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This study examines the effects of board members’ compensation on the voluntary establishment of an internal audit function in publicly listed firms. While previous studies have identified some individual determinants related to the voluntary establishment of an internal audit function, the existing evidence on how board members’ compensation affects voluntary use of internal audit is, at best, ambiguous, scarce and incoherent.

Board compensation is a central incentive instrument in the classic principal–agent relationship between the owners and board members. The theme is empirically examined by using data compiled from Finnish publicly listed companies for the period 2015 to 2018. Since the dependent variable of the study is a binary variable, the logistic regression method was chosen as the statistical method of the study.

Our results unequivocally show that generous compensation of the board members increases the likelihood of establishing an internal audit function. Thus, we conclude that good corporate governance can be improved through generous compensation of board members.

Identifying the determinants of internal audit is vital to better understand the mechanisms that facilitate firms' improvement of internal control and risk management in terms of voluntarily adopting an internal audit function, and the implementation of good governance in general. Although numerous determinants of internal audit have been identified in previous studies, this study showed that one of the key determinants has so far been overlooked; namely, the remuneration of board members.

Given the serious question raised by the subprime of the 2008 global financial crisis over the rising practices of excessive rewarding of executives in the USA and European firms, the executive pay-performance nexus has emerged as a popular topic of debate in the contemporary corporate finance research. Conducted mostly on the Anglo-Saxon contexts, research outcomes have been inconclusive and dichotomous. Considering this backdrop, this study aims to investigate the endogenous relationship between executive compensation and risk taking in the context of the USA.

Using a large sample of non-financial firms from 2010 to 2020 based on panel data and two-stage least square regression. In this study, the riskier corporate decision is measured as book leverage and ratio of R&D expense to total assets. Chief executive officers’ (CEO) experience and age are used as instrumental variables, and these are expected to influence compensation incentives and, hence, affect firm riskiness indirectly. Firm size, return on assets and CEO turnover are reported to affect compensation and corporate decisions, therefore, included as control variables. Given that higher executive compensation is related to riskier corporate decision in firms, this study incorporates total wealth (i.e. accumulated equity related compensation) as an additional proxy of compensation, and this selection is justifiable by the perfect contracting notion of the agency theory.

The results of this study show a significant positive and increasing nexus among compensation and riskier corporate decisions. Besides, the compensation level proxied through the percentage of each form of compensation in total compensation is very important as greater equity and greater salary diminishes risk taking.

The outcomes of this study have useful implications for firm stakeholders and policymakers.

The level of pay measured by the percentage of each type of compensation in total compensation is of utmost importance as it can increase or decrease risk taking in corporate decisions.

This paper aims to further contribute to the growing stream of literature on the CEO's impact on corporate social responsibility (CSR). The authors shed light on the implications of attunement theory on which relatively less research has been done. Furthermore, this paper strives to reconcile contradictory findings of the effect of CEO tenure on CSR and use the immediate changes of CSR enacted by the new CEO upon firm value.

The empirical strategy of the paper is centered around CEO transition. Applying first difference model, the authors identify a tenure-varying pattern of CEO influence on CSR. Moreover, the authors base the analyses of CSR value relevance on the sudden change of CSR during CEO transition, and use a within-industry matching approach as the inferential strategy. Manual data collection is conducted extensively for robustness checks.

The authors find that CSR activities change drastically at the beginning of the new CEO's ascendancy. One exception to this general pattern of CSR policy change is when the new CEO is brought from outside the organization, a result supporting the attunement theory. The authors find that firm value increases (decreases) when the new CEO increases (decreases) the CSR investment above (below) the industry norm.

This paper is among the first ones in the extant literature that directly examines the analytical implications of attunement theory concerning the CEO's impact on the firm's CSR policies. Furthermore, the positive association between CSR and firm value corroborates the arguments of instrumental stakeholder theory.

Remuneration policies may differ from country to country, and their effect on bank stability could be due to the legal framework. Therefore, this study aims to investigate how the legal system impacts the relationship between CEO compensation and bank stability across countries.

