Search results

The Black Sea region has become as an important energy transit route for Caspian and Russian oil and natural gas to western markets. Since 1996 the quantity of oil exported from the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits and the number of transiting tankers has doubled and will continue to expand. However, these are also two waterways where the risk of either an accidental or intentional disaster is significant bringing serious repercussions for energy supply security. This paper will analyze measures taken by Black Sea coastal States to provide for secure ports and shipping against accidental and intentional disasters. The paper will examine the role of technology, such as satellite based VTS providers in the Black Sea, implementation of the ISPS Code, the role of the relatively new BlackSeaFor in providing both port and navigational security. The paper will further make recommendations for further improvements for enhancement of security emergency response planning. In addition, the paper will examine current security measures taken by the Turkish Administration for oil transportation through the Turkish Straits.

At the substantive level, there exists a gap in knowledge about the position of security risk management (i.e. SRM) during the terminals’ operations and management; particularly when there is potential for deliberate anti-security acts. Correspondingly, the purpose of this paper is a need for more practical research to find out the justification for the existence of the SRM and different techniques for its appropriate execution on these logistics infrastructures principally with due regard to the potential requirements in the near future.

Both qualitative and quantitative techniques are used in this study incorporating fuzzy set theory and risk assessment matrix to achieve the research objective.

A designed SRM framework tailored for Qalhat liquefied petroleum gas (LNG) terminal in Sultanate of Oman was established to manage the security threats which can be resulted from any probable terrorist attacks.

The limited numbers of experts for the purpose of the addressed SRM are causing challenges in data collection.

The pressures for enhanced attention to critical infrastructure security have fostered new challenges for petrochemical seaports and terminals (PSTs). These tendencies dictate to maintain comprehensive security regimens that can be integrated with national and international strategies to support the country’s security against terrorism.

The development of the security risk factor table model in the case of Qalhat LNG Terminal.

Organizations, would they be individual companies or large multi-firm networks, face a wide variety of potential risks requiring dedicated keen management. It all the better applies to supply-chains as risk, related to both physical and information flows, pervades the whole logistics network and has acquired a new and growing security dimension since 9/11. More specifically, as they are now under the permanent threat of terrorism, and because offering sufficient security levels is bound to become a necessary condition for global supply-chain membership, seaports need to adjust their risk management strategy and processes accordingly. In such a context, this paper aims at describing the project of a decision-support system, dedicated to container transit security-wise decision making and which features an expert-system architecture.

Port performance and port choice have been treated as separate streams of research. This hampers the efforts of ports to anticipate on and respond to possible future changes in port choice by shippers, freight forwarders and carriers. The purpose of this paper is to develop and demonstrate a port performance measurement methodology, extended from the perspective of port choice, which includes hinterland performance and a weighting of attributes from a port choice perspective.

A review of literature is used to extend the scope of port performance indicators. Multi-criteria decision analysis is used to operationalize the context of port choice, presenting a weighted approach using the Best-Worst Method (BWM). An empirical model is built based on an extensive port stakeholder survey.

Transport costs and times along the transport chain are the dominant factors for port competitiveness. Satisfaction, reputation and flexibility criteria are the other important decision criteria. The results also show how the availability of different modal alternatives impact on the position of a port. A ranking of routes for hinterland regions is done.

The paper focuses on two extensions of port performance measurement. So far, not all factors that determine port choice have been included in port performance studies. Here, first, factors related to hinterland services are included. Second, a weighting of port performance measures is proposed. The importance of factors is assessed using BWM. The approach is demonstrated empirically for a case of the European contestable hinterland regions, which so far have lacked quantitative analysis.

The issue of cybersecurity has been cast as the focal point of a fight between two conflicting governance models: the nation-state model of national security and the global governance model of multi-stakeholder collaboration, as seen in forums like IGF, IETF, ICANN, etc. There is a strange disconnect, however, between this supposed fight and the actual control over cybersecurity “on the ground”. This paper aims to reconnect discourse and control via a property rights approach, where control is located first and foremost in ownership.

This paper first conceptualizes current governance mechanisms through ownership and property rights. These concepts locate control over internet resources. They also help us understand ongoing shifts in control. Such shifts in governance are actually happening, security governance is being patched left and right, but these arrangements bear little resemblance to either the national security model of states or the global model of multi-stakeholder collaboration. With the conceptualization in hand, the paper then presents case studies of governance that have emerged around specific security externalities.

While not all mechanisms are equally effective, in each of the studied areas, the author found evidence of private actors partially internalizing the externalities, mostly on a voluntary basis and through network governance mechanisms. No one thinks that this is enough, but it is a starting point. Future research is needed to identify how these mechanisms can be extended or supplemented to further improve the governance of cybersecurity.

This paper bridges together the disconnected research communities on governance and (technical) cybersecurity.

