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In this study, we investigate whether higher institutional ownership is related to better internal controls and whether better internal control is associated with a higher quality of transparency.

Family businesses dominate the economic landscape and contribute to the market for corporate control across the globe, either as acquiring companies or as target. However, there is still limited research investigating acquisitions by or of family firms. The authors begin to remedy this gap by providing a narrative review of extant research. Findings indicate that acquisitions in family firms are primarily regarded as a tool to solve succession problems, and not as a strategic tool to achieve growth. A greater dialog between acquisition and family business scholars can be an important means to improve theory and practice of acquisitions involving family businesses across the globe.

This paper investigated the effect of employee share ownership, mediated through psychological ownership, on organizational citizenship behavior. The analysis included the possible complementary role of High Performance Ownership systems. This paper investigated these relationships by analyzing employee survey data from a Dutch organization that has implemented employee share ownership. We used PLS, a variance-based structural equation model to test the hypotheses. The results showed a direct influence of employee ownership on organizational citizenship behavior, but the relationship was not mediated by psychological ownership. Unexpectedly, the results show that a High Performance Work System bundle without employee ownership generates psychological ownership, but this does not influence organizational citizenship behavior. This research could not confirm the comprehensive model in which employee ownership, HRM system, and psychological ownership are positively related to each other. We choose a deliberate set of HR practices on theoretical grounds, but future research could investigate other sets of HR practices that may produce the expected effects. This research showed that employee ownership has a positive influence on organizational citizenship behavior. Organizations are therefore advised to consider implementing employee ownership. The results also show that a set of HR practices positively influences psychological ownership. The results suggest that organizations should strive for a consistent message, which makes the employees feel that they are taken serious as and deserve to be owners. We analyzed the influence of a configuration of high performance ownership system on psychological ownership and organizational citizenship behavior that is not done before.

We take a state-stewardship view on corporate governance and executive compensation in economies with strong political involvement, where state-appointed managers act as responsible “stewards” rather than “agents” of the state.

We test this view on China and find that Chinese managers are remunerated not for maximizing equity value but for increasing the value of state-owned assets.

Managerial compensation depends on political connections and prestige, and on the firms’ contribution to political goals. These effects were attenuated since the market-oriented governance reform.

Economic reform without reforming the human resources policies at the executive level enables the autocratic state to exert political power on corporate decision making, so as to ensure that firms’ business activities fulfill the state’s political objectives.

As a powerful social elite, the state-steward managers in China have the same interests as the state (the government), namely extracting rents that should adhere to the nation (which stands for the society at large or the collective private citizens).

As China has been a communist country with a single ruling party for decades, the ideas of socialism still have a strong impact on how companies are run. The legitimacy of the elite’s privileged rights over private sectors is central to our question.

Chinese executive compensation stimulates not only the maximization of shareholder value but also the preservation of the state’s interests.

We examine the empirical relationship between direct equity agency costs measures and corporate governance control mechanisms to control equity agency costs. We measure the three direct agency cost proxies commonly used in the literature: the operating expense; asset turnover; and selling, general, and administrative (SGA) ratios. Internal corporate governance control mechanisms examined are inside ownership (IO), outside ownership concentration (OC), the size of the board of directors (BODs), and the composition of the BODs (proportion of nonexecutive (NE) directors and separation of chief executive officer (CEO) and board chair). The external corporate governance control mechanism examined is the size of bank debt (short-term debt). Univariate and multivariate tests reveal that the only statistically significant relationship between corporate governance control mechanisms and direct equity agency cost measures is the negative relationship between the proportion of IO and direct agency costs. The asset utilization ratio (asset turnover) ratio is the best proxy for direct equity agency costs and can be useful for event studies of announcement period excess returns.

The purpose of this study is to provide an integrated framework that conceptualizes multifaceted antecedents pertaining to international expansion of emerging market businesses in relation to firm performance. This paper develops multiple-item measures of multiple dimensions to clarify ownership structure and three diversification strategy relationships to performance. We test how ownership structure and diversification strategy affect emerging market multinational enterprises’ financial performance. The result shows that the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance is a nonlinear relationship (S shape). We also found that excessive international diversification, product diversification, and geographic scope of the expansion process negatively moderate the impact of Asia Pacific multinational enterprises’ performance.

