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THOUGH Soviet aviation has its roots in pre‐revolutionary Russia, its main development has taken place since the revolution. Russian military aviation dates from 1910, when several officers were sent to foreign aviation schools by the Russian government; but at that time there were no Russian‐built aeroplanes.

IT has always been difficult to obtain information regarding the progress of aviation in the U.S.S.R. and, in particular, reliable details of aeroplane types have been especially hard to come by. This cloak of mystery arises from two causes: the natural reticence of the Soviet authorities (natural in the first place because of the poor state of development, and the inefficiency of, aeroplane design and production in the past, but now less understandable as a matter of settled policy) and the unreliable political colouring of such reports as those which do leave the country. It has usually been impossible to accept any description without careful “watering down,” for the communist enthusiast can see no wrong, while their political opponents can do naught but find fault. The following notes have been carefully prepared from a considerable quantity of the available data and, though regrettably incomplete, are believed to present accurate details of the machines described.

THE spread of the war to the East in the summer of 1941 has disproved the opinions of Russian aeroplanes that were widely held outside that country and, at the same time, it has shown that the progress in design, which started to be apparent between 1925 and 1930, has been steadily maintained. In a previous article an outline of the Soviet aviation system, together with details of some of the then more modern designs, was given for the period up to 1939. Exact information about Russian aeroplanes is still hard to obtain, but what can be discovered bears out the conclusions given in this earlier article.

Under this heading are published regularly abstracts of all Reports and Memoranda of the Aeronautical Research Council, Reports and Technical Notes of the United States National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics and publications of other similar Research Bodies as issued

FOR some years the writer of this article has carefully studied the scanty and conflicting information available on the aircraft of the U.S.S.R. and the organization of both military and civil aeronautics. It has been our policy to publish, whenever possible, articles giving accurate—if of necessity limited—details of Russian developments. In this respect we would point out to readers that the contents of this present article may appear somewhat conservative, because only undoubted facts have been presented and, as such, it offers a commentary upon the mixture of fanciful propaganda and restricted information available—a fact which we have had to mention on each previous occasion that we have published a similar article.— EDITOR

Argues that the collapse of socialism in the former Soviet Union as well as the collapse of that state resulted from a complex interaction of both internal and external factors. Internally the systemic transformation is significantly impeded by the hysteretic memory of the old system and its functioning. External pressures influence the pace and the scope of this transformation, conditioning Western assistance to the reform process by the demands for rapid convergence to the path of the resolute marketization. The evolution of the internal and external circumstances has brought about the current crisis in the former Soviet Union and raised the critical question of tactical and strategic goals.

I reexamine the conflicting results in Frank, Lynch, and Rego (2009) and Lennox, Lisowsky, and Pittman (2013). Frank et al. (2009) conclude that firms can manage book income upward and taxable income downward in the same period, implying a positive relation between aggressive book and tax reporting. Lennox et al. (2013) conclude the relation is negative and aggressive book reporting informs users that aggressive tax reporting is less likely. I identify four key differences in the research designs across the two studies, including measures of aggressive book reporting, measures of aggressive tax reporting, sample time periods, and empirical models. I systematically examine whether each of these differences is responsible for the conflicting results by altering the key difference while holding other factors as constant as possible. I find the relation between aggressive book and tax reporting is driven by the measure of aggressive book reporting, as the relation is positive for some subsets of firms and negative for others. Firms accused of financial statement fraud have a negative relation while nonfraud firms exhibit a positive relation. Using discretionary accruals, I also look for, but do not find a “pivot point” in the relation between aggressive book and tax reporting. I provide a better understanding of the relation between aggressive book and tax reporting by identifying research design choices that are responsible for prior results. I show that measures of both discretionary accruals and financial statement fraud are necessary to gain a more complete picture of the relation between aggressive book and tax reporting.

WE must apologise for the delayed appearance of the article on the Paris Aero Exhibition by M. de Marolles. The show opened so late in November that only by exact adherence to a schedule which we had prearranged was it, we hoped, possible for it to appear, in synchrony with the closing of the exhibition, in our issue published on December G. Unfortunately, through the vagaries of the French or British Post Office—or both—in spite of the author's posting his manuscript strictly to time, it did not arrive until just too late.

The authors construct asset portfolios comprising small-sized companies and value stocks that provide with higher returns for the UK market based on a three-factor model with incorporated behavioural features. The authors were able to demonstrate that value factor model is vulnerable to behavioural patterns, especially corporate fraud. In all of the above, the authors utilised a new proportional sorting methodology against the value ranking approach, commonly employed in empirical studies. Strong evidence is observed that portfolio performance based on various syntheses of allocated assets reveals counter-intuitive results related to the BE/ME, namely, that expected returns based on size and BE/ME produce significant errors and small firms retain consistently better returns. The reason might be the unusual accounting techniques many firms follow to receive extended capital after management decisions. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

The authors were able to demonstrate that value factor model is vulnerable to behavioural patterns, especially corporate fraud. In all of the above, authors utilised a new proportional sorting methodology against the value ranking approach, commonly employed in empirical studies. Strong evidence is observed that portfolio performance based on various syntheses of allocated assets reveals counter-intuitive results related to the BE/ME, namely, that expected returns based on size and BE/ME produce significant errors and small firms retain consistently better returns. The reason might be the unusual accounting techniques many firms follow to receive extended capital after management decisions.

Value factor model is vulnerable to behavioural patterns, especially corporate fraud. In all of the above, the authors utilised a new proportional sorting methodology against the value ranking approach, commonly employed in empirical studies. Strong evidence is observed that portfolio performance based on various syntheses of allocated assets reveals counter-intuitive results related to the BE/ME, namely, that expected returns based on size and BE/ME produce significant errors and small firms retain consistently better returns. The reason might be the unusual accounting techniques many firms follow to receive extended capital after management decisions. Overall, asset pricing models with embedded risk factors which entail either shares or dividends are logically circular behavioural simultaneities, thus invalid when tested and estimated by statistical methods as an outcome of the EMH.

In distinctive contrast to the recent literature, the authors show that the returns from a size factor model of small stocks tend to outperform big stocks especially in crisis periods. Moreover, the authors were able to demonstrate that value factor model is vulnerable to behavioural patterns, especially corporate fraud. In all of the above, the authors utilised a new proportional sorting methodology against the value ranking approach, commonly employed in empirical studies. Strong evidence is observed that portfolio performance based on various syntheses of allocated assets reveals counter-intuitive results related to the BE/ME, namely, that expected returns based on size and BE/ME produce significant errors and small firms retain consistently better returns. The reason might be the unusual accounting techniques many firms follow to receive extended capital after management decisions. Overall, asset pricing models with embedded risk factors which entail either shares or dividends are logically circular behavioural simultaneities, thus invalid when tested and estimated by statistical methods as an outcome of the EMH.

This study aims to analyze the challenges facing five Palestinian clusters and to understand their dynamics and level of development. Using multiple sources of evidence, the research questions are answered using semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions. Content analysis was used to analyze the data obtained. The five clusters in Palestine are located in a complex environment that imposes a mix of challenges that adversely affect their performance. The challenges facing Palestinian clusters are different in terms of their degree of complexity. The common challenges facing the Palestinian clusters are the fundamental lack of innovative stimulation policies or incentives in the Palestinian ecosystem, lack of trust, unfair competition, limited access to finance, lack of access to promising markets, and the limited collaboration between different parties. More focused policies are suggested to the Palestinian authorities.