This paper aims to consider selected results from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC)-funded “Managing Access to the internet in Public Libraries” (MAIPLE) project, from 2012-2014. MAIPLE has explored the ways in which public library services manage use of the internet connections that they provide for the public. This included the how public library services balance their legal obligations and the needs of their communities in a public space and the ethical dilemmas that arise.

The researchers used a mixed-method approach involving a review of the literature, legal analysis, a questionnaire survey and case studies in five public library authorities.

UK public library services use a range of methods to regulate internet access. The research also confirms previous findings that filtering software is an ubiquitous tool for controlling access to and protecting library users from “inappropriate”, illegal and harmful internet content. There is a general, if sometimes reluctant, acceptance of filtering software as a practical tool by library staff, which seems to contrast with professional codes of ethics and attitudes in other countries. The research indicates that public library internet access will be a valued service for some time to come, but that some aspects of how public library services regulate internet access is currently managed can have socially undesirable consequences, including blocking legitimate sites and preventing users from accessing government services. Education could play a greater part in helping the general population to exercise judgement in selection of materials to view and use. This does not preclude implementing stricter controls to protect children, whilst allowing public libraries to continue providing a social good to those who are unable to otherwise participate in the digital age.

The response to the survey was 39 per cent meaning that findings may not apply across the whole of the UK. The findings of this study are compared with and supplemented by other quantitative sources, but a strength of this study is the depth of understanding afforded by the use of case studies.

This paper provides both a quantitative and qualitative analysis of how internet access is managed in UK public libraries, including how library services fulfil their legal obligations and the ethical implications of how they balance their role in facilitating access to information with their perceived role as a safe and trusted environment for all members of their communities. The findings add to the international discussion on this issue and stimulate debate and policy making in the UK.

Container shipping companies face various risks with different consequences that are required to be mitigated. Limited empirical research has been done on identifying and evaluating risk management strategies in shipping operations with different risk consequences. This paper aims to identify the appropriate risk mitigation strategies and evaluate the relative importance of these strategies.

Literature review and interviews were used to identify and validate the appropriate risk mitigation strategies in container shipping operations. A questionnaire with a Likert five-point scale was then conducted to rank the identified risk mitigation strategies in terms of their overall effectiveness. Top six important strategies were selected to evaluate their relative importance under three risk consequences (i.e. financial, reputation and safety and security incident related loss) through using another questionnaire with paired-comparison. Fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (AHP) was then conducted to analyse the paired-comparison questionnaire.

After conducting a systematic literature review and interviews, 18 mitigation strategies were identified. The results from the first questionnaire show that among the 18 strategies, the top three are “form alliances with other shipping companies”, “use more advanced infrastructures (hardware and software)” and “choose partners very carefully”. After conducting fuzzy AHP, the results show that shipping companies emphasize more on reducing the risk consequence of financial loss; and “form alliance with other shipping companies” is the most important risk mitigation strategy.

This paper evaluates the risk mitigation strategies against three risk consequences. Managers can benefit from the systematic identification of mitigation strategies, which shipping companies can consider for adoption to reduce the operational risk impact.

It is commonly known that numerous incidents of container security failure are detected on a daily basis for which nobody is held legally liable. This state of affairs is essentially due to the shippers providing erroneous information, either inadvertently or by design. However, none of the stakeholders such as the carrier, the port operator, the inland transporter or the dry port operator are saddled with the legal responsibility of verifying the correctness of the information provided by the shippers or moving against them legally for misrepresentation of facts.

This paper discusses the issue of container security from a legal perspective with a specific focus on the liability for security failure. While discussing the reasons for non-development of a globally standardized legal regime for container security, this paper also endeavors to suggest possible solutions for the abysmal state of affairs.

This state of affairs persists despite the shipper being saddled with the additional responsibility of providing documentary evidence of verified gross mass of the cargo stuffed in the container by International Maritime Organization.

There is apparently no visible legal action that appears to have been taken against the culprit responsible for the security failure. Thus, the loopholes in the existing legal regime are exploited by all concerned for commercial reasons.

The European Union's Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), which is already one of the EU's most impactful instruments for reducing greenhouse gases (GHGs), will soon include the maritime transport industry. Although ports are this industry's most environmental-friendly component, there are still some barriers to including ports in the system. Therefore, the purpose of the study is to identify these barriers and to reveal the barriers' interrelationships.

The study was conducted by identifying barriers from a literature review before analyzing the barriers with the Fuzzy DEMATEL method. Finally, based on the Complex Adaptive System Approach, various solutions are proposed to overcome these barriers.

The identified barriers were grouped into cause-and-effect groups. Two barriers, namely long payback period and high investment costs, were evaluated as triggers of the model while the others were more sensitive to the model.

This study only includes the perceptions of green certificated ports in Türkiye. The results revealed an expectation that elimination of financial concerns will alleviate other barriers to including ports in the system. The study's findings can guide port managers on the integration of the managers' processes into the system.

This study provides novel findings regarding the relationships between barriers hindering ports from involvement in the EU ETS.