This research seeks to understand how shareholder constituencies including controlling family, nonfamily insiders, as well as domestic and foreign institutions in the corporate governance system of emerging economy firms perceive institutional risks in terms of regulative, normative, and cognitive institutions and influence strategic choices in the internationalization of their invested firms.

The sample data are Taiwanese publicly listed companies in the electronics and computer industry. Panel data of the parent firms and their overseas affiliates are available from the annual report and Taiwan Economic Journal database. Country-level data are available from the World Investment Report and the IMD World Competitiveness Report. Statistical regression models including tobit and logistic regression are used to analyze the data.

Controlling family and nonfamily insider shareholders tend to influence their invested firms to enter in institutionally smaller host countries through a shared ownership. Domestic institutional shareholders tend to influence their invested firms to adopt a shared ownership and enter in host countries with larger and smaller institutional distances in terms of regulative and normative institution, respectively. Foreign institutional shareholders tend to influence their invested firms to enter in institutionally smaller host countries through a whole ownership.

The strategic choices of foreign market entry made by emerging economy firms are significantly shaped by the different risk perceptions of shareholder constituencies in their corporate governance system toward the institutional distances between the home and the host country.

Despite the increasing use of the agency perspective in studies of headquarters-subsidiaries relations in the multinational corporation (MNC), opponents fundamentally question its utility. In an attempt to contribute to this debate, we evaluate prior studies and develop considerations for future research. Our review of extant studies of headquarters-subsidiaries relations that make (explicit) use of the agency perspective reveals two significant shortcomings. First, we identify a need to validate the underlying assumptions when using the agency perspective in studies of headquarters-subsidiaries relations. Second, we detect a need to better account for the complex nature of headquarters-subsidiary relations in the MNC. A focus on these two areas can improve the use of the agency perspective and, ultimately, help resolve the contentious debate over the utility of the agency perspective.

Corporate governance is regarded as a major issue during the post-financial crisis period in Asia. These countries have implemented corporate governance reforms to enhance the protection of shareholders and stakeholders interests. Such reforms have affected the conduct of business of all corporations in the region as it allows for greater monitoring especially by the shareholders. Unlike earlier studies which focused on non-financial firms, this study analyzes the corporate governance of listed banking firms in nine Asian emerging markets. Corporate governance mechanisms that serve to monitor the banking firms can be classified into Ownership Monitoring Mechanism, Internal Control Monitoring Mechanism, Regulatory Monitoring Mechanism, and Disclosure Monitoring Mechanism. This paper suggests that there are differences in the monitoring mechanisms of banking firms and non-bank firms.

The literature of ethnic ownership economies descends from middleman minority theory, a subject it continues to include. However, ethnic economy literature now more broadly addresses the economic independence of immigrants and ethnic minorities in general, not just of middleman minorities (Light & Bonacich, 1991, pp. xii–xiii).¹ This expansion releases the subject from narrow concentration upon historical trading minorities, and opens discussion of the entire range of immigrant and ethnic minority strategies for economic self-help and self-defense. Partial or full economic independence represents a ubiquitous self-defense of immigrants and ethnic minorities who confront exclusion or disadvantage in labor markets. Ethnic economies permit immigrants and ethnic minorities to reduce disadvantage and exclusion, negotiating the terms of their participation in the general labor market from a position of greater strength. Unable to find work in the general labor market, or unwilling to accept the work that the general labor market offers, or just reluctant to mix with foreigners, immigrants and ethnic minorities have the option of employment or self-employment in the ethnic economy of their group. Although ethnic and immigrant groups differ in how well and how much they avail themselves of this defense (Collins, 2003; Light & Gold, 2000, p. 34; Logan & Alba, 1999, p. 179), none lacks an ethnic economy.²