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The aim of this study is to empirically identify crucial dimensions of security management in the container shipping sector in Taiwan and assess their impacts on security performance.

Data for this study were collected by questionnaire survey. An exploratory factor analysis was performed to identify crucial security management dimensions in the container shipping sector. Multiple regression analysis was then performed to examine the effect of security management on the security performance.

Four crucial security management dimensions were identified: facility and cargo management; accident prevention and processing; information management; and partner relationship management. Multiple regression analysis revealed that information management and partner relationship management had significant positive effects on safety performance, whereas partner relationship management had a significant positive effect on customs clearance performance.

This study primarily focuses on the effect of security management on security performance. Future research could identify the drivers and barriers to comply with supply chain security initiatives.

Container shipping firms can improve safety and customs clearance performance by focusing security management efforts on facility and cargo management, accident prevention and processing, information management, and partner relationship management.

Government administrators or other authorities may want to consider using crucial container shipping security management dimensions as criteria for assessing security performance in container shipping firms.

This study presented is the first to assess the effect of security management on security performance in the container shipping sector. Particularly, partner relationship management is found to be the key dimension for supply chain security success.

It is commonly known that numerous incidents of container security failure are detected on a daily basis for which nobody is held legally liable. This state of affairs is essentially due to the shippers providing erroneous information, either inadvertently or by design. However, none of the stakeholders such as the carrier, the port operator, the inland transporter or the dry port operator are saddled with the legal responsibility of verifying the correctness of the information provided by the shippers or moving against them legally for misrepresentation of facts.

This paper discusses the issue of container security from a legal perspective with a specific focus on the liability for security failure. While discussing the reasons for non-development of a globally standardized legal regime for container security, this paper also endeavors to suggest possible solutions for the abysmal state of affairs.

This state of affairs persists despite the shipper being saddled with the additional responsibility of providing documentary evidence of verified gross mass of the cargo stuffed in the container by International Maritime Organization.

There is apparently no visible legal action that appears to have been taken against the culprit responsible for the security failure. Thus, the loopholes in the existing legal regime are exploited by all concerned for commercial reasons.

Recently, the United Statesgovernment plans to introduce electronic container seals on all imported containers as a mandatory requirement. Further, containers without electronic seals may be prohibited or restricted for import based on this planned regulation. An electronic seal is a tamper-free seal with radio frequency identification (RFID) chips embedded in it. It could provide additional security information such as the tamper evidence and the history of tampering status. In this paper, a brief review of the types of container seals, the characteristics of electronic seals, and their system components are presented. International efforts for securing cargo security are also reviewed including Container Security Initiative (CSI), Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), and International Standards Organization (ISO) requirements. Finally, the current issues and the status of technology development are discussed with future directions as a final word

Due to the globalization of trade, hundreds of millions containers pass every year through world ports. Such a situation is extremely challenging in terms of securing freight transport operations. However, costs and lead-times are still very important components of supply chains' performance models. Therefore, the drive for enhanced safety and security cannot be made at the expense of these other two factors of competitiveness, and the processes implemented by the global supply chain links, including the maritime port one, should tend to a joint optimization of trade facilitation and operational safety / security.

The research on which this paper feeds back falls within the frame of this mixed performance requirement. More specifically, the paper presents a decision-support system dedicated to managing the risks associated with land and maritime container transportation; this system is based on the modeling of the knowledge of a group of experts, and covers the three phases of risk identification, assessment and avoidance / mitigation.

Radio frequency identification (RFID) provides a useful tool for the prescreening or detection of goods and containers moving across the border and for controlling the trade of illicit materials and preventing or mitigating the effects of terrorism. Although anti-terrorism measures are important in today’s dangerous world, RFID tools, if misused, may violate the WTO trade rules. Whenever goods or container control measures using RFID are proposed, their contents, objectives, and rationale must be published, and WTO members must be notified through the WTO Secretariat and allowed to make comments. WTO members should not take such measures that are designed or applied in a discriminatory manner and those measures must be adopted only under necessary situations and to the extent necessary. These measures must reduce the incidence and complexity of import and export formalities, and there should not be substantial penalties for minor breaches of the requirements under the measures. If the measures require country-of-origin information in RFID tags, they must apply in the same way to like products, and they must not cause unnecessary inconveniences or unreasonable cost. If the measures deal with containers in international transit, they must be reasonable, consider the conditions of the traffic, and guarantee transit through the most convenient routes for international transit.

A container control measure designed to restrict the flow of fissionable materials or their derivative materials, traffic in arms, ammunition, and implements of war, or traffic in military supply goods and materials may be justified, even if it violates some of the GATT rules. In addition, a measure established in time of war or other emergency in international relations or based on the United Nations Charter and designed to maintain international peace and security can also be justified. As a last resort, WTO members may request a waiver from GATT and TBT Agreement obligations for container control measures that include RFID.

Superpowers must be careful not to use RFID to practice power politics and create regulations to deal with national security and anti-terrorism issues that do not conform to international law. The key question is how to maintain a balance between the two inalienable values of free trade and national security in this era of globalization, harmonization, and terrorism .