To test the study hypotheses, the authors use panel data of 74 banks operating in ten OECD countries during the period 2009–2016 and apply the generalized moments method regression model to better remediate the endogeneity problem.

The findings confirm that a country’s banking regulations significantly affect its bank stability. Common law countries have less bank stability than civil law countries. This result can be interpreted by the fact that, in common-law countries, banks’ CEO are strongly protected by the law, so they allocate a large part of bank assets to risky loans to improve their variable remuneration.

The research can help policymakers understand bank stability in one country. Any legal reform would require prior knowledge of how risk-taking may arise in executive compensation.

The contribution is to explain the controversial effect of executive compensation on bank stability in the framework of legal theory. The authors argue that regulators should monitor compensation structures and that the country’s legal origin of law shapes the CEO compensation structure and is a determinant of bank stability. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there are no studies exploring this field. So, this study tries to shed more light on the dark side of CEOs’ behavior when undertaking risky projects to maximize their remuneration.

Nwaeze and Kalelkar (2023) examine the association between the functional background of the compensation committee chair (CC chair) and CEO compensation using S&P 500 firms from 2008 to 2018. They find that the CC chair's functional background is positively associated with the adoption of performance measures that are more aligned with such background. This discussion starts with Nwaeze and Kalelkar's (2023) incremental contribution, and offers suggestions on two areas for improvement. First, the authors could provide a more focused discussion of the conceptual framework. Second, the authors could improve their empirical design and interpretation of results. Avenues for future research are also suggested.

This discussion suggests methods and model specifications that may strengthen the research design, facilitate the interpretation of results, and provide additional insights.

The discussed paper could improve the reliability and rigor of the empirical tests and the conclusions by providing more contextual and granular information on firms' actual CEO compensation arrangements, using more careful testing procedures, and enhancing clarity in the writing.

Researchers could be interested in alternative perspectives and richer analyses of non-agency model based determinants of CEO compensation.

This study investigates the empirical association between environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) performance and top executive compensation in the US financial services industry. Considering that financial firms can inflict systemic shocks across the economy, it has been argued that they must conduct ethical and sustainable business in accordance with ESG principles. This study examines whether ESG efforts are beneficial to managers.

The authors use CEO compensation and ESG performance ratings data for all US financial firms (SIC 6000–6799) from 2015 to 2019. Employing fixed effects regressions, the authors test whether lagged ESG performance is related to CEO compensation, after controlling for other firm characteristics such as size, financial performance, leverage and CEO stock ownership.

The authors find that lagged ESG ratings are strongly associated with all forms of compensation. An increase of one standard deviation in the composite ESG rating is associated with a 14%–16% increase in the total pay. Among the three ESG pillars, only S (social) and G (governance) exhibit persistent and significant associations with both short- and long-term executive pay. The authors also document the significant moderating effects of ESG on the relationships among firm performance, size, leverage, ownership and executive pay, identifying how ESG is associated with compensation.

The authors conclude that managers receive ESG incentives implicitly and explicitly. The novel finding of direct and indirect associations between ESG and top executive compensation contributes to the growing ESG literature on the financial sector and ongoing debate about the explicit inclusion of ESG targets in compensation design.

In the context of sustainable development goal 5 of the United Nations 2030 Agenda: “Achieve gender equality and women’s empowerment”, where gender equality is not only a matter of justice but also essential to achieve sustainable development, this paper aims to examine the gender pay gap in executive director compensation and the influence of female board representation and participation in nomination and remuneration committee (NRC) on this gap in Spanish listed firms over the period 2012–2022.

The analysis is conducted using a data set created by the authors, which includes executive director compensation data for 164 unique firms. This data set comprises 128 distinct observations for a given firm and year for women, and 2,333 observations for men. The authors estimate ordinary least squares models, clustering standard errors by executive. The authors use Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to decompose gender differences in compensation into differences in the characteristics of men and women and differences in the return on the same characteristics.

