the production cost but also the probability of a low production cost can affect the option strike price. In addition, from the perspective of the manufacturer, a high cost does not always bring a high information rent. These findings can provide some guidance to decision-makers.

This study aims to investigate the influence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure on asymmetric information and return on investment (RoI) in Indonesia. The research specifically assesses the effects of CSR disclosure along with other independent variables such as total assets, return on equity, capital expenditures, net profit margin and sales growth on asymmetric information and RoI.

The study applied a panel econometric regression model to examine and test the effects of CSR disclosure and financial indicators on asymmetric information and RoI. A total of 275 samples were garnered from private and state-owned publicly listed companies selected in the SRI-Kehati index as sustainable firms in Indonesia from 2009 to 2019. Those listed companies in the SRI-Kehati index have market recognition and are able to maintain sustainability practices in their business doings. Asymmetric information was calculated by measuring the spread of market share prices. CSR disclosure was measured with global reporting initiative standards. Other variables did not require calculation.

This study discerns the significant influence of CSR disclosure on asymmetric information and RoI on the listed firms of the SRI-Kehati Index in Indonesia. To articulate, the more transparent CSR disclosure is, the asymmetric information should be lower. Besides that, more comprehensive CSR disclosure is associated with a better corporate return of investment. In scrutinizing the control variables, this research validates the significant influence of corporate assets and sales revenue on both dependent variables.

This research has some limitations that require further research. First, the research was conducted in Indonesia. However, other Southeast Asian markets may have their own uniqueness. Therefore, further research is needed in other specific Southeast Asian countries. Second, the sampling bounds on the corporation which gained sustainable recognition in SRI-Kehati Index. Future studies can extend more observation by comparing SRI-Kehati index to firms, which are not listed in the index.

This study recommends better capital market monitoring and evaluation to improve the quality of the firms’ reports in both business and social aspects. By investing more in philanthropic and social activities, firms can signal the market credibility to their various external stakeholders on their market adjustment to changing external business environment.

As for society, robust CSR disclosures will facilitate investors’ understanding of the conditions before making an investment in public listed companies. At the same time, companies issuing the disclosures are expected by society to perform responsibly, as illuminated in the report. As a result, the CSR disclosures will create a virtuous cycle of sustainability between the company and the society.

First, this research reinforces the global corporate governance concern to urge more corporate disclosures on firm performance in an Indonesian context. Second, this study fills the research gap on the association of CSR disclosure to asymmetric information in Indonesian literature. Third, the findings underpin the integration of social responsibility on the firms’ core business decision-makings to warrant business credibility to all firms’ stakeholders in Indonesia.

The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of information asymmetry on revenue sharing contracts and performance in a dual-channel supply chain. First, the authors model the optimum revenue sharing contract in a dual-channel supply chain under both the full information case and the asymmetric information case. Second, they contrast the optimal decisions of a dual-channel supply chain between the full information case and the asymmetric information case. Third, they explore the impact of asymmetric cost information on the performance of a dual-channel supply chain and investigate the information value.

The authors present two main issues associated with revenue sharing contracts to alleviate manufacturer–retailer conflicts in a dual-channel supply chain. In the first issue, a revenue sharing contract is designed in a dual-channel supply chain under asymmetric cost information conditions, based on the principal-agent model. In the second issue, an optimal revenue sharing contract under full information conditions, based on the Stackelberg game is discussed. They explore the impact of asymmetric cost information on the performance of a dual-channel supply chain and investigate the information value based on comparative static analysis.

First, the direct sale price is unchanged and independent of the retailer’s cost construct, but the wholesale price increases and the retail sale price does not decrease under asymmetric cost information. The information asymmetry leads to higher direct sale demand and lower retail sale demand. Second, information asymmetry is beneficial for the retailer, but imposes inefficiency on the manufacturer and the whole supply chain. Third, the performance of the dual-channel supply chain is improved if the retailer’s cost information is shared and the dual-channel supply chain reaches coordination. The retailer is willing to share its cost information if the lump sum side payment that the manufacturer offers can make up the retailer’s reduced profit due to sharing this information.

