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This study investigates whether block acquisitions lead to changes in board and CEO compensation characteristics and finds that block purchasers do not play a significant role in improving the firm’s governance practices. However, the majority of professional investors have sold their block within a year, suggesting that they do not own their stock long enough to alter governance policies nor to benefit from such changes. For the smaller number of firms where a new blockholder maintains their investment for more than a year, the use of equity based CEO compensation increases while the use of cash based compensation decreases.

We investigate whether active involvement of private equity firms in their portfolio companies during the holding period of a later-stage private equity investment is related to increased levels in operating performance of these companies. Our analysis of unique survey data on 267 European buyouts and secondary performance data on 29 portfolio companies using partial least squares structural equation modeling indicates that private equity firms, that is, their board representatives, can increase operating performance not only by monitoring the behavior of top managers of portfolio companies, but also by becoming involved in strategic decisions and supporting top managers through the provision of strategic resources. Strategic resources, in particular expertise and networks, provided by private equity firm representatives in the form of financial and strategic involvement are associated with increases in the financial performance and competitive prospects of portfolio companies. Operational involvement, however, is not related to changes in operating performance. In addition to empirical insights into the different types of involvement and their effects, this chapter contributes to the buyout literature by providing support for the suggested broadening of the theoretical discussion beyond the dominant perspective of agency theory through developing and testing a complementary resource-based view of involvement. This allows taking into account not only the monitoring, but also the more entrepreneurial supporting element of involvement by private equity firms.

In the build-up of an investment decision, the existence of both active and passive investment vehicles triggers a puzzle for investors. Indeed the confrontation between active and index replication equity funds in terms of risk-adjusted performance and alpha generation has been a bone of contention since the inception of these investment structures. Accordingly, the objective of this chapter is to distinctly underscore whether an investor should be concerned in choosing between active and diverse passive investment structures.

The survivorship bias-free dataset consists of 776 equity funds which are domiciled either in America or Europe, and are likewise exposed to the equity markets of the same regions. In addition to geographical segmentation, equity funds are also categorised by structure and management type, specifically actively managed mutual funds, index mutual funds and passive exchange traded funds (‘ETFs’). This classification leads to the analysis of monthly net asset values (‘NAV’) of 12 distinct equally weighted portfolios, with a time horizon ranging from January 2004 to December 2014. Accordingly, the risk-adjusted performance of the equally weighted equity funds’ portfolios is examined by the application of mainstream single-factor and multi-factor asset pricing models namely Capital Asset Pricing Model (Fama, 1968; Fama & Macbeth, 1973; Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966; Sharpe, 1964; Treynor, 1961), Fama French Three-Factor (1993) and Carhart Four-Factor (1997).

Solely examination of monthly NAVs for a 10-year horizon suggests that active management is equivalent to index replication in terms of risk-adjusted returns. This prompts investors to be neutral gross of fees, yet when considering all transaction costs it is a distinct story. The relatively heftier fees charged by active management, predominantly initial fees, appear to revoke any outperformance in excess of the market portfolio, ensuing in a Fool’s Errand Hypothesis. Moreover, both active and index mutual funds’ performance may indeed be lower if financial advisors or distributors of equity funds charge additional fees over and above the fund houses’ expense ratios, putting the latter investment vehicles at a significant handicap vis-à-vis passive low-cost ETFs. This chapter urges investors to concentrate on expense ratios and other transaction costs rather than solely past returns, by accessing the cheapest available vehicle for each investment objective. Put simply, the general investor should retreat from portfolio management and instead access the market portfolio using low-cost index replication structures via an execution-only approach.

The battle among actively managed and index replication equity funds in terms of risk-adjusted performance and alpha generation has been a grey area since the inception of mutual funds. The interest in the subject constantly lightens up as fresh instruments infiltrate financial markets. Indeed the mutual fund puzzle (Gruber, 1996) together with the enhanced growth of ETFs has again rejuvenated the active versus passive debate, making it worth a detailed analysis especially for the benefit of investors who confront a dilemma in choosing between the two management styles.

This chapter investigates the effect of the geographical distance between institutional investors and firms on managers' financial misconduct. The evidence shows that the likelihood of committing financial misconduct by management is positively associated with distance. The distance effect is more prominent for firms with higher information asymmetry and more dedicated institutional investors. In line with the balance between risk-taking and benefit extraction from misconduct, the severity of financial misconduct is higher for firms closer to their institutional investors. Results show that geographical proximity can significantly reduce the cost of information production and facilitate monitoring through access to soft information.

Introduction – Markowitz (1952) argues that individuals act rationally in their financial decisions. In contrast, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) claim that the psychological characteristics of people significantly affect financial decisions. In making these decisions, factors such as age, gender, and educational status may have an impact.

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to determine whether financial literacy has an impact on individuals’ cognitive biases related to financial investments.

Methodology – A sample of 444 individuals were surveyed.

Findings – In the results of study (1) it was determined that financial literacy leads to differences in cognitive biases; and (2) cognitive biases of individuals who do not receive finance education are different from individuals who receive finance education and professionals in the business world. The findings indicate that the increase in the level of financial literacy of individuals will reduce the cognitive biases and heuristics, and therefore will have a positive effect on the investor behavior in financial markets.