The authors find evidence of pay penalty for female executive directors compared to male counterparts. After controlling for firm, board and executive characteristics, the authors find that women earn 27% less than comparable men. The penalty is lower in companies with a higher share of women on the compensation committee, suggesting that women’s participation plays a role in setting a more equal remuneration policy. The gender gap in executive compensation narrows over time due to a substantial reduction of the differences between men and women in both characteristics and the return on these characteristics.

This study is one of the few analysing the gender gap in executive director compensation and its evolution in Spain. It specifically explores how gender diversity on both the board and the NRC impacts this gap. The analysis is focused on the most recent period characterized by important efforts to promote gender diversity.

The authors analyze the association between the functional background of the compensation committee chair and CEO compensation. The analysis is motivated by the continuing debate about the reasonableness of executive pay patterns and the growing emphasis on the role of compensation committees.

The authors define three expert categories—accounting, finance, and generalist—and collect data on the compensation committee (CC) chairs of the S&P 500 firms from 2008 to 2018. The authors run an ordinary least square model and regress CEO total and cash compensation on the three expert categories.

The authors find that firms in which the CC chair has expertise in accounting, finance, and general business favor performance measures that are more aligned with accounting, finance, and general business, respectively. There is little evidence that CC chairs who are CEOs of other firms endorse more generous pay for the host CEO; the authors find some evidence that CC chairs tenure relative to the host CEO's is negatively associated with the level of the CEO's pay.

This study suggests that firms and regulators should consider the background of the compensation committee chair to understand the variations in top executive.

Companies desiring to link executive compensation to particular areas of strategy must also consider matching the functional background of the compensation committee chair with the target strategy areas. From regulatory standpoint, requiring compensation committees to operate independent of inside directors can reduce attempts by inside directors to skim the process, but a failure to also consider the impact of compensation committees' discretion over the pay-setting process can distort the executives' pay-performance relation.

This is the first study to examine the effects of the functional background of the compensation committee chair on CEO compensation.

The present study investigates the impact of accounting comparability on chief executive officer (CEO) incentive plans and the moderating role of board independence for companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).

The information about 177 companies in 2014–2021 was examined. In this study, equity-based compensation and cash-based compensation were used as the CEO incentive plans. The equity-based compensation was calculated through the ownership of the CEO shares.

The results suggest that the higher accounting comparability increases not only CEO equity-based compensation, but also cash-based compensation. Board independence also strengthens the relationship between accounting comparability and CEO compensation. Hypothesis testing based on robustness checks confirmed these results.

The paper is pioneering, to the authors' knowledge, in identifying how board independence moderates the impact of accounting comparability on CEO compensation. The findings provide insights into economic consequences to the firm related to accounting comparability and board monitoring. The results have important practical implications for international investors to evaluate accounting comparability, corporate governance mechanisms and CEO incentives.

The purpose of this study is threefold: to examine the impact of a remuneration committee (RC) on the level of chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration; whether firms with a RC, pay a premium to CEOs with different skill sets (general or specific); and whether a pay premium mitigates the potential for CEO turnover.

This study uses a sample of 5,305 firm-year observations on a data set drawn from companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange for the period 2007 to 2014. The authors use ordinary least squares as well as logit regression techniques to test the formulated hypotheses. Difference in difference and propensity score matching techniques were undertaken to address the endogeneity concerns.

The findings show that firms with a RC pay a higher total remuneration to CEOs compared to firms without a RC. Furthermore, firms with a RC, value and reward CEOs with general skills by paying a premium not offered to CEOs with industry-specific skills. Paying a premium, in turn, mitigates CEO turnover by strengthening the CEO’s commitment to the organisation.

The study helps us to understand the critical role played by the RC in the remuneration of CEOs. The findings show that RCs act as an effective governance mechanism to deal with issues of executive remuneration and to retain skilled CEOs. Additionally, CEOs who acquire and develop general managerial skills will be able to extract higher pay from improved bargaining power. The findings will be of relevance to shareholders, regulators and company management who have an interest in executive pay and performance.