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This paper aims to address the questions of different outsourcing strategies between Airbus and Boeing and point out the theoretical limits of the resource-based view (RBV) approach that must be broadened with a finance perspective. Owing to the complexity of systems, the aircraft industry is nowadays structured around a well-organised value chain of product development and manufacturing. However, according to the RBV, capabilities attached to some systems and components are strategic resources and must be kept in house to maintain competitive advantage. In commercial aircraft avionics, critical systems such as flight controls fall directly under this rule, due to substantial risks of passenger safety they deal with.

This study is based on two comparative studies concerning the A330/340 and A350 programmes at Airbus and their equivalents at Boeing, the B777 and the B787. The data are both primary (financial and patent data) and secondary (semi-structured interviews and documentation.

The main result highlights the limits of the RBV model to understand why Airbus has chosen to re-internalise the development and production of flight control systems contrary to Boeing. For both, cost reduction is the main objective of outsourcing, but European firms are more careful with critical resources. The financialisation of aircraft manufacturers’ strategies is another explanatory factor relevant to understand why Boeing outsources strategic resources such as flight controls.

The authors demonstrate the potential of multiplication of research methods to address a question. Second, they try to bring together different theories in a preliminary effort, which gives them some promising stuffy perspective for future works.

By addressing both the RBV and the financialisation perspectives, the authors provide an interesting view of the COmplex Products and Systems (CoPS) challenges.

The findings of this research must provide key of interpretation for business managers, which may consider the two faces, knowledge management and financial, to explain corporate performance.

Several originalities are relevant in this work. From a methodological point of view, the authors offer a comparison between the two main players of commercial aircraft manufacturing, an oligopolistic industry. Second, the data they choose to rely on are both qualitative and quantitative to strengthen the results. Third, at a micro level, this study is original in its approach of linking outsourcing to financialisation.

This paper sets out to outline a human hazard analysis methodology as a tool for managing human error in aircraft maintenance, operations and production. The methodology developed has been used in a slightly modified form on Airbus aircraft programmes. This paper aims to outline a method for managing human error in the field of aircraft design, maintenance and operations. Undertaking the research was motivated by the fact that aviation incidents and accidents still show a high percentage of human‐factors events as key causal factors.

The methodology adopted takes traditional aspects of the aircraft design system safety process, particularly fault tree analysis, and couples them with a structured tabular notation called a human error modes and effects analysis (HEMEA). HEMEA provides data, obtained from domain knowledge, in‐service experience and known error modes, about likely human‐factors events that could cause critical failure modes identified in the fault tree analysis. In essence the fault tree identifies the failure modes, while the HEMEA shows what kind of human‐factors events could trigger the relevant failure.

The authors found that the methodology works very effectively, but that it is very dependent on locating the relevant expert judgement and domain knowledge..

The authors found that the methodology works very effectively, but that it is very dependent on locating the relevant expert judgement and domain knowledge. Using the method as a prototype, looking at aspects of a large aircraft fuel system, was very time‐consuming and the industry partner was concerned about the resource implications of implementing this process. Regarding future work, the researchers would like to explore how a knowledge management exercise might capture some of the domain knowledge to reduce the requirement for discursive, seminar‐type sessions with domain experts.

It was very clear that the sponsors and research partners in the aircraft industry were keen to use this method as part of the safety process. Airbus has used a modified form of the process on at least two programmes.

The authors are aware that the UK MOD uses fault tree analysis that includes human‐factors events. However, the researchers believe that the creation of the human error modes effects analysis is original. On the civil side of the aviation business this is the first time that human error issues have been included for systems other than the flightdeck. The research was clearly of major value to the UK Civil Aviation Authority and Airbus, who were the original sponsors.

The Airbus A320 family engine fan cowl doors (FCDs) safety issue is known to the industry for almost 18 years; however, it has not been addressed adequately by the aircraft manufacturer and the various operators and regulating authorities. The purpose of this paper is to examine in a systematic way the possible operational and safety implications of a new modification on the engine FCDs.

An array of error-prone scenarios is presented and analysed under the prism of human factors in a non-exhaustive qualitative scenario analysis.

All examined scenarios are considered more or less probable. A number of accident prevention solutions are proposed for each of the scenario examined, in view of the acceptance and implementation of this modification by operators.