The authors proposed a contract menus design model in a dual-channel supply chain. They examine how information asymmetry affects optimal policies and performance. They compared the optimal policies under symmetric information and asymmetric information. Conditions under which the partners prefer sharing information are identified. They quantified the information value from the points of partners and the whole system.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the relations of investment and stock prices (Tobin‐Q), the impact of asymmetric information on the investment sensitivity to stock price, and the impact of asymmetric information on the stock price sensitivity to investment.

Research was conducted with 313 listed companies and 1,878 firm‐year observations from Chinese stock market. Empirical studies were conducted based on two hypotheses by using R², information delay and scores of information disclosure as measures of asymmetric information and taking changes in book assets and capital expenditures scaled by book assets as measures of investment.

The key findings of the paper are: managers are learning from the market when they make investment decisions; the asymmetric information has a significant negative impact on the investment sensitivity to stock price; and the asymmetric information has a significant positive impact on the stock price sensitivity to investment.

The paper has a significant practical implication for regulation policy making in stock market.

The paper fills the research gap in two points. It studies the impact of asymmetric information on the investment sensitivity to stock price, and the impact of asymmetric information on the stock price sensitivity to investment in Chinese stock market for the first time.

Asymmetric cost information exists between a supplier and a manufacturer regarding the manufacturer's process innovation for remanufacturing (PIR), which may hurt the supplier's profit. The authors therefore seek to develop a menu of nonlinear pricing contracts for channel information sharing.

Based on principal–agent theory, the supplier, acting as a Stackelberg leader, designs a menu of nonlinear pricing contracts to impel the manufacturer to disclose its private cost information on PIR (i.e. PIR efficiency). In addition, the authors compare the equilibrium outcomes under asymmetric and symmetric information to examine the effects of asymmetric PIR information on the production policies and profits of the supplier and the manufacturer.

The proposed contract menu encourages th4e manufacturer to spontaneously share PIR efficiency information with the supplier. Asymmetric PIR information may distort the output of new products upward or downward, but the output of remanufactured products may only be distorted downward. In addition, the manufacturer with high PIR efficiency gains information rent, and interestingly, the increase in the probability of low PIR efficiency amplifies its information rent. Finally, an asymmetric information environment may increase the threshold for the manufacturer to enter remanufacturing.

The authors probe the issue of the supplier's contract design by jointly considering remanufacturing, process innovation and information asymmetry. The paper expands the influencing mechanism of process innovation information in the remanufacturing field. The authors also observe new results that may offer guidance to decision makers.

This study aims to both test the asymmetric information hypothesis and explore the factors influencing the one‐ through four‐quarter‐ahead Federal Reserve inflation forecasts for 1983‐2002.

Encompassing tests are used to examine the asymmetric information hypothesis. In modeling the Federal Reserve inflation forecasts, the authors are mindful of alternative theories of inflation which emphasize such determinants as cost‐push, demand‐pull and inertial factors.

First, the Federal Reserve inflation forecasts embody useful predictive information beyond that contained in the private forecasts. Second, with the private forecasts controlled for, the near‐term Federal Reserve inflation forecasts make use of qualitative information, and the longer‐term forecasts are influenced by the forecasts of growth in both unit labor costs and aggregate demand as well as the preceding‐quarter inflation forecasts and monetary policy shifts.

The Federal Reserve forecasts are released to the public with a five‐year lag and are currently available up to the fourth quarter of 2002. This limits the use of the most up‐to‐date forecasts desirable for this study.

The factors influencing the Federal Reserve inflation forecasts are basically those emphasized publicly by monetary authorities. This finding points to the Fed's transparency and should thus help enhance its credibility with the public. Also, our results (which shed light on the predictive information in the Federal Reserve inflation forecasts not included in the private forecasts) are of value, since they can help the Fed better predict how inflation will respond to policy actions, and they can help the public form more informative inflationary expectations.