Container shipping companies face various risks with different consequences that are required to be mitigated. Limited empirical research has been done on identifying and evaluating risk management strategies in shipping operations with different risk consequences. This paper aims to identify the appropriate risk mitigation strategies and evaluate the relative importance of these strategies.

Literature review and interviews were used to identify and validate the appropriate risk mitigation strategies in container shipping operations. A questionnaire with a Likert five-point scale was then conducted to rank the identified risk mitigation strategies in terms of their overall effectiveness. Top six important strategies were selected to evaluate their relative importance under three risk consequences (i.e. financial, reputation and safety and security incident related loss) through using another questionnaire with paired-comparison. Fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (AHP) was then conducted to analyse the paired-comparison questionnaire.

After conducting a systematic literature review and interviews, 18 mitigation strategies were identified. The results from the first questionnaire show that among the 18 strategies, the top three are “form alliances with other shipping companies”, “use more advanced infrastructures (hardware and software)” and “choose partners very carefully”. After conducting fuzzy AHP, the results show that shipping companies emphasize more on reducing the risk consequence of financial loss; and “form alliance with other shipping companies” is the most important risk mitigation strategy.

This paper evaluates the risk mitigation strategies against three risk consequences. Managers can benefit from the systematic identification of mitigation strategies, which shipping companies can consider for adoption to reduce the operational risk impact.

There is significant amount of literature tackling different issues related to the port industry. The present chapter focuses on a single business unit of seaports aiming at the documentation of works related to container terminals.

An effort to review, collect and present the majority of the works present in the last 30 years, between 1980 and 2010, has been made in order to picture the problems dealt and methods used by the authors in the specific research field. To facilitate the reader, studies have been grouped under five categories of addressed problems (productivity and competitiveness, yard and equipment utilization, equipment scheduling, berth planning, loading/unloading) and four modelling methodologies (mathematics and operations research, management and economics, simulation, stochastic modelling).

The analysis shows that most works focus on productivity and competitiveness issues followed by yard and equipment utilisation and equipment scheduling. In reference to the methodologies used managerial and economic approaches lead, followed by mathematics and operations research.

In reference to future research, two fields have been identified where there is scope of significant contribution by the academic community: container terminal security and container terminal supply chain integration.

The present chapter provides the framework for researchers in the field of port container terminals to picture the so far works in this research area and enables the identification of gaps at both research question and methodology level for further research.

Despite a hangover from the worldwide economic crisis, international trade rebounded nicely with a record-level growth in late 2010. A sharp rise in international trade has sparked the international traffic growth. A majority of this traffic growth originated from maritime logistics which could move cargoes in large volume and at cheaper freight costs. Due to its cost-efficiency and easy access, maritime logistics typically accounts for more than half of the worldwide freight volume. However, maritime logistics poses a greater supply chain risk, since ocean carriers used for maritime logistics are more vulnerable to unpredictable weather conditions, piracy attacks, terrorist hijacking, and cargo damages on the open sea than any other modes of transportation. Also, given the vast areas that maritime logistics covers, it is more difficult to protect maritime logistics activities from potential hazards and threats.

To better protect maritime logistics activities from potential security lapses, this chapter introduces and develops a variety of systematic security measures and tools that were successfully used by best-in-class companies and government entities across the world. Also, this chapter proposes a total maritime security management model as a way to formulate maritime risk mitigation strategies. To elaborate, this chapter sheds light on the roots of maritime security measures and tools, the ways that those measures and tools are best utilized, the roles of advanced information technology in maritime security from the global supply chain perspectives, the visualization and identification of potential maritime and its related supply chain risks, and policy guidelines that will help enhance maritime security.

This study has two purposes. The first is to identify the determinants influencing the selection of a container number recognition system via a quantitative method to thereby establish an evaluation structure. The second purpose is to conduct an empirical study to determine the weights of the criteria and alternatives.

The exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (AHP) were applied to determine the evaluation structure and weights of the criteria and alternatives, respectively.

An empirical study based on a dedicated terminal at Keelung Port is conducted. The result demonstrates that the radio-frequency identification (RFID) system is a suitable system for the terminal under consideration in this study.

The value of this study is twofold. First, EFA was applied to extract common factors from a wide questionnaire survey, thereby establishing a hierarchical analysis structure. This method and comprehensive evaluation structure are useful references for both practitioners and researchers to deal with problems of gate automation. Second, fuzzy AHP was used to decide the weights of the hierarchical structure. The weights obtained by this method are more objective and rational as the imprecision expressions in returned samples have been considered and dealt with.

Organizations, would they be individual companies or large multi-firm networks, face a wide variety of potential risks requiring dedicated keen management. It all the better applies to supply-chains as risk, related to both physical and information flows, pervades the whole logistics network and has acquired a new and growing security dimension since 9/11. More specifically, as they are now under the permanent threat of terrorism, and because offering sufficient security levels is bound to become a necessary condition for global supply-chain membership, seaports need to adjust their risk management strategy and processes accordingly. In such a context, this paper aims at describing the project of a decision-support system, dedicated to container transit security-wise decision making and which features an expert-system architecture.