As these scenarios are neither exhaustive nor have been tested/validated in actual aircraft maintenance practice, the further analysis is necessary. A substantial follow-up survey should take place, which should include a wider array of scenarios. This would allow obtaining the necessary data for a quantitative (statistical) analysis.

This case study identifies issues in relation to this modification, introduced by Airbus and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which may prove problematic from the point of view of safety effectiveness and disruption of operations.

This case study examines a long-standing aviation safety issue and the implications of a solution proposed by the aircraft manufacturer and adopted by EASA. This can be useful in increasing the awareness around these issues and highlight the importance of a human-centric and scenario-based design of engineering modifications towards minimising error in aircraft technical operations.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of condition-based maintenance based on unscheduled maintenance delays that were caused by ATA chapter 21 (air conditioning). The goal is to show the introduction of condition monitoring in aircraft systems.

The research was done using the Airbus In-Service database to analyze the delay causes, delay length and to check if they are easy to detect via condition monitoring or not. These results were then combined with delay costs.

Analysis shows that about 80 percent of the maintenance actions that cause departure delays can be prevented when additional sensors are introduced. With already existing sensors it is possible to avoid about 20 percent of the delay causing maintenance actions.

The research is limited on the data of the Airbus in-service database and on ATA chapter 21 (air conditioning).

The research shows that delays can be prevented by using existing sensors in the air conditioning system for condition monitoring. More delays can be prevented by installing new sensors.

The research focuses on the effect of the air conditioning system of an aircraft on the delay effects and the impact of condition monitoring on delays.

BAe Airbus has studied the application of the maintenance free operating period (MFOP) concept to Airbus aircraft in order to meet a growing demand for autonomous operation. This concept can apply to both civil and military aircraft and, most recently, has resulted in Airbus Military Company including the MFOP as part of its formal proposal for a new military transport aircraft. The paper concludes that it is difficult to predict the progress in further improving the levels of MFOP achievement, but that the final solution is likely to be a “pick and mix” of techniques, technologies and disciplines integrated under a “supportability” banner.

High-altitude ice crystals (HAICs) are causing one in-flight event or more per month for commercial aircraft. The effects include preventing air data probes (pitot pressure and total air temperature in particular) from functioning correctly and causing engines to roll back and shut down. The purpose of this study is to describe the process used by the National Research Council Canada (NRC) to develop and test a particle detection probe (PDP). The probe mounts on the fuselage of aircraft to sense and quantify the ice crystals in the environment.

The probe was demonstrated on the NRC Convair and Airbus A340 research aircraft as part of the European Union HAIC programme. The probe was ruggedised, adapted for easy installation in standard aircraft fittings and tested in a variety of conditions for longevity and endurance.

Efforts to achieve the safety requirements for flight on aircraft are discussed. The challenges, surprises and opportunities for testing on which the development group is capitalised are also presented.

It was demonstrated that the detectors gave signals proportional to the ice crystal content of clouds, and results demonstrating the functionality of the probe are presented.

This paper describes the multi-year process of developing the NRC PDP from a test cell sensor for detecting engine exhaust contaminants on an aircraft ice crystal detection probe. The work included over 20 flight tests on NRC aircraft and the Airbus HAIC test programme.

Boeing Company has been the world's leading producer of large commercial airplanes for several decades. However, in the late 1990s, Europe‐based Airbus Industrie competed with Boeing aggressively and captured almost fifty percent of the over‐100‐seat airplane market. This paper examines the battle between Boeing and Airbus, including a concise report on Airbus' launch of its A380 superjumbo project. The paper also contains the authors' recommendations to Boeing and the U.S. government.

ONE responsibility of MBB Transport Aircraft Group is the development of high‐lift aids for the Airbus wings. An Airbus A 310–300, used in the role of a flying wind tunnel model, has yielded vital information on aerodynamics.

This paper presents the safety case for the consideration of cross-cultural factors in aviation by focusing on cultural interfaces, those situations where members of one culture encounter people or artifacts from other cultures. Global aviation is strongly influenced by the USA and Western Europe as the largest manufacturers and largest customers; hence almost all cultural interfaces are weighted in favor of the dominant users. The challenge for safety is not to ignore or eliminate these interfaces but to manage the potential threats they pose. To move forward, there is a role for those inside and outside the